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Regulatory Takings
Mr. Justice Holmes's opinion, for the Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon, [is] both the most important and most mysterious
writing in takings law.'
Nine cases and four findings of constitutional infirmity over the last
decade would not amount to a trend in, say, First Amendment jurisprudence.
But it does in Takings Clause jurisprudence. Before 1986, the Supreme Court's
two-hundred-year history arguably reveals no more than four occasions on
which the Court found laws to be regulatory takings, triggering the obligation
to pay just compensation under the Federal Constitution's Takings Clause2
although they involved no physical appropriation or destruction of property.
3
Yet the Rehnquist Court has found four regulatory takings in its first ten
years.4 The Court also heard three other regulatory taking cases,5 and has
agreed to hear two more.6
Genealogists of this regulatory takings jurisprudence have found their
Adam in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' a 1922 Supreme Court decision
with a majority opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. The Mahon Court
concluded that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting mining of coal so as to cause
surface subsidence was unconstitutional.' "The general rule at least," Holmes
wrote, "is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."9 The Holmes
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist concludes, was "the foundation of our
1. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TE CONsTrIION 156 (1977)
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use. without just
compensation.").
3. The number here depends upon several definitional issues regarding the term "'regulatory takings"
Six cases are widely recognized candidates: Loretto %: Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U S 419
(1982); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v Beckwith,. 449 U.S. 155 (1980). Kaiser Aetna % Unted States. 444
U.S. 164 (1979); Armstrong vt United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Louisville Joint Stock Bank v Radford.
295 U.S. 555 (1935); and the subject of this Arucle. Pennsvlvaia Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U S 393
(1922). However, if takings turning on physical invasions ate not regulatory takings. then Loretto and
Kaiser Aetna drop out. If "regulatory taking" implies invocation of the Fifth Amendment either directly or
by incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, then, as I argue below. Mahon drops out. See inf'ra text
accompanying notes 249-63. If, on the other hand, "regulatory takings" cases include Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause cases that strike down regulatory measures because they are
unaccompanied by just compensation, then many other cases from the first quarter of this century should
be added to the list. See infra text accompanying notes 268-83.
4. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994): Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505
U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Hodcl v Irving. 481 U S
704 (1987).
5. See Concrete Pipe & Prod. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust. 508 U.S. 602 (1993). Yee v
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U S. 470
(1987).
6. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996). cert. granted. 65
U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-243); Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194 (9th Cir. 1995). cet.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1874 (June 3. 1996) (No. 95-1595).
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
8. See id. at 414.
9. Id. at 415.
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'regulatory takings' jurisprudence."'" Holmes, echoes Justice Scalia, invented
the idea of the regulatory taking because he recognized that "if the protection
against physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully
enforced, the government's power to redefine the range of interests included
in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional
limits."" A bevy of scholars has come to the same conclusion.
12
The Holmes opinion in Mahon is lauded, not just as the common ancestor
of all regulatory takings decisions, but also as the progenitor of particular
features of current regulatory takings doctrine. The Supreme Court 13 and
Congress 4 have both embraced a tradition of looking to Mahon for a
diminution in value test; scholarly recognition has preceded and accompanied
10. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 508 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
11. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1014 (1992). Justice Stevens has also
pointed to Justice Holmes's opinion in Mahon as "chart[ing] a significant new course" and "kindl[ing]" the
"so-called 'regulatory takings' doctrine." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2327 (1994) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., DAVID L. CALLIES Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 245 (2d ed, 1994) ("In
[Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon], the regulatory taking doctrine was bom."); STEVEN J. EAGLE,
REGULATORY TAKINGS § 1-1, at 2 (1996) ("Mhe Supreme Court... never had found governmental
activities short of a physical invasion to constitute a taking. This changed abruptly with Justice Holmes's
famous declaration in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon."); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §
2.11, at 29 (3d ed. 1993) ("Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, a landmark decision, was the first Supreme
Court case to hold a land use regulation unconstitutional under the taking clause."); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings,
102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1086 (1993) ("[I]n Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon ... the Court for the first time struck
down a regulation as an uncompensated taking."); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) ("In 1922... the
Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon established a new takings regime.").
13. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Mahon as basis for per se rule that regulation will effect taking
when diminution in value is complete); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978) (citing Mahon as "the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers
important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a
'taking"'); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("[G]ovemmental action in the form of
regulation ca[n] be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation.");
United States v. Central Eureka Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("[We have recognized that action In the
form of regulation can so diminish the value of property as to constitute a taking."). The Court has also
adverted to a "diminution in value" interpretation of Mahon in presenting its rationale for its ripeness
doctrine in takings cases. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)
("A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation
goes.") (citing Mahon).
14. The regulatory takings bills introduced in Congress after the 1994 elections adopt a diminution In
value test for determining whether compensation is due. As one bill stated:
A private property owner that, as a consequence of a final qualified agency action of an agency
head, is deprived of 33 percent or more of the fair market value, or the economically viable use,
of the affected portion of the property as determined by a qualified appraisal expert, is entitled
to receive compensation in accordance with the standards set forth in section 204 of this Act.
S. 605, 104th Cong. § 508(a) (1995); see also H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) ("The Federal Government
shall compensate an owner of property whose use of that property has been limited by an agency action..
that diminishes the fair market value of that property by 33 1/3 percent or more ...."). Committee reports
and floor statements associated with these bills often acknowledge the pioneering role of Mahon. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 104-46, at 4 (1995) ("In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon the Supreme Court recognized
that regulation of property could be considered a taking if it 'goes too far."') (citation omitted); 141 CONe.
REC. S4503 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (citing Mahon as holding that regulation
will be taking if it "goes too far").
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that embrace.' 5 At other times, the Court has cited Mahon for a balancing
test, a view of the case also apparently endorsed by the two most recent
Supreme Court nominees.' 6 Academic acknowledgment of a balancing test
in Mahon runs a close second to acknowledgment of a diminution in value
test.'7
But if Mahon is celebrated for its originality and fecundity, it is also
blamed for the muddled state of regulatory takings doctrine. The decision in
Mahon, charges Justice Scalia, "offered little insight into when, and under what
circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going 'too far' for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment,"' 8 a point echoed by supporters of recent takings
legislation 9 and by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in their nomination
hearings. 20 Scholars have been even less charitable. Mahon, Carol Rose finds,
15. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Sitl a Muddle. 57 S
CAL. L. REv. 561, 562 n.9, 565-66 (1984); Rubenfeld. supra note 12, at 1086-87: Joseph L Sax. Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 41 & nn.33-35 (1964): Treanor. supra note 12. at 799
16. Justice Breyer discussed Mahon extensively at the hearings on his nomination. See Nomination
of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 110-1. 115. 208-09. 281 (1994) (testimony of
Judge Breyer) [hereinafter Breyer Nomination]. One passage from his testimony links Mahon most clearly
to a balancing test:
Mhe Constitution recognizes, and Holmes ... recognized ... that it is perfectly necessary for
the Government to say to a coal mine operator ... you must leave columns of coal in the mine
so it does not collapse. That is called regulation.
Balancing what is at the heart of the matter in the case of property and the need for
society to function through regulation is different in that area than in some other area. but that
is because different things are involved ....
Id. at 208. At her hearings, Justice Ginsburg also presented a balancing approach. refernng obliquely to
Mahon:
There is a clear recognition that at some point a regulation can become a taking. . . On the
one hand, the regulations are made for the benefit of the community; and on the other hand.
there is the expectation, the reliance interest of the private person. Those two considerauos will
have to be balanced in future cases.
Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 249 (1993) (testimony of Judge Ginsburg)
[hereinafter Ginsburg Nomination].
17. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL, THE TAKINa ISSUE 238 (1973) ("[L]and use regulations must
be tested by balancing the value of the regulation against the loss in value to each affected property owner.
This balancing test was established as the law by the famous case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.");
MANDELKER, supra note 12, at 29 ("Justice Holmes provided very little additional guidance on when a
regulation is a taking because it goes 'too far,' but some commentators believe he adopted a balancing test
to decide this question."); Frank I. Michelman, Propert; Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1190 n.53 (1967) (tentatively
suggesting that one of Holmes's references in Mahon to diminution in value might actually indicate
adherence to "some kind of a 'balancing' test"); Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings"
Revisited. The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HAS'TINGS LJ. 335, 339 (1988) ("Since the 1922 case
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it has been clear that the just compensation clause was designed to
promote balanced fairness and justice to property owners and the public.").
18. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
19. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 54503 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (-Just how
do courts determine when regulation amounts to a taking? Holmes's answer [in Mahon], 'if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking,' is nothing more than an ipse dixit.") (citation omitted).
20. See Ginsburg Nomination, supra note 16, at 249 (CTbere is a clear recognition that at some point
a regulation can become a taking. When that point is reached is something to be settled in the future....
This is a still evolving area and I can't say any more about it than what is reflected in the most recent
precedents ...."). Similarly, Judge Breyer noted:
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"seems to have generated most of the current confusion about takings.'
Bruce Ackerman's conclusion best sums up the conventional praise and
criticism of Justice Holmes's opinion in Mahon: It is "both the most important
and most mysterious writing in takings law."2
My goal in this Article is to unveil the mystery.23 The Mahon opinion,
I will argue, is best understood as a terse expression of Justice Holmes's
theory of the constitutional protection of property, and of his views about the
textual basis for that protection, both of which he had developed over decades.
Much of that theory and those views was unique to Holmes; other Supreme
Court Justices agreed with him at most in part. There was, however, broader
agreement on the Court about several features of the Mahon opinion. In the
modem campaign to force Mahon into the role of a seminal regulatory takings
case, most of its original meaning-to Holmes and to the other members of the
When does a reasonable regulation become a taking of property for which you must pay
compensation? You know what Justice Holmes said. You are going to be disappointed, but what
he said was this. He said, "[Y]ou don't have to compensate, when you regulate. But,
Government, you cannot go too far." What is too far? Indeed, ever since that time, the courts
have been trying to work out what is too far, and I don't think anyone has gotten a perfect
measure of that.
Breyer Nomination, supra note 16, at 111.
21. Rose, supra note 15, at 562; see also James E. Krier, Takings from Freund to Fischel, 84 GEO.
L.J. 1895, 1895 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS (1995)) ("Mhe regulatory takings problem has become the jurisprude's version of Fermat's last
theorem, with Justice Holmes playing provocateur.").
22. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 156.
23. My work is, of course, preceded and supported by that of others. Although I will have occasion
as the Article proceeds to cite much of the previous scholarly inquiry into Mahon, an overview of the work
focused specifically on Mahon, or providing particularly novel perspectives on the case, seems appropriate.
Carol Rose discusses Mahon in her article, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
supra note 15. The avowed purpose of her discussion, however, is not to reconstruct a single Holmesian
theory of constitutional property, but to examine "various standard approaches to takings" that all might
be seen to be exemplified in Mahon, as a prelude to her conclusion that takings law remains confused
because of a "fundamental tension in the American property tradition." Id. at 563. Lawrence Friedman
analyzes Mahon as the response of the Court, upholding the sanctity of contract and creditors' rights, to
a certain kind of legislative populism, and criticizes Holmes for fragmenting "the ruin of an entire
community" into a "series of petty losses." Lawrence M. Friedman, A Search for Seizure: Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon in Context, 4 LAw & HIST. REV. 1, 22 (1986). William Fischel argues that the outcome in
Mahon had little impact on the behavior of the coal mine owners, who decided voluntarily to repair or
compensate damage caused by subsidence and to take steps to minimize subsidence because of the mutual
economic dependence of mine owners and surface dwellers in the community. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 13-47 (1995). Fischel's investigation supports
Robert Ellickson's contention that social norms often make legal rules irrelevant. See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SET'LE DIsPuTEs (1991). Fischel's discovery that
mine owners repaired or compensated for damage also throws a bit of cold water on Friedman's argument
that Mahon ignored a tragedy occurring in coal country. Joseph DiMento has published an excellent piece
of historical research on the drafting of the Mahon opinions, making full use of the Holmes and Brandeis
Papers collections at the Harvard Law School, as well as published sources. See Joseph F. DiMento, Mining
the Archives of Pennsylvania Coal: Heaps of Constitutional Mischief, II J. LEGAL HIsT. 396 (1990). Bruce
Ackerman discusses Mahon as a product of "Ordinary Observing" rather than "Scientific Policymaking"
in his attempt to make sense of the confusion in takings law by developing accounts of those two
paradigms. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 156-67. Finally, E.F. Roberts provides a somewhat rambling
meditation on Mahon, the conclusion of which is that Holmes would likely have supported forcing
governments to pay damages for temporary takings. See E.F. Roberts, Mining with Mr Justice Holmes, 39
VAND. L. REv. 287 (1986).
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Mahon Court-has been obscured. The opinion has come simultaneously to
mean more, and less, than it did as written and handed down.
I unveil Mahon in two Parts, addressing four tasks. First and most
importantly, Part I constructs an account of Justice Holmes's constitutional
property jurisprudence, using the relevant portions of his enormous judicial
output and his substantial nonjudicial work, and shows how Mahon fits into
that jurisprudence. The remaining three tasks are my goals in Part II, which
tracks the shifting meanings of Mahon. First, I distinguish those portions of
Mahon that were idiosyncratically Holmesian from those shared by enough of
the other Justices to become part of the contemporary constitutional property
jurisprudence. Next, I demonstrate how the latter-day use of Mahon has
obscured its original meanings and has rendered inexplicable much of the
analysis and language in Justice Holmes's opinion. Lastly, I suggest a number
of issues to be considered before deciding whether and how the rediscovered
Mahon should affect the further development of the regulatory takings
doctrine.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE HOLMES OPINION IN MAHON
All that can be expected from modern improvements is that legislation
should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in
accordance with the will of the de facto supreme power in the
community .... 4
The jurisprudence of Mahon requires extended discussion, but a succinct
summary of its facts will suffice. The law at issue in Mahon was the Kohler
Act,2 a 1921 Pennsylvania statute that prohibited underground mining of
anthracite coal that caused the surface above to collapse. The prohibition
applied only to surfaces that were not owned by the miner and that supported
specified uses including streets, hospitals, schools, factories, and houses.2'
When the Pennsylvania Coal Company notified Mr. and Mrs. Mahon of its
intention to mine underneath their house, the Mahons sued under the Kohler
Act to enjoin the company from mining in such a way as to cause their house
to sink.27 The company's defense was that the Act was unconstitutional. The
company noted that when it had originally sold the surface rights to the
Mahons' lot, it had not only retained the mineral rights, but had also
specifically obtained a waiver of all claims against the company due to
24. 1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.. Summary of Events: Grear Brttam. in TiE COLLECTED WORKS
OF JUSTICE HOLMES 323, 325 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (emphasis added) (hereinaftcr COLLECTED
WORKS]. Holmes makes this observation in a short article about a gas-stokers" stoke in London. written
during his tenure as editor of the American Law Review.
25. Act of May 27, 1921 (Kohler Act), 1921 Pa. Laws 445.
26. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. 412-13 (1922).
27. See id. at 412-13.
1996]
The Yale Law Journal
subsidence to the surface. By effectively nullifying the waiver, argued the
company, the Kohler Act deprived it of property without due process of law,
took its property without just compensation, and impaired the obligation of a
contract.28 The company won in the Pennsylvania trial court, but lost on the
Mahons' appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and persuaded the United
States Supreme Court to hear the case on writ of error. Of the eight Supreme
Court Justices who heard the case,29 seven agreed with the company that the
Act was unconstitutional; Justice Louis D. Brandeis was the sole dissenter.
30
Chief Justice William Howard Taft assigned the opinion of the Court to Justice
Holmes. Holmes had rejected broad protection for property and contract rights
in a number of prominent cases,3 1 and Taft may have wanted to reward
Holmes for his vote and to make sure that Holmes remained on board.
Holmes produced a short opinion of about 1500 words, covering less than
five pages in the United States Reports.32 Yet within those limits, Holmes
outlines and demonstrates a distinctive, coherent approach to the constitutional
protection of property. That approach is best discussed in three stages. First,
Holmes defines the "property" protected by the Constitution and suggests
criteria for a successful theory of constitutional property protection. In doing
so, Holmes establishes his position in relation to both of the main American
traditions of constitutional property jurisprudence: the vested rights tradition
and the substantive rights/police power tradition. Second, Holmes attempts to
develop and apply a theory for deciding constitutional property cases that
remains true to his definition of constitutionally protected property. Under that
theory, judges must determine how drastically a challenged law has departed
from basic principles, or as Holmes once referred to them, "structural habits,"
embedded in preexisting positive law. The body of Holmes's opinion is best
read as an application of that theory to the issue of whether the Kohler Act is
28. See Brief for the Plaintiffs in Error, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 394-404
(1922) (No. 549).
29. Justice William Rufus Day resigned on November 13, 1922, the day before Mahon was argued,
and Justice Pierce Butler, Justice Day's replacement, was not sworn in until January 2, 1923, 22 days after
Mahon was decided. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 986
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
30. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31. Most importantly for Taft, Holmes had dissented the previous Term from the first majority opinion
Taft had written upon joining the Court as Chief Justice. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (invalidating Arizona statute legalizing picketing by striking employees as
deprivation of employer's property without due process). Holmes had also written the majority opinion In
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153 (1921), upholding a wartime rent control scheme, and dissented In the
famous due process cases of Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 190 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting); and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
32. Holmes's brevity in opinion writing, conventionally linked to his relative lack of concern about
the facts in a particular case, and his lack of patience in performing the analyses that he thought were
necessary in theory, has been regularly noted by commentators. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 251-54 (1990); Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV.
213, 247-48 (1964). The laconic character of the Mahon opinion, which has frustrated a generation of
takings scholars, is typical of the Holmesian style.
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constitutional as applied both to private homes and to publicly owned property.
Third, Holmes suggests the limits of his own theory-limits at which he only
hints in Mahon, but more fully develops in other opinions and writings. Legal
theories and doctrines, Holmes contends, are irreducibly historical and
collective: They are developed over time and by more than one judge. Holmes
demonstrably did not view Mahon as the application of a settled,
comprehensive calculus of constitutional property, but as one more step in
developing a series of guiding precedents. In this Part of the Article, I discuss
each of these three facets of Holmes's approach in turn.
A. A Noncategorical Historical Framework for Constitutional Property
Rights: Framing the Question Presented
After a page of facts and procedural history, Justice Holmes turns to
framing the question presented by Mahon. In two sentences, Holmes states, in
a highly compressed form, the two basic elements of his approach to
constitutional property rights: "As applied to this case the statute is admitted
to destroy previously existing rights of property and contract. The question is
whether the police power can be stretched so far."33 The first element of
Holmes's approach is that the rights of property and contract that the
Constitution protects are defined by historically contingent standing positive
law.34 This element is suggested by the first sentence, in which Holmes states
that the statute raises a constitutional question because it has "destroy[ed]
previously existing" rights. The issue of "deprivation" or "taking" of property,
or "impairment" of contract, is thus framed as an issue of legal change, a
framework Holmes reminds the reader of twice later in the opinion, when he
argues that government could not exist if it had to "pay[] for every ... change
in the general law,",35 but that in some cases, the "constitutional way" is to
"pay[] for the change. '36 A corollary of this positivist approach is that if
33. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
34. By "standing positive law" or "existing positive law" I mean the law actually enforced in a
particular jurisdiction at a particular time, including judge-made, administrative, statutory, and plebiscitary
law. Of course, it is a matter of jurisprudential dispute whether it is meaningful to speak in such terms. If.
for example, one thought that the application of coercive force by the state was not really governed by
rules, or that no valid theory could support a distinction between state and private coercion, the term
"standing positive law" would not be meaningful. As we will see, Holmes was aware of and participated
in such jurisprudential debates. I will argue that he thought it meaningful to speak of standing positive law.
See infra text accompanying notes 83-96. Until the late nineteenth century. one could have used the term
"municipal law" rather than "standing positive law." See I WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44
(defining municipal law as "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power of a state"): I JA.MtES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *447 (following Blackstone): THEODORE SEDGWICK. A
TREATISE ON THE RuLES WHICH GOvERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPICAION OF STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (New York, John S. Voorhies 1857) (following Blackstone and Kent). That use
of "municipal law," however, has survived only in the field of international law. See BRYA' A. GALER.
A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 577 (2d ed. 1995).
35. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
36. Id. at 416.
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positive law remains the same, no constitutional property or contract issue will
arise.37 For example, the enactment of a statute that codifies an ancient
common law rule will not raise a constitutional property issue. As Justice
Holmes explained in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.:38
[I]f, from what we may call time immemorial, it has been the
understanding that the burden exists, the land owner does not have the
right to that part of his land except as so qualified and the statute that
embodies that understanding does not need to invoke the police
power.
39
The second element in Holmes's approach is that there is no categorical
difference between the legal changes that the Constitution forbids (or for which
it requires compensation) and those changes that it allows without
compensation. The Constitution allows some destruction of the kind of
property rights it protects; it provides only partial protection, against those
legal changes that go "too far." The Constitution's tolerance of small
uncompensated takings can be, and has been, described as a separate
government power-the "police power"-but that does not mean that exercises
of the police power have some distinctive quality that justifies or explains the
tolerance. Holmes explicitly acknowledges the justificatory use of the term, and
criticizes it as "cover[ing] and ... apologiz[ing] for the general power of the
37. Although I believe this statement correctly describes Holmes's view, it is also likely to be
misleading. As I will discuss in the next Section, for Holmes the most important question of constitutional
property law was whether a particular rule of positive law was supported by principles and practices
reflected in the entire body of positive law. Ordinarily, this question would be raised when the particular
rule under examination was a recently adopted alteration of previously existing law. Conceivably, however,
over time the entire body of positive law might change so much that a particular rule of law, though itself
unchanged, would no longer be supported by accepted principles and practices. If that were the case, the
particular rule might be open to constitutional attack though it had never changed. Holmes made clear,
however, that he believed such cases would be rare. Upholding an ordinance prohibiting burial of the dead
within city and county limits, Holmes wrote:
Since, as before the making of constitutions, regulation of burial and prohibition of it in certain
spots, especially in crowded cities, have been familiar to the Western World.... The plaintiff
must wait until .there is a change of practice or at least an established consensus of civilized
opinion before it can expect this court to overthrow the rules that the lawmakers and the court
of his own State uphold.
Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 366 (1910). For further discussion of Holmes's
notion of "survivals," see infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
38. 260 U.S. 22 (1922) (upholding Pennsylvania statute that Court found to reflect longstanding
Pennsylvania common law rule granting adjoining property owners reciprocal easements to allow either
owner to build party wall).
39. Id. at 31. In Otis Co. v. Ludlow Manufacturing Co., 201 U.S. 140 (1906), Justice Holmes made
clear that he believed longstanding statutory law could also become an incident of ownership that needed
no police power justification. Responding to a due process challenge to a mill act, he commented:
mhe liability of streams to this kind of appropriation and use has become so familiar a
conception in New England, where water power plays as large a part as mines in Utah, that it
would not be very extravagant to say' that it enters as an incident into the nature of property in
streams as there understood.
Id. at 152.
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legislature to make a part of the community uncomfortable by a change."
As Holmes sums up in a dissent written six years after Mahon:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found
to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other. Property must not be taken without compensation, but with the
help of a phrase, (the police power) some property may be taken or
destroyed for public use without paying for it, if you do not take too
much.41
40. Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton. 273 U.S. 418. 446 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). It is significant that this frank statement appears in a dissent. Justice Holmes's
view that there was no qualitative distinction between exercises of the police power and takings was a
source of friction between him and other Justices on numerous occasions, including the drafting of Mahon
itself. Eleven years before Mahon, in the case of Noble State Batik i Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911). Holmes
issued an opinion for a unanimous Court containing a typical statement suggesting that there was no clear
line between "private use" and "public use." He soon issued a clarifying statement in the form of a rare
opinion on denial of petition for rehearing, explaining that '[t]he analysts of the police power" in his Noble
State Bank opinion, "whether correct or not. was intended to indicate an interpretation of what has taken
place in the past not to give a new or wider scope to the power" Noble State Bank. 219 US at 580
(denying petition for rehearing). One can only imagine that this extraordinary retreat--"whether correct or
not"-was motivated at the very least by Holmes's perception that other members of the Court did not
agree with him.
Holmes reported in a letter to Harold Laski that comments from other members of the Court led him
to delete a reference to "the petty larceny of the police power" in another opinion handed down some two
months before Mahon: "[M]y brethren, as usual and as I expected, corrected my taste when I spoke of
relying upon the petty larceny of the police power. dele 'the petty larceny of.' it is done-our effort is to
please." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 22. 1922). in I HOLMES.LASKI LETTERS
338, 338 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). Howe suggests that Holmes is refemng to Knzghts v Jackson.
260 U.S. 12 (1922). See I HOLIES-LASKI LETTERS, supra. at 338 n.3.
In a draft of Mahon itself, Holmes expressed the same sentiment in almost exactly the same terms.
The police power, said Holmes, is "little more than a conciliatory phrase to reconcile the doctine with
the seemingly absolute protecting provisions of the Constitution."' DiMento. supra note 23. at 406 (quoting
draft of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, possibly marked "De 1122"). Holmes deleted this phrase before
publication, apparently responding to objections from other Justices. Holmes reports the objections in a
letter to Frederick Pollock:
At our conference yesterday two cases of mine were hung up for further consideration, Brandeis
wanting to write against one-that I don't care about-and everybody seeming to have
misgivings about another on the police power which I believe to be a compact statement of the
real facts of the law and as such sure to rouse opposition for want of the customary soft
phrases. But as I couldn't get at what the trouble was. or rather troubles were, for different men
had different difficulties, I told them I would put my head under my wing and go to sleep until
somebody wrote something.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Nov. 26, 1922). in 2 HoL t.s-PoLLOCK LET'rERS
106, 106 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) (citations omitted). According to Howe. the first case Holmes
refers to is Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. it United States. 260 U.S. 327 (1922). and the second
is Mahon. See 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LET'TrERS, supra, at 106 nn.l-2.
41. Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands. 277 U.S. 189. 209-10 (1928) (Holmes. J..
dissenting). The Springer dissent may have been the last occasion on which Holmes expressed his views
on the police power. The first was over 50 years earlier, in an 1871 book review of Thomas , Cooley's
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations: "Another interesting topic on which we find an instructive chapter
is the police power. We suppose this phrase was invented to cover certain acts of the legislature %% hich are
seen to be unconstitutional, but which are believed to be necessary .... " HOLMES. Cooleyrs Treatise on
Constitutional Limitations, in I COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24. at 268. 269. Holmes expressed the
same views on a number of occasions before his appointment to the Supreme Court. See. e.g., Bent v.
Emery, 53 N.E. 910, 911 (Mass. 1899); United States Reports. Supreme Court. in 3 COLLEcTED WORKS.
supra note 24, at 35, 35.
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Holmes's two basic framing choices are expressed in two sentences. But
to understand fully the significance of the two choices, one must understand
the alternatives Holmes was rejecting, the legal traditions against which he was
reacting, and his reasons for those rejections and reactions. Thus, in the
remainder of this Section, I first describe historical and ahistorical models of
constitutional property rights both in their pure, abstract form and as they have
actually appeared in dominant American constitutional traditions: the historical
model in the vested rights tradition and the ahistorical model in the substantive
rights/police power tradition. I then explain how Holmes's approach, which
rejects the ahistoricism of the substantive rights/police power tradition and the
categorical approach of the vested rights tradition, fits in with his broader
views about law, morality, and human psychology.
1. The Alternatives Holmes Rejected
Two formal models of property rights have dominated American
constitutional law. Under a historical model, property is defined in terms of the
advantages-the rights, powers, and immunities-afforded owners under
existing positive law. The relevant question in a constitutional challenge to a
statute is whether-or how much-the statute alters those advantages or some
privileged subset of them. Under an ahistorical model, a "property right" is a
segment of an unchanging ideal boundary between a property owner and the
surrounding community, rather than a segment of the boundary that the
government actually enforced at an identified time in history. The relevant
question in a constitutional challenge is whether the challenged statute
sufficiently comports with the ideal boundary; the state of positive law
immediately before the passage of the statute is, in theory, irrelevant to the
constitutional issue.42
42. Of course, neither model is complete as a theory of constitutional property. For one thing, without
additional assumptions, neither does a good job of distinguishing between allowed and prohibited changes
in positive law. For the attempts of courts and scholars before Holmes to deal with change within a
historical model, see infra text accompanying notes 51-61; for typical solutions to the problem of change
within an ahistorical model, see infra text accompanying notes 71-74. Furthermore, both models are
compatible with a variety of views about the nature of law and of constitutional adjudication, methods of
constitutional decisionmaking, and the value of legislative activism. Thus, although an ahistorical model
is often linked to the natural law view that there is a moral order independent of human will, whence the
ideal boundary derives, see infra text accompanying notes 98-99, it is possible to imagine an ideal
boundary that is the product of human judgment and compromise. Second, both models are compatible with
either close attention to specific precedent or with relative disregard of it. For a discussion of the use of
precedent to inform an ahistorical model, see infra text accompanying notes 284-89. Third, both historical
and ahistorical models can be used either by those who favor expansive legislative powers, or by those who
favor tighter limits on the legislature. Justice Brandeis's dissent in Mahon is a classic example of the
deferential use of an ahistorical model. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing between statutes that "confer benefits upon property owners" and those that "protect the
public from detriment and danger"). The majority opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
striking down a law limiting the working hours of bakers, may be the best known use of an ahistorical
model to place significant limits on legislative power. See id. at 53 (noting that "property and liberty"
protected by Fourteenth Amendment "are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the
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When Justice Holmes joined the Supreme Court in 1902, he could look
back over the previous century of Supreme Court decisions and find strong
traditions of both historical and ahistorical approaches to protecting property
and contract. The leading historical approach was the vested rights tradition,
which dominated thinking on the limits of legislative power for the first three-
quarters of the nineteenth century. The most prominent ahistorical approach
was the substantive rights/police power tradition, which coexisted with the
doctrine of vested rights during the middle of the nineteenth century and came
to eclipse it by that century's end. Jurists working within each of these
traditions advanced not only a conceptual framework for understanding
constitutional property rights, but interpretations of specific constitutional texts.
The doctrine of vested rights, a general theory about the limits of
legislative power, turned centrally on the rights afforded individuals under
standing positive law.43 Under the vested rights doctrine, a legislature
exceeded the scope of its power when it enacted a law that took away rights
that had "vested" in individuals under preexisting positive law. Such a law was
described as "retroactive" because it was thought to be an attempt to reach into
the past to alter or ignore an event that had already occurred-namely, the
transmutation of some privilege that an individual had enjoyed under existing
positive law into an immunity from subsequent legislative interference. The
Court came to understand two constitutional provisions as protecting particular
categories of vested rights, and thus as embodying a historical approach to the
limitation of legislative power. In Calder v. Bull," the Court rejected the
argument that the Ex Post Facto Clause45 prohibited all laws impairing vested
rights, but it affirmed in dicta that the Clause prohibited abrogation of a
criminal's vested right to a punishment no greater than the law provided at the
time the crime was committed.6 More importantly, in Ogden v. Saunders,4 '
governing power of the State in the exercise of [its police] powers").
43. The classic progressive account of the vested nghts doctrine can be found in Edw,.ard S. Corwin.
The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REv. 247 (1914). Among more recent
accounts, I have found those of James Kainen to be particularly helpful. See James L Kancrn. The
Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 87 (1993) [hereinafter Kainen, Histoncal Framework]: James L Kainen, Nineteenth
Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive
Rights Against the State, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1982) [hereinafter Kamen. Nineteenth CenturY).
44. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (holding that Connecticut law setting aside probate court decree and
granting new trial did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause of Federal Constitution).
45. U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any ... cx post facto Law.").
46. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 390-91 (Chase. J.); id. at 396 (Paterson. J.); id. at 399-400 (lredell.
J.).
47. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). Ogden involved a challenge to an 1801 New York statute under
which insolvent debtors could obtain discharges of their debts. The statute applied only to debts contracted
after its passage. A creditor whose claim under an 1806 debt contract was destroyed by the discharge
statute argued that it impaired the obligation of his contract with the debtor, and thus violated the Contract
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The Ogden Court upheld the statute. Because the debt was incurred after
passage of the statute, the creditor was on notice that the debtor's obligation was from the outset qualified
by the insolvency statute.
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a bare majority of the Court adopted a vested rights model for the Contract
Clause,48 explicitly rejecting the position, advocated by Chief Justice Marshall
in dissent, that the Clause protected a substantive right to contract independent
of state law.
49
The Court explicitly acknowledged that the Ex Post Facto and Contract
Clauses implemented only selected parts of the vested rights doctrine's general
limitation on legislative power.50 The Court's refusal to enforce the whole of
the vested rights doctrine as federal constitutional law, however, was partially
offset by its broad interpretation of the Contract Clause. Under the Court's
landmark holding in Fletcher v. Peck,5' the "contracts" protected by the
Contract Clause included not only contracts between private parties, but also
contracts between a private party and the state. 2 Moreover, they included not
only executory contracts, but also executed grants. 3 Thus in Mahon, for
example, the deed under which the Mahons claimed title to their house, and
the deeds under which governments claimed title to streets and schools, were
all "contracts" within the meaning of the Contract Clause; the Pennsylvania
Coal Company quite naturally claimed, among other things, that the obligation
of those contracts was impaired by the Kohler Act.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall . . . pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.").
49. See Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 354-57 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
50. The doctrine of vested rights was understood to protect not just property rights or contract rights
in a narrow sense, but all rights "'to do certain actions or possess certain things,' which [a citizen] has
already begun to exercise, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists in the present laws of the land."
Merrill v. Sherburne, I N.H. 199, 214 (1819) (paraphrasing Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 394 (Chase, J.)).
Thus all legislation, civil and criminal, fell within its scope. The Supreme Court came to adopt the position
that, at least when it was acting under federal question jurisdiction, it was confined to the enforcement of
the Federal Constitution, which embodied only selected portions of the vested rights doctrine. See Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 539-40 (1837) (finding that law divesting vested
rights must "impair the obligation" of contract to be unconstitutional); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
88, 110 (1834) (refusing to declare act void merely because it "d[i]vests antecedent vested rights of
property"); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 413 (1829) (holding that statute which
"divest[ed] rights which were vested by law" would not violate Federal Constitution "provided its effect
be not to impair the obligation of a contract"); Kainen, Nineteenth Century, supra note 43, at 425-34
(discussing Supreme Court enforcement of vested rights doctrine).
51. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating Georgia legislature's attempt to annul titles to land that
had been transferred from state's original corrupt grantees to bona fide purchasers).
52. See id. at 137-38.
53. See id. at 136-37. As Stephen Siegel has noted, acceptance of a broad construction of the Contract
Clause in Fletcher v. Peck was undoubtedly tied to the absence of any other federal constitutional
protection of property against legislative incursion by the states. See Stephen Siegel, Understanding the
Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause
Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 n.134 (1986). The Court decided that the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause (and, in dicta that took root, the rest of the Bill of Rights) applied only to action by the
federal government. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The Contract Clause thus became
the symbolic bulwark of the protection of private property against the states, and the most frequently
invoked federal constitutional provision during the nineteenth century. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION at xiii (1938) ("During the nineteenth century no constitutional
clause was so frequently the basis of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States as that forbidding
the states to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts.").
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Although the broad interpretation of "contract" survived, by the last quarter
of the nineteenth century the vested rights model began to decline, due to its
failure to find an uncontroversial yet effective definition of vesting. In the case
of contracts for debt, the vesting event seemed obvious. The act of entering
into the contract seemed to transform the expectations of the parties into
something qualitatively different; formerly diffuse expectations crystallized.
Gradually, however, jurists ceased to believe that uncontroversial criteria could
classify laws as prospective or retrospective.-4 If one asked the only truly
uncontroversial form of the question, "Does this law create a new obligation
in respect to a transaction already past?," every statute turned out to be
retrospective, thus rendering the retrospective/prospective distinction useless.
As Bryant Smith, writing in the 1920s, put it, "[tihere is no such thing as a
law that does not extinguish rights, powers, privileges, or immunities acquired
under previously existing laws. That is what laws are for.""5 The
uncontroversial form of the vested rights doctrine turned out, quite unhelpfully,
to mandate complete legal stasis. Only by covertly or unconsciously making
additional assumptions or judgments could one salvage a category of
prospective laws.
The enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment coincided with the rise of a
new approach. The Amendment, which created a Due Process Clause
applicable to the states, raised the issue of whether the Federal Constitution
would now protect not just those vested rights falling within the scope of the
Ex Post Facto and Contract Clauses, but all vested rights. A number of state
courts-most prominently the New York Court of Appeals in 11'nehamer v.
People-56 --had interpreted the due process clauses in their state constitutions
to provide the general protection for vested rights that was lacking in the pre-
Reconstruction Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, declined
to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as embodying a
historical vested rights model. Rather, in Mugler it Kansas,57 the Court
interpreted the Due Process Clause as embodying an ahistorical approach to
constitutional property rights. Mugler, like Wynehamer, involved a challenge
to a state Prohibition statute that banned virtually all manufacture and sale of
54. James Kainen provides an illuminating account of this loss of faith. See Kainen. Nineteenth
Century, supra note 43, at 461-80.
55. Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights. 5 TEX. L REV 231. 233 (1927); see also
Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights 11, 6 TEX. L. REv. 409 (1928).
56. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). In Wynehamer, the New York Court of Appeals struck down a New York
Prohibition law as violative of a brewer's vested rights under preexisting law, protected under the Due
Process Clause of the New York Constitution. Edward Corwin and others have enshnned 115-nehamer as
the first substantive due process case. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN. LIBERTY AGANST GOVER.%tE!T
101-02 (1948) (describing Wynehamer as "compris[ing] a new starting point in the history of due process
of law"). As I explain in the text, however, the "substance" in lI'nehamer-the vested rights doctnne--was
quite different than the "'substance" that the Supreme Court found in the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. See Kainen, Historical Framework, supra note 43. at 125 (noting this difference).
57. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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intoxicating liquors.58 Mugler argued that the statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, both on a vested rights theory,59 and on the
theory that the statute violated liberty and property rights as defined by the
Constitution, independent of standing positive law.' The Court rejected
Mugler's challenge and upheld the statute, employing a purely ahistorical
analysis:
The principle, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, was embodied, in substance, in
the constitutions of nearly all, if not all, of the States at the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment; and it has never been
regarded as incompatible with the principle, equally vital, because
essential to the peace and safety of society, that all property in this
country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of
it shall not be injurious to the community.
6t
In other words, claimed the Mugler Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
implicitly defines the property rights it protects as excluding any right to injure
the community; that definition is quite independent of the rights recognized by
the positive law of any particular jurisdiction at any particular time. When
reviewing a statute under the Due Process Clause, the only issue is whether the
statute can reasonably be described as preventing injury to the community. If
so, then it is within the state's police power, which is the power to protect the
safety, health, and morals of the community.62  Because Mugler's
58. The Court had consolidated two cases for argument. Kansas had twice convicted Muglcr of
brewing and selling beer in contravention of the Prohibition statute, and was pursuing the other defendants,
Ziebold and Hagelin, under a provision empowering the state to close breweries and distilleries as public
nuisances. For expository ease, I will let Mugler speak for all three defendants.
59. See id. at 634 (summarizing Mugler's argument) ("The Kansas legislature has attempted to
destroy property rights already vested, and created under laws enacted by the same authority.").
60. See id. at 630-31.
61. Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
62. Contemporary treatise writers supporting such an approach included Thomas Cooley, Ernst Freund,
and Christopher Tiedeman. As Cooley observed:
The police of a State ... embraces its system of internal regulation, by which it is sought...
to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood which are calculated ... to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his
own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 572 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868);
see also ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 511, at
546-47 (1904) ("[I]t may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to
the public, and under the police power because it is harmful, or as Justice Bradley put it, because 'the
property itself is the cause of the public detriment."') (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107
(1877)); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1900) ("Mhe police power of the government, as understood in the
constitutional law of the United States, is simply the power of the government to establish provisions for
the enforcement of the common as well as civil-law maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas."). The
Latin expression means "use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." BRYAN
A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 807 (2d ed. 1995).
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constitutional property rights were subject to exercises of the police power, his
challenge to a statute within that power failed.63 The ahistorical character of
the approach adopted in Mugler is underlined by the Court's terse dismissal
of Mugler's vested rights argument:
It is true, that, when the defendants in these cases purchased or
erected their breweries, the laws of the State did not forbid the
manufacture of intoxicating liquors. But the State did not thereby give
any assurance, or come under an obligation, that its legislation upon
that subject would remain unchanged.
Under the Mugler Court's approach, a statute's alteration of rights under
previously existing law is irrelevant: No change in law violates constitutionally
protected property rights so long as it aims at protecting the public side of an
ideal boundary between owner and community.
Once the basic notion of an ideal boundary was in place, it became
necessary to explain why, if the ideal boundary was unchanging, many changes
in positive law were permissible. The Mugler Court alluded to the most
common attempt to resolve this paradox: "The supervision of the public health
and the public morals is . . . 'to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the
moment may require .... In other words, changes in factual
circumstances may cause certain conduct to produce new injurious
consequences, and cause other previously injurious conduct to become
benign.66 Other explanations of the paradox appealed to increases in
knowledge and changing enforcement costs. Even if conditions do not change,
over time we may gain new knowledge of the injurious effects of particular
actions, and that new knowledge may justify the legislature's prohibition of
63. The Mugler Court disposed of Mugler's Fourteenth Amendment liberty" claim by using the same
conceptual framework. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 660 ("[Wlhilc power does not exist with the whole people
to control rights that are purely and exclusively private, government may require 'each citizen to so conduct
himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another.' (quoting Munn v Illinois.
94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876))). The Court also rejected Mugler's claim that the manufacture of liquor for the
personal use of the maker cannot be injurious to others, and affirmed the preeminence of the legislature
in making such factual determinations. See id. at 660-62.
64. Id. at 669.
65. Id. (quoting Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814. 819 (1880)); see also Munn. 94 U S at 134
("[T]he great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt
it to the changes of time and circumstances.").
66. As Brandeis noted in dissent in Mahon:
The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. . Whenever the
use prohibited ceases to be noxious--as it may because of further change in local or social
conditions--the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy
his property as heretofore.
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Sutherland's opinion in Village of Euchd v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-97 (1926), the landmark case upholding local zoning, masterfully
develops this argument. Sutherland contends that zoning is reasonable "under the complex conditions of
our day" even though it would not have been in simpler times: "'[While the meaning of constitutional
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation." Id. at 387
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those actions.67 And if the state's limited resources justify the legislature's
passing a law that does not track the ideal boundary perfectly but is more
practical to enforce, then changing enforcement costs may result in legal
changes.8
Mugler was decided in 1887; Mahon reached the Supreme Court in 1922.
In the intervening thirty-five years, Mugler's ahistorical approach to the Due
Process Clause had become the dominant, established tradition. The "property"
and "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause were not reducible to rights
under standing positive law, and due process inquiry was not triggered by an
alteration of positive law rights. Rather, property and liberty were defined
independently of standing law, in terms of an ideal boundary between owner
and community that defined the limits of the police power. The Court echoed
and cited Mugler in the most famous of substantive due process cases, Lochner
v. New York: 69 "Both property and liberty," stated the Lochner Court, "are
held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing power
of the State in the exercise of [its police] powers. 70
Over the same period, the ahistorical model reshaped the Court's
previously settled Contract Clause inquiry. The Court's first step was to adopt
a rule of strict construction, reading narrowly contracts such as corporate
charters to avoid shackling the police power.7' Ultimately, in the 1880 case
of Stone v. Mississippi,72 it established what became known as the reserved
powers doctrine,73 under which no legitimate exercise of the police power
could ever violate the Contract Clause, on the theory that the state never had
the authority to contract away that power.74 Once there was a police power
67. The success of the "Brandeis brief" in cases such as Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), is
good evidence of the Court's acceptance of this form of argument. In Muller, the Court ostensibly upheld
maximum-hour legislation for women in large part because of "abundant testimony of the medical
fraternity" about the injurious effects of long hours on women's bodies, and through women on the children
they bore, and consequently on "the strength and vigor of the race." Id. at 421. Of course, in Muller, the
"new knowledge" was used to reinforce stereotypes rather than challenge them, which might lead one to
wonder whether the Court was really convinced by the "new discoveries" of medical experts. For further
discussion of Muller and the possible reasons underlying the Court's decision in that case, see LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-4, at 573, 573 n.20 (2d ed. 1988).
68. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388 (concluding that legislature may constitutionally forbid even
some innocuous uses in course of "inclu(ding] ... a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement").
69. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
70. Id. at 53 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
71. See, e.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (upholding ordinance prohibiting
transportation of animal offal through village of Hyde Park, Illinois, even though prohibition would cripple
corporation chartered by state to make fertilizer from offal).
72. 101 U.S. 814 (1880) (upholding Mississippi law banning state-chartered lottery).
73. See id. at 817-19. For the Supreme Court's use of the term "reserved-powers doctrine," see, e.g..
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977).
74. See Stone, 101 U.S. at 819 ("No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public
morals."). In Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905), the Court adopted the same approach to contracts
between two private parties, by upholding a state law that authorized one landowner to flood land owned
by another, in spite of a preexisting contract in which he had promised to refrain from doing so, Justice
Brown concluded that "parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws
intended for the public good." Id. at 480.
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escape hatch, the central issue in most Contract Clause cases became whether
the legislation challenged was sufficiently aimed at protecting the health,
safety, and welfare of the public, the same issue that was determinative in
most Due Process Clause cases.75 This fusing of the two inquiries, as we
shall see, was commonplace by the time Mahon was decided, and is reflected
in Justice Holmes's parallel references to the Due Process and Contract
Clauses.76
2. Holmes's Reasons for Embracing a Noncategorical Historical
Approach
Long before he became a Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
Holmes gave notice of his rejection of both the substantive rights/police power
and vested rights traditions. In Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 77 for example,
Holmes, writing as Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
criticized the United States Supreme Court's use of an ahistorical substantive
rights model to uphold a law repealing a statute of limitations for debts on
which the limitations period had already run.
Such a repeal requires the property of one person to be given to
another when there was no previous enforceable legal obligation to
give it. Whether the freedom of the defendant from liability is due to
a technicality or to his having had no dealings with the other party,
he is equally free, and it would seem logical to say that if the
Constitution protects him in one case it protects him in all.' s
The property recognized by the Constitution, Holmes insisted, is defined by
historically existing rules directing the exercise of state coercion, not by an
ideal boundary of "justice." When a debt action is barred under an existing
statute of limitations, a statute that revives the action imposes a new legal
burden on the debtor, and thus takes his property. Whether the original debt
was "just" or not, and whether it is "just" for a debtor to invoke the statute of
limitations, are not matters addressed by the constitutional provisions
protecting property.
75. The Court still interpreted the Contract Clause to protect particular contractual obligations once
made, rather than a tight to create contractual obligations. The significance of that limitation. however. was
greatly diminished by the discovery of substantive "liberty of contract- under the Due Process Clause. See.
e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating federal criminal law prohibiting discharge
of employees of interstate carrier for belonging to labor organization as violating liberty to contract).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating law restricting hours of labor as violating liberty
to contract); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (invalidating insurance regulation as violating
"the liberty to contract" under Due Process Clause).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 245-48.
77. 59 N.E. 1033 (Mass. 1901).
78. Id. at 1033.
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But if Holmes seemed to embrace the historical orientation of the vested
rights tradition, he denied that there was any categorical difference between
"vested rights," immune from legislative alteration, and "unvested rights,"
subject to legislative whim. For example, in Rideout v. Knox,79 an 1889
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision, Holmes considered the
constitutionality of a statute granting a cause of action against landowners who
erected or maintained fences, not to benefit themselves, but to cause grief to
their neighbors-so-called "spite fences. ' 0 When Holmes addressed the
application of the statute to already existing fences, he did not ask whether a
landowner's rights regarding such fences had "vested," thus rendering the
application "retroactive" in the vested rights sense. Rather, Holmes adopted a
noncategorical approach, asking whether such an application, under the
circumstances, placed too great a burden on the landowner. Holmes concluded
that the burden was not as great as it seemed, and that the statute was therefore
constitutional even as to its application to already existing fences."'
The identification of constitutionally protected property with rights under
standing positive law, and the rejection of a categorical distinction between
vested and unvested rights, led straight to Holmes's formulation of the question
presented in Mahon. The challenged statute raised a constitutional issue
because it "destroy[ed] previously existing rights of property and contract"; the
issue was "whether the police power [could] be stretched so far."82 Why
should we see the taking or deprivation of constitutionally protected property
as a matter of degrees of change in historically contingent assignments of legal
rights? Holmes's answer to this question starts with a conception of law as
jurisdictionally regularized coercion, and is further reinforced by moral
skepticism, a rejection of deductive ordering of law, and a particular
understanding of human psychology.
a. Law as Jurisdictionally Regularized Coercion
Holmes, influenced by positivists like Comte and Mill,8 3 viewed law as
a set of rules observed to govern the application of coercion. Under this theory
79. 19 N.E. 390 (Mass. 1889).
80. The law declared a private nuisance every fence exceeding six feet in height and "maliciously
erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owners or occupants of adjoining property." Id. at
391 n.*.
81. As Holmes interpreted the statute, an owner would not make himself liable for the cost of taking
down the fence merely by letting it stand. "If the owner of the fence gave leave to the party complaining
to take it down, it would show conclusively that the fence was no longer maintained by him for malevolent
motives, and therefore would defeat an action for subsequent annoyance." Id. at 393.
82. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
83. On the connection between positivist influences on Holmes and his interpretation of the Due
Process and Takings Clauses, see Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes's Early Constitutional Law Theory and Its
Application in Takings Cases on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 18 S. ILL. U. LJ. 357, 362-63,
383-84 (1994). I discuss Professor Kelley's interpretation of Holmes's constitutional property jurisprudence
below. See infra note 145.
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of law, legal concepts such as property and contract could be reduced to
groups of rules about the application of force that benefitted people identified
as owners or as contracting parties. If that was all property and contract were
as a legal and constitutional matter, then a change in rules that eliminated
some of those previously enjoyed benefits "took" property or "impaired the
obligation" of a contract. As Holmes put it in Mahon, such a change in rules
would "destroy previously existing rights of property and contract."'
More precisely, I think, Holmes implicitly accepted a definition of law as
coercion that was regularized-in other words, that was applied in a way that
could be described by rules-over a jurisdiction. First, law was for Holmes
fundamentally a matter of coercion, of violence and threats of violence by
human beings against other human beings."5 Holmes argued that a universal
classification of law "should be based on duties and not on rights, 's6 because
"[d]uties precede rights logically and chronologically."" One can only have
a right if a duty, a threat of sanction, is imposed on others. The effect of all
law is thus to limit freedom that people otherwise would have had: "[T]he
direct operation of the law is to limit freedom of action or choice on the part
of a greater or less number of persons in certain specified ways."" Holmes
specifically used this framework to analyze legal concepts such as possession,
property, and contract. All of them, according to Holmes, are reducible to a set
of legal duties. To have "property" in the legal sense is not to have the ability
to use it, but to have others placed under duties with regard to that use:
[T]he law does not enable me to use or abuse this book which lies
before me. That is a physical power which I have without aid of the
law. What the law does is simply to prevent other men to a greater or
less extent from interfering with my use or abuse."
84. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
85. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Sept. 7. 1916). in I HOLIES-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 40, at 14 ("[A]II law means I will kill you if necessary to make you conform to my
requirements."). As Holmes once wrote:
As long as law means force-(and when it means anything else I don't care who makes it and
will do as I damn choose--) force means an army and this army will belong to the ternitonal
club. Therefore the territorial club will have the last word-subject to the knowledge that if it
does too much there will be a war in which it may go under in its present form.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (Nov. 23. 1919). in LEONORA COHEN ROSEnFIELD.
PORTRAIT OF A PHILOSOPHER: MORRIS R. COHEN IN LIFE AND LETTE 324 (1962).
86. 1 HOLMES, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law. in COLLECTED WORKS. supra note 24. at 212,
214.
87. Id.
88. 3 HOLMES, Possession, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24. at 37. 47.
89. Id. According to Holmes, the law not only defines what property is; it also defines the
circumstances under which a property right (that is, the power to remove or enforce certain duties on
others) will be recognized in a particular person:
Every right is a consequence attached by the law to a group of facts which the law defines....
When we say that a man owns a thing, we affirm directly that he has the benefit of the
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Second, law was not just coercion, but regularized coercion. Holmes
explicitly acknowledged the regularity implicit in his concept of duty when he
formulated his prediction theory of law:
[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does
or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way
by judgment of the court;-and so of a legal right .... The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.90
Since predictions depend on observed regularities, to define duty-the most
basic legal concept-in terms of prediction is to make regularity fundamental
to law.
Finally, the regularity implicit in Holmes's understanding of property and
contract is regularity over a jurisdiction. Justice Holmes recognized that one
might make "prophecies of what the courts will do" on a judge-by-judge basis,
but in practice his predictive model did not focus on the behavior of individual
judges.9' Rather, it typically assumed that the predictions would be made for
an entire jurisdiction. Thus, wrote Holmes, his famous "bad man" wants to
know "what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact.
92
The predictions that a lawyer needs to learn can be found in "[tihe reports of
a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation," which "take up pretty much
the whole body of the law, and restate it from the present point of view.
' ' 3
Holmes's analysis of constitutional property and contract rights also assumes
that the rules which comprise "property" and "contract" apply across a
jurisdiction. The "previously existing rights of property and contract" 94 that,
when destroyed, raise a constitutional issue, were not the quirks of individual
judges, even if those quirks were highly predictable. Rather, they were
advantages that we would expect every judge in a jurisdiction to recognize.
Holmes never explained how to reconcile his predictive theory, which
seems as though it might atomize law into the behavior of individual public
90. Id. at 391, 393.
91. Holmes's recognition of the "inarticulate and unconscious judgment[s]" that underlie judicial
decisionmaking, see id. at 397, led legal realists such as Jerome Frank to claim him as a grandfather. See,
e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 124-25,253-60 (1930). Holmes's reaction to Law and
the Modem Mind, however, is telling:
Frank's book ... has ideas but ... seems to show some confusion about the emotional reaction
of judges as if it were all to be set against the rules. Whereas the greater part of such reactions
are in aid of them.... Frank's prejudice against the rules seems to forget how great a body of
conduct is determined by them and how many cases they keep out of Court.
Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 17, 1930), in HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR
CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 258-59 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds., 1996).
92. 3 HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 391, 393.
93. Id. at 392.
94. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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officials, with his practical treatment of law as uniform over a jurisdiction."
One might speculate, however, that he would ground a reconciliation in
empirical observation.96 In fact, he would assert, judges apply precedent and
statutes in a reasonably uniform manner, so that it is possible in a very large
number of circumstances to speak of jurisdictional regularities. Those are the
conditions-themselves historically contingent-under which it is possible to
speak meaningfully of property and contract rights under standing positive law,
and under which it is possible to determine whether a particular legislative
enactment changes standing positive law. So long as they obtain, it is possible
to organize a constitutional property and contract jurisprudence around the
notion of degrees of change from existing law.
95. Holmes's only expression of his reasoning is quite brief and incomplete. In an early essay.
published nine years before The Common Law, he wrote:
Any motive for [judges'] action, be it constitution, statute, custom, or precedent. ,huch can be
relied upon as likely in the generality of cases to prevail. is worthy of consideration as one of
the sources of law, in a treatise on jurisprudence. Singular motives, like the blandishments of
the emperor's wife, are not a ground of prediction, and are therefore not considered.
[Oliver W. Holmes], The Law Magazine and Review, 6 AM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1872) (revicwing essay by
Frederick Pollock on John Austin's definition of law). This explanation suffers from several omissions
First, the traditional sources of law and the urgings of an influential person about a single case hardly
exhaust the universe of potential motives for judicial conduct; they represent only the two poles. A lawyer
attempting to predict the behavior of judges committed to classical substantive due process might do well
to read "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," see Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45. 75 (1905) (Holmes.
J., dissenting), or the works of influential treatise writers such as Thomas Cooley. Chnstopher Tiedcman.
and John Dillon. Such texts could have at least as much predictive value as arguably obsolete precedent.
Second, we might be able to develop very reliable predictions for the conduct of an individual judge.
framed as a description of the judge's motives. These motives would not be "singular" in the srise that
they appeared in only a single case, but they would apply only to a single judge. Are they properly part
of jurisprudence, or not? Third, when Holmes makes an assertion about what is ",orthy of
consideration ... in a treatise on jurisprudence," is this an assertion about the practicalities of publication
(that the legal community would not accept a treatise that listed individual judges and made predictions
about them), or is it an assertion about the nature of law? See The Law Magazine and Revew. supra. at
724. By avoiding these questions, Holmes manages to reconcile his radical pronouncements of theory with
a much more conservative practice.
96. The treatment of law as regularized across a jurisdiction could also be grounded in a pragmatic
goal or theoretical commitment. One might decide that jurisdictional predictons were most helpful to
lawyers, who must often counsel clients without knowing which partcular judge will hear the client's case.
Thomas Grey has most convincingly argued that Holmes's prediction theory was part of a practical
jurisprudence, concerned with aiding lawyers in their professional practices. See Thomas C. Grey. Holmes
and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 826-29 (1989). Or one could decide, as a matter of legal
theory, that only coercion that was regularized across a jurisdicton could and should count as law. This
view, which assumes that law has at least a minimum moral content, is decidedly un-Holmesian. For such
a view, see LON L. FUILLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106 (rev. ed. 1969) (defining law as "the enterprise
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules"). For Fuller's criticisms of Holmes and the
concept of law as coercion, see id. at 106-18. Fuller also discusses Holmes and positivism in his earlier
lectures published as LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 92-95. 117-18 (1940). For another
criticism of Holmes as failing to recognize that the very idea of law depends on regularity. see Rogat. supra
note 32, at 225 ("[Holmes] never seems to have perceived, and certainly never acknowledged. the extent
to which general commitments to fairness, generality and neutrality are built into the idea of legality and
constitute part of its meaning.").
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b. Moral Skepticism
Justice Holmes's adoption of a historical approach to constitutional
property jurisprudence was also influenced by his moral skepticism. Ahistorical
approaches to constitutional property rely on the notion of an ideal boundary
between owner and others against which positive law can be measured. 97 The
ideal boundary might be a matter of human choice, but it is more usually
identified with a moral order that is independent of human will and posited
law. On this view, the Constitution should be read as declaratory of moral
rights and duties that exist independently of any text.98 Terms such as
"property" and "contract" are ultimately linked, not to a historically contingent
set of rules for applying state coercion, but to justice itself. Thus, during the
heyday of vested rights, departures from a historical approach were often
defended by appeals to justice. Consider, for example, Thomas M. Cooley's
defense of a "healing statute," or curative act, which would render enforceable
a deed that was invalid when made:
There is some apparent force ... in the objection that such a statute
deprives a party of vested rights. But the objection is more specious
than sound .... The right which the healing act takes away in such
case is the right in the party to avoid his contract,-a naked legal
right, which it is usually unjust to insist upon, and which no
constitutional provision was ever designed to protect. 99
Under this view, the Constitution was ultimately designed to protect moral
rights, rather than positive legal rights; if a new law clearly enforced justice,
it could not be unconstitutional.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
98. Akhil Amar nicely depicts the declaratory theory:
To a nineteenth-century believer in natural rights, the Bill [of Rights] was not simply an
enactment of We the People as the Sovereign Legislature bringing new legal rights into
existence, but a declaratory judgment by We the People as the Sovereign High Court that
certain natural or fundamental rights already existed.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1206 (1992).
For another description of constitutional provisions as declaratory, see Howard Jay Graham, Our
"Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3, 3-4 (1954-55). The declaratory theory need
not lead to the position that all natural rights should be enforced by judicial review, however. Arguably,
the official position of the Supreme Court in the second quarter of the nineteenth century was that the Ex
Post Facto and Contract Clauses were declaratory of a natural limit on legislative power-the legislature
cannot deprive individuals of vested rights-but that those Clauses also defined the portions of that natural
limit that were enforceable by the federal judiciary. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50.
99. CooLEY, supra note 62, at 378. Alternatively, one might argue that the "justice" to which Cooley
is appealing is embedded in the existing legal regime itself. The principle that people should be held to
their promises, or at least the promises that they make for consideration, is more central to contract law
than the rule that contracts of a certain kind must be signed and acknowledged. An appeal to principles
immanent in positive law will turn out to be central to Holmesian constitutional property jurisprudenee. See
infra note 134 and text accompanying notes 102-11.
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For Holmes, the problem with this view was that it relied on something
that did not exist. Holmes kept no secret of the fact that he was a
thoroughgoing moral skeptic. He consistently expressed his lack of belief in
the existence of a prepolitical moral order. "The jurists who believe in natural
law seem to me to be in that naive state of mind that accepts what has been
familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be
accepted by all men everywhere."'to A constitutional directive to judges to
test legislative enactments by engaging in moral reasoning was for Holmes no
better than a directive to follow the commands of ghosts-if you don't believe
in ghosts, it's hard to comply with the directive. '
c. The Rejection of Large-Scale Deductive Ordering
A third reason Justice Holmes opted for a historical model of constitutional
property was his criticism of the view that the individual legal rules
comprising positive law could be deduced from a single postulate or a small
group of postulates. The position that law is or should be so organized is
sometimes called "formalism" or "legal formalism," although no consensus has
formed on just how these terms should be used.102 Holmes's views on the
organization of bodies of law are complex.'0 3 For now, it is important only
to recognize that Holmes rejected an extreme form of organization by means
of deductive logic: He did not believe that specific rules governing a wide
variety of legal disputes could be derived from a single, general principle.
Holmes's 1880 review of Christopher Columbus Langdell's contracts casebook,
for example, criticized Langdell for his "effort to reduce the concrete details
of an existing system to the merely logical consequence of simple postulates,"
an effort "always in danger of ... leading to a misapprehension of the nature
of the problem and the data."3 4 Similarly, The Path of the Law criticized
"the notion that a given system ... can be worked out like mathematics from
some general axioms of conduct."'0 5 In his Supreme Court opinions, Holmes
100. 3 HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED WORKS. supra note 24. at 445-46.
101. The "ghost" example, brought to my attention by Henk Brands, is from JOHN HART ELY.
DEMocR.AcY AND DISTRUST 29 (1980).
102. For the use of "formalism" as synonymous with "deductive ordering." sce, e.g., Grey. supra note
96, at 822 ("Conceptualism is the project of structuring law into a system of classification made up of
relatively abstract principles and categories; formalism is the project of making law certain by making legal
reasoning deductive."). The many uses of "formalism" are catalogued in Frederick Schauer. Formalism.
97 YALE LJ. 509, 509-10 (1988).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 123-34.
104. 3 HOLMES, Review of Langdell's Law of Contracts and Anson's English Law of Contracts. in
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 102, 103. The Langdell review also provided the first public airing
of the aphorism that, after its appearance one year later, in Holmes's book The Common Law. became the
most famous antiformalist slogan: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." The
sentence is identical in both appearances. Compare id.. with 3 HOL.Es, The Common Law, in COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 24, at 109, 115.
105. 3 HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COL.ECTED WORKS. supra note 24. at 391, 396.
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applied these criticisms to constitutional interpretation, warning that "there
should not be extracted from the very general language of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a system of delusive exactness and merely logical form."' 6 In
Mahon itself, there is at least one sentence that can be read as an echo of these
criticisms: "[T]his is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed
of by general propositions."'07
The rejection of large-scale deductive ordering of law is important because
Holmes seemed to conclude that an ahistorical approach to constitutional
property depended on such ordering. Recall that Mugler bases its ahistorical
constitutional property jurisprudence on the notion that all property owners are
subject to a general duty not to injure others: "[A]II property in this country
is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be
injurious to the community."''0 8 If such a jurisprudence is to succeed, that
general imperative-"do not injure the community"-must have some bite in
specific cases, even though some discretion will be left to the legislature. In
his analysis of tort liability, however, Holmes concludes that this very
imperative-"sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"-"teaches nothing but a
benevolent yearning"; it is an "empty general proposition" from which only
"hollow" deductions can be made.' °9 Particular rules of tort liability were
actually grounded on multiple specific policy judgments. Holmes considered,
among others, the rule that a man incurred no liability by "build[ing] a house
upon his land in such a position as to spoil the view from a far more valuable
house hard by."' This privilege, Holmes argued, could not be deduced from
a general principle that one was free to use one's land in any way that did not
injure the community. Instead, it rested upon more particular judgments,
namely,
106. Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U.S. 135, 139 (1907).
107. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
108. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
109. 3 HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 371, 373; see
GARNER, supra note 62, at 807 (translating "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" as "use your own property
in such a manner as not to injure that of another"). The rejection of "sic utere" and similar principles as
"hollow" is undoubtedly connected to a rejection of objective morality. As Frederick Schauer comments
with regard to criticism of Blackstone:
Blackstone's view that certain abstract terms definitionally incorporate a wide range of specific
results is tied intimately to his perception of a hard and suprahuman reality behind these general
terms. If the word "property," for example, actually describes some underlying and
noncontingent reality, then it follows easily that certain specific embodiments are necessarily
part of that reality, just as pelicans are part of the underlying reality that is the universe of birds.
Schauer, supra note 102, at 513.
110. 3 HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 371, 373. For
a similar argument concerning the law of contract conditions, see 3 HOLMES, The Common Law, in
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 30, at 109, 287; William P. La Piana, Victorian from Beacon Hill: Oliver




upon the fact that a line must be drawn between the conflicting
interests of adjoining owners, which necessarily will restrict the
freedom of each; upon the unavoidable philistinism which prefers use
to beauty when considering the most profitable way of administering
the land in the jurisdiction taken as one whole; [and] upon the fact
that the defendant does not go outside his own boundary."'
If these particular considerations could not be reduced to a single general
principle, and Holmes concluded that they could not be, then a constitutional
property jurisprudence that depended on such a reduction was impossible.
Holmes decided that the ahistorical model of classical substantive due process
was so dependent, and therefore vacuous.
d. The Psychological Basis of Property and the Limits of Law as a
Human Institution
A last major factor behind Holmes's adoption of a historical approach to
constitutional property was his view that the institution of property was
grounded in a human psychology that lawmakers had to accommodate. Holmes
did not believe in a teleological human nature. For him, there was no
cosmological order that gave a reason for living or goals in life. Rather, he
concluded, "beliefs and wishes have a transcendental basis" only "in the sense
that their foundation is arbitrary. You can not help entertaining and feeling
them, and there is an end of it."" 2 Thus, in Holmes's ethics and
epistemology, "Can't Helps""3 substitute for ultimate truths.
On the other hand, Holmes did have a particular view of human
psychology, which had direct ties to his conceptions of both knowledge and
property:
[P]roperty, friendship, and truth have a common root in time. One can
not be wrenched from the rocky crevices into which one has grown
for many years without feeling that one is attacked in one's life. What
we most love and revere generally is determined by early
associations."'
111. 3 HoLMEs, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED WORKS. supra note 24, at 371. 373.
Holmes also mentioned, in a separate paragraph, the consideration that the owner's liability should not turn
on his subjective motive in building the house, because ownership ights would become too uncertain. See
id. This consideration plays an important role in Holmes's opinion in Rideout v Knox. 19 N.E. 390 (Mass.
1889), which I discuss below, see infra text accompanying notes 142-47.
112. 3 HoLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24. at 445. 446-47.
113. Id at 446.
114. Id Holmes applied this associational psychology to friendship in a touching eulogy to Walbndge
Abner Field, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "Long association makes
friendship, as it makes property and belief, a part of our being. When it is wrenched from us. roots are tom
and broken that bleed like veins." 3 HOLMNiES, Answer to Resolutions of the Bar, in COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 24, at 494-95.
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Thus the institution of property is due, at least in part, to a fundamental
element of human psychology-the desire to continue enjoying something that
one has enjoyed for a long time and to which one has become firmly attached.
This characteristic is also a reason to take a historical approach to
constitutional property jurisprudence. Property law, Holmes suggested, protects
expectations formed by personal history.
This reason for adopting a historical approach to constitutional property,
however, is in tension with Holmes's analytical theory of law, which equates
property with rights under existing positive law, regardless of the content of
that law. The psychological perspective is a prelegal one, which, according to
Holmes, has implications for the content of the positive law itself. Thus,
Holmes most often invoked human psychology to justify a particular doctrine
of property law, that of acquiring ownership by prescription:
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to
defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no better
justification than the deepest instincts of man." 5
True to his moral skepticism, however, Holmes was not suggesting that the
law should protect "the deepest instincts of man" because those instincts were
morally worthy of nurture. Rather, as he explained elsewhere, recognition of
prescription as a method of acquiring ownership is merely instrumental to the
survival of the legal system itself:
115. 3 HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 391, 405. Holmes
made the same point in an opinion he wrote as Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
five years later:
Prescription and limitation are based on one of the deepest principles of human nature, the
working of association with what one actually enjoys for a long time, whatever one's defects
of title may be, and of dissociation from that of which one is deprived, whatever may be one's
rights. The mind like any other organism gradually shapes itself to what surrounds it, and
resents disturbance in the form which its life has assumed.
Dunbar v. Boston & Providence R.R., 63 N.E. 916, 916 (Mass. 1902); see Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907), in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: His SPEECIIES,
ESSAYS, LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 416, 417-18 (Max Lemer ed., 1943) ("The true explanation of
title by prescription seems to me to be that man, like a tree in a cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots
to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain size, can't be displaced without cutting
at his life."). This view also influenced Holmes's perspective in a U.S. Supreme Court ease deciding that
a member of a Philippine tribe had a right under United States law to register his private ownership of a
tract of land that had been seized by the Philippine and United States governments. Holmes noted that the
organic statute adopted by Congress to govern the Philippines provided that "'no law shall be enacted in
said islands which shall deprive any person of... property without due process of law"' (quoting Organic
Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691) and found it hard to believe that Congress
meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a
large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what
they, by native custom and by long association, one of the profoundest factors in human
thought, regarded as their own.
Carifio v. Insular Gov't, 212 U.S. 449, 459 (1909).
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Law, being a practical thing, must found itself on actual forces. It is
quite enough, therefore, for the law, that man, by an instinct which he
shares with the domestic dog, and of which the seal gives a most
striking example, will not allow himself to be dispossessed, either by
force or fraud, of what he holds, without trying to get it back again.
Philosophy may find a hundred reasons to justify the instinct, but it
is totally immaterial if it should condemn it and bid us surrender
without a murmur. As long as the instinct remains, it will be more
comfortable for the law to satisfy it in an orderly manner, than to
leave people to themselves. If it should do otherwise, it would become
a matter for pedagogues, wholly devoid of reality." 6
Here, Holmes formulated yet another reason why the enforcement of a moral
order cannot be the essence of law. Not only is law analytically reducible to
regularized coercion, shaped by human will, and not only is there no objective
moral order, but even if there were an objective moral order, it could not be
embodied in enforceable law because it would be impossible to maintain
obedience. Legislators and judges, Holmes argued, cannot stand in opposition
to a widespread human desire; the only thing they can and should do is attempt
to bring some order to the satisfaction of the desire.
Holmes's view of the proper reaction of judges to widespread human
desires may lead, not only to his view that standing positive law defines the
property protected by the Constitution, but also to his view that the
constitutional protection afforded property is protection against drastic changes
in principles embedded in that positive law." 7 Because the issue of
protecting constitutional property rights arises when positive law is changed,
it is important to examine Holmes's instructions to judges faced, not with a
constant human desire, but with a dramatic shift in expressed popular will. In
1871, Holmes considered the question whether the North Carolina Constitution
could be amended without following the amendment procedures set out in the
Constitution itself. True to his view that judges cannot stand in opposition to
the desires of dominant social forces, Holmes concluded that "if the will of the
majority is unmistakable ... the courts must yield.".... According to Holmes,
116. 3 HOLMEs, Possession, in COLLECTED WORKS. supra note 24. at 37. 59; see also 3 HoLMEs,
Montesquieu, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 425. 429 ("What proximate test of excellence can
be found except correspondence to the actual equilibrium of force in the community-that is, conformity
to the wishes of the dominant power?"). Holmes considered violence the basis, not just of law, but of all
social organization. As he observed in The Common Law, -the ultima ratio. not only regum. but of private
persons, is force... at the bottom of all private relauons, however tempered by sympathy and all the social
feelings, is a justifiable self-preference." 3 HOLMES, The Common Law. in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note
24, at 109, 137. Holmes was alluding to Louis XIV's practice of stamping "Ultima Ratio Rcgum"-The
Last Argument of Kings"--onto the barrels of cannons forged dunng his reign. See KEVIN GtINAGH.
DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN PHRASES AND ABBREVIATIONS 199 (3d ed. 1983).
117. For a description of this protection, see infra text accompanying notes 142-47
118. 1 HOLMES, Cooley's A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations. in COLI.ECTED WORKS. supra
note 24, at 268. Here, I am heavily indebted to H.L. Pohlman's analysis of this discussion and Holmes's
constitutionalism more generally. See H.L. POHLMAN. JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLtES: FREE SPEECH
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however, "[t]he courts may properly abide by [the old constitution]," which is
"an admitted expression of the sovereign will," "until they see that the new
manifestation is not only unmistakable, but irresistible."".9 The key
premise-that the old constitution was the "admitted expression of the
sovereign will"--enables Holmes to promote continuity under the guise of
deference to the will of the community.
Holmes's constitutional property jurisprudence may be grounded on similar
logic. Continuity, a value resting on a universal feature of human psychology,
is the principal value underlying the constitutional protection of property. To
promote that value, while remaining deferential to the will of dominant social
forces, courts should presume that certain basic principles embedded in
standing positive law reflect the settled will of those dominant forces.
Although gradual legal change is inevitable, sudden changes that drastically
undermine basic principles, unaccompanied by compensation to disadvantaged
parties, should be struck down as inconsistent with the settled will of the
community, so long as those changes are not perceived as "irresistible."
B. Measuring Degrees of Legal Change from "Structural Habits" in Positive
Law
Under Holmes's formulation of the question presented in Mahon, the issue
in constitutional property cases is one of degrees of change from preexisting
positive law; a government unconstitutionally "takes" or "deprives" someone
of property when it alters legal rights and obligations too drastically. This
noncategorical historical approach excludes a large number of theories for
deciding constitutional property cases, but it does not itself constitute a
complete theory of decision because it leaves open crucial questions: How do
we measure degrees of change in preexisting law? When we say that a law
"goes too far,"' 120 what sort of distance do w6 have in mind?
The Mahon opinion also has something to say about those questions. In
the three-and-a-half pages of legal discussion following the question presented,
Holmes offers a tentative theory for measuring degrees of legal change and
demonstrates the application of that theory. Holmes thought that the positive
law of a jurisdiction could be described, not just as an accidental aggregation
of specific, unrelated rules, but as a body of law that exhibited an internal
structure, organized around a variety of principles or paradigm cases. Those
"structural habits" provided a basis for assessing how much change in
positive law a particular piece of legislation caused. A court could locate
AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 225-39 (1991). Patrick Kelley also addresses Holmes's discussion of the
North Carolina Constitution. See Kelley, supra note 83, at 368-69.
119. Id.
120. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
121. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907).
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relevant principles and ask whether a particular legislative alteration of
preexisting law ran directly counter to one or more of them or was only mildly
in tension with them. In Mahon, Justice Holmes applies this theory to the
Kohler Act. His opinion examines the relationship of the Kohler Act
restrictions on mining to selected doctrines and principles in existing law,
including the doctrine of public nuisance, the principle of placing a high value
on the physical safety of individuals, and the tradition of more closely
protecting legal rights that have been recognized as separate, transferable
"estates." Holmes concludes that the Kohler Act constitutes too drastic a
departure from these "structural habits" to be tolerated without
compensation.'22
In the first two of the following Subsections, I present the account of
positive law organization on which Holmes's method of measuring legal
change depends, and sketch the basic features of that method. In the third
Subsection, I describe Holmes's development and application of that method
in Mahon; in the fourth, I consider the role of diminution in value.
1. Analogy and the Organization of Bodies of Law
For Holmes, positive law was an organized body, rather than a set of
unrelated rules. As I have already suggested, however, Holmes rejected the
model of deductive ordering, under which all rules are deduced from a small
number of basic postulates and axioms.'2 Yet the alternative was not chaos;
it was another kind of organization. Holmes's alternative model differed from
that of deductive ordering in two ways. First, the number of principles that
organized law was not necessarily small: There might be scores, if not
hundreds, of such principles. Second, these principles did not serve as axioms
from which specific legal rules could be deduced. Rather, they were more like
paradigm cases, the reach of which was determined gradually through
analogical reasoning. Reasoning by analogy, unlike deductive reasoning, was
always part discovery and part artifice. The point of equipoise between two
opposed paradigm cases could never be precisely calculated, and judges needed
to exercise judgment in drawing the lines that determined the sphere of
influence for each paradigm case.
A passage in what is probably Holmes's most famous opinion, his dissent
in Lochner, 24 suggests the distinction between deductive and analogical
ordering. The irresistible deduction does not exist; as Holmes put it, "[g]eneral
propositions do not decide concrete cases."'5 But in rejecting the possibility
of absolute logical compulsion, Holmes did not reject the possibility of logical
122. See infra text accompanying notes 148-95.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 102-11.
124. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
125. Id at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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influence. Thus, in the Lochner dissent, he immediately qualifies his aphorism:
"General propositions do not decide concrete cases .... But I think that the




The challenge, then, was to develop a model of reasoning under which one
could describe propositions, not as "decid[ing] concrete cases" of their own
logical force, but as "carry[ing] us far towards the end., 2 7 To meet this
challenge, Holmes drew heavily from an older, common law model of
reasoning by analogy.' This distinguished him from later skeptics, who
questioned the power of legal reasoning of any kind.'29 Viewed from a later
skeptical perspective in which deduction and analogy were indistinguishable,
Holmes's legal thought was contradictory and inexplicable, and seemed to
vacillate from prophetic utterances daring to suggest that general propositions
did not decide concrete cases, to atavistic pronouncements about fundamental
principles in the law. 3' If we accept Holmes's distinction, however, the lines
126. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The "proposition just stated" was Holmes's own
assertion'that "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory." Id. at 75 (Holmes,
J., dissenting). Thus Holmes was not criticizing the Lochner majority's use of a general proposition, but
explaining the limits of his own.
127. As Karl Llewellyn would later put it, the challenge was to develop a model that would explain
why it was not the case "that if the outcome of an appeal is not foredoomed in logic it therefore Is the
product of uncontrolled will which is as good as wayward." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 4 (1960). Benjamin Cardozo viewed himself as engaged in the same
project:
A definition of law which in effect denies the possibility of law since it denies the possibility
of rules of general operation, must contain within itself the seeds of fallacy and error.,.. Law
and obedience to law are facts confirmed every day to us all in our experience of life.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 126-27 (1921) (footnote omitted).
128. On reasoning in common law theory, see, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION 30-38 (1986). Postema describes a blend of "particularist" and "principled"
conceptions of reason in common law theory that bears a striking resemblance to Holmes's view of the
reasoning process generating legal structure. According to that blended conception, "'[p]articularist' reason
or intuition is inadequate and incomplete without guidance from general principles," but both kinds of
reason are "practical reason exercised within an already constituted, though open-ended, framework." Id.
at 35-36. The only "'natural law' involved is not external to the tradition, but implicit in it, not socially
transcendent, but immanent." Id. at 36.
129. For examples of scholarship from the legal realist and critical legal studies schools that more
broadly challenge legal reasoning, see Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 838-49 (1935); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part 71vo: As
Through a Class Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 233, 241-42 (1931); David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 11, 11-17 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 40, 47 ("There is never a 'correct
legal solution' that is other than the correct ethical and political solution to that legal problem."); Joseph
W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
130. The failure to distinguish between deductive and analogical reasoning may account, at least in
part, for the judgment of some scholars that, for all his protestations to the contrary, Holmes believed in
deductive ordering of law. Grant Gilmore came to the starkest conclusion in his general assessment of
Holmes: "Holmes's accomplishment was to make Langdellianism intellectually respectable." GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 56 (1977). For other scholarly suggestions that Holmes was to
some degree a formalist, see GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14-53 (1974); Robert W.
Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Social and Legal Science, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719, 726-30 (1982);
Saul Touster, Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV.
673, 691 (1982); G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes' Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633,
638-39 (1982).
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of his theory of legal organization begin to come into focus.
Holmes relied frequently on two models of legal organization, one bipolar,
the other multipolar. The bipolar model stems from an image of law that
Holmes first described in 1873, at the age of thirty-two, and returned to often
over the remaining sixty-two years of his life:
The growth of law is very apt to take place in this way: Two widely
different cases suggest a general distinction, which is a clear one
when stated broadly. But as new cases cluster around the opposite
poles, and begin to approach each other, the distinction becomes more
difficult to trace; the determinations are made one way or the other on
a very slight preponderance of feeling, rather than articulate reason;
and at last a mathematical line is arrived at by the contact of contrary
decisions, which is so far arbitrary that it might equally well have
been drawn a little further to the one side or to the other. The
distinction between the groups, however, is philosophical, and it is
better to have a line drawn somewhere in the P3enumbra between
darkness and light, than to remain in uncertainty."
The components of this image suggest a model of legal organization. Law is
organized around certain principles that we understand in the context of their
application in paradigm cases and in the opposition of those paradigm cases
to other paradigms. As we get further away from a particular paradigm case,
application of the principle becomes less certain. Holmes's description of cases
clustered around poles suggests the metaphor of gravity: As we gain distance
from one paradigm case, its gravitational pull decreases and we start feeling
the attraction of another paradigm case. If there are very few other decided
cases located around the paradigms, our task of deciding a case that falls
somewhere in the middle will be very difficult. As other cases are decided,
plotting a location for each new case becomes easier. But there will always be
an element of judgment involved at the edges.
32
Although Holmes often used a bipolar model to explain legal reasoning
and organization, he also used a more complex, multipolar model, under which
each principle or paradigm case stood in relation to and was limited by many
others, and under which the resolution of a particular legal conflict potentially
drew on many principles. For example, Holmes offered a multipolar model
131. 1 HOLMES, The Theory of Torts, in COLLECTED WORKS. supra note 24. at 326. 327 Tlus passage
reappears almost word for word in The Common Law. See 3 HOLMES, The Common Law. in COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 24, at 109, 179-80. For a list of citations to passages in which Holmes pursues this
theme, see Jerome Frank, A Conflict with Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of Legal
Pragmatism, 9 RuTGERS L. REV. 425, 437 n.66 (1954).
132. Holmes often used this bipolar model, not only to explain legal reasoning and organization in
general, but also to explain constitutional property doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 217-27
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when he sought to explain the restricted scope of ostensibly absolute
constitutional rights: Such rights, Holmes argued, are "limited by the
neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the
particular right is founded."' 33 Here, the image is of principles spread out on
a two-dimensional plane.
Holmes calls these principles "structural habits," a term the connotations
of which are worth teasing out. The principles are "structural" because they act
to organize legal doctrine. Like habits, the principles are not innate or natural,
but are contingently acquired or developed over time; they are features of a
particular legal culture or tradition." 4 On the other hand, like habits, they
may become so settled and involuntary in application that they seem natural
and are difficult to discard. Thus the distinction between physical trespasses
and nontrespassory annoyances is an important organizing feature of tort and
property law. Countless cases, statutes, and social practices have established
and reinforced it, so someone raised in Anglo-American legal culture will
automatically view a physical trespass as, all other things being equal, a more
serious matter. And it has become so much a part of the way we see things
that we cannot quite imagine its elimination.
With this dimension added, Holmes's view of law can be seen as an
attempted synthesis or reconciliation of the two principal contending schools
of nineteenth-century jurisprudence: positivism and historicism.' Holmes
begins with the positivist notion that law consists of rules posited by human
will, rather than divined by natural reason. 36 But he adds the historicist
insight that human will and human understanding operate only within a
tradition. When people make law, they do so within a tradition and do not
discard all of the legal categories and distinctions that shape that tradition,
though they may seek to alter some of them. When people understand law,
they do so in terms of paradigm cases opposed to other paradigm cases, and
an array of such paradigms defines part of a legal tradition. Because laws are
so made and understood, they can cohere as a body even though they are
contingent acts of will.
133. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). As discussed above, Holmes
also drew on a multipolar model when seeking to explain the lack of tort liability for building a house that
destroys a neighbor's view; the privilege is not derived from a single, general principle, bvt is related to
a number of more particular judgments of policy. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
134. Thus, Holmes distinguished between objective and positive morality: "I utterly disbelieve all
postulates of human rights in general. Those established in a given society stand on a different ground."
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 23, 1926), in 2 HOLMES-LAsKi LETTERS, supra
note 40, at 115. Law, Holmes contended, embodied the judgments of positive morality: "The law is the
witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the
race." 3 HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in CoLLECrED WORKS, supra note 24, at 391, 392.
135. Foran interpretation of Holmes as attempting to blend positivism and historicism, see Grey, supra
note 96, at 805-13.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 83-96.
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2. Measuring Legal Change from Structural Habits
If positive law can be described as a body built around a number of
principles or structural habits, then it may be possible to assess degrees of
legal change from those principles in a way that would be impossible were
positive law a collection of unrelated rules. To determine how drastic an
alteration a particular piece of legislation works on previously existing law,
one could assess its relationship to the principles underlying the relevant
portion of that law. In a number of constitutional property cases before Mahon
Holmes explicitly reasons by analogy, drawing principles from existing law
and using them to defend the challenged legislation. Perhaps the best example
of these is Interstate Consolidated Street Railway i. Massachusetts.' In
Interstate Consolidated Street Railway, Holmes finds it centrally important that
the challenged law, which required street railways to carry pupils to and from
school at half fare, can be described as promoting education, for it can then be
compared to the practice of financing schools through general taxation. The
latter practice, Holmes notes, "is an appropriation of property to a use in which
the taxpayer may have no private interest, and, it may be, against his
will."'33 Yet although "[lit has been condemned by some theorists on that
ground .... no one denies its constitutionality. People are accustomed to it
137. 207 U.S. 79 (1907). Two other examples are worth mentioning. The first is Hudson County Water
Co., 209 U.S. 349, which upheld a New Jersey law limiting piping of water from New Jersey lakes and
streams to out of state destinations. Holmes found it crucial that the purpose of the law at Issue was to
"maintain ... rivers that are wholly within" the state. Id. at 356 He looked for decisions concerning
analogous purposes, and found two sets of cases that support the state's po, er One set of cases
"recognize[s] that the State as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the public has standing
in court to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests within its temiory. irrespectise of the assent
or dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately concerned." Id at 355 (citing Kansas v
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 141, 142 (1902); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.. 206 U S 230. 238 (1907).
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99 (1907)). The other set affirms that "the State may make laws for the
preservation of game" on the "principle[s] of public interest and the police power, and not merely as the
inheritor of a royal prerogative." Hudson County Water Co.. 209 U.S. at 356 (citing Gecr v- Connecticut.
161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896)). Holmes concluded that the statute at issue in Hudson Count). Water Co fell
close enough to these two existing paradigms to pass the constitutional test. The pnnciple in Hudson
County Water Co. was not one of Holmes's great successes. For the story of its decline. see Sheldon M.
Novick, Introduction, I COLLECTrD WORKS. supra note 24, at 8. 56-57.
The second example of such reasoning by analogy is Noble State Bank v Haskell. 219 U S 104
(1911) (upholding state statute requiring banks to contribute to depositors' guaranty fund)- Holmes
concluded that "analogy and principle" support the power of the legislature to enact such a statute, cited
several other statutes previously approved by the Court that regulated banks for the purpose of protecting
depositors, and noted that the practice of requiring other banks to contibute to depositors' guaranty funds
was itself common and longstanding. See id. at 111-12. Finally. Holmes noted and responded to the classic
"obsta principiis" or "slippery slope" argument: "It is asked whether the State could require all corporations
or all grocers to help guarantee each other's solvency, and where we are going to draw the line. But the
last is a futile question, and we will answer the others when they arise." Id. at 112. It is futile to ask where
the line will be drawn, Holmes argued, because there is no general theory, transcending legal traditions,
which would tell us where to draw the line. Grocers might be treated differently from banks; the Court
would decide the grocers' case when it arose, by locating pnnciples in the legal tradition, and drawing
analogies from them.
138. Interstate Consol. St. Ry, 207 U.S. at 87.
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and accept it without doubt."'' 39 Here Holmes returns to his basic framework.
The "property" protected by the Constitution is not a theorist's ideal, but the
actual, established practice of a particular legal tradition; the tradition in
question includes the practice of financing the education of children by taxing
everyone, even those who have no children to be educated. The half-fare
requirement must be evaluated in terms of how different it is from established
practice. Holmes concludes that it "is not different in fundamental
principle"' 4 ---it does not amount to so drastic a change as to require
compensation. At the end of the opinion, Holmes reemphasizes that inquiry
always starts from within a particular legal tradition and takes as given the
distinctions drawn in that tradition:
It does not follow that it would be equally in accord with the
conceptions at the base of our constitutional law to confer equal
favors upon doctors, or workingmen, or people who could afford to
buy 1000-mile tickets. Structural habits count for as much as logic in
drawing the line.'
4'
In assessing departures from such structural habits, Holmes considered the
purposes and reasons that underlay both the challenged law and existing
positive law rules. Recall Justice Holmes's opinion in Rideout v. Knox, the
1889 "spite fence" legislation case. 142 Once Holmes established that the spite
fence statute changed the common law, and thus "limit[ed] ... previously
existing rights of property,"'' 43 the issue became whether the statute was a
"small limitation[]" that "may be imposed for the sake of preventing a manifest
evil," or a "larger one[]," which "could not be [imposed] except by the
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Holmes's reference to "people who could afford to buy 1000-mile tickets" is an allusion to
Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684 (1899) (invalidating state law requiring railroads to sell
1000-mile tickets at rate lower than that otherwise determined reasonable), For another expression of the
same point, see Holmes's dissent in Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358, 366 (1910)
(upholding ordinance prohibiting cemeteries within city and county limits) ("[The extent to which
legislation may modify and restrict the uses of property consistently with the Constitution is not a question
for pure abstract theory alone. Tradition and the habits of the community count for more than logic.").
142. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
143. Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 391 (Mass. 1889); see id. (stating that at common law, "[t]he limit
up to which a man may impair his neighbor's enjoyment of his estate by the mode of using his own Is
fixed by external standards only."). In The Common Law, published eight years earlier, Holmes had already
fully developed his view that the law should be governed by external standards, and had shown his
eagerness to demonstrate that the common law had in fact progressed from internal to external standards.
See 3 HOLMES, The Common Law, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 109, 134 (asserting that law,
"by the very necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting . . . moral standards into external or
objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly eliminated."); see also Sheldon
M. Novick, Introduction, I COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 8, 11 (describing Holmes's arguments
about external standards in The Common Law). Thus, Holmes's conclusion that the common law used an
external standard, made against the background of evidence in Rideout that he recognizes is conflicting,
see Rideout, 19 N.E. at 392, may not be an entirely disinterested one.
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exercise of the right of eminent domain."'" For Holmes, the first step in
analyzing that issue was to consider the reason underlying the common law
rule of no liability for spite fences; Holmes concluded that "the right to use
one's property for the sole purpose of injuring others" was "not a right for the
sake of which property is recognized by the law, but is only a more or less
necessary incident of rights which are established for very different ends."'4 5
This "quasi accidental character of the ... right to put up a fence for
malevolent purposes '46 remained central to Holmes's conclusion that the
spite fence statute was constitutional. The statute did not drastically change
preexisting law because it destroyed only an incidental feature, not a core
principle. The Rideout opinion also discusses the impact of the statute on the
owner; but that discussion is colored by Holmes's conception of law as an
organized body, in which particular legal rules must be seen as related to
underlying policies and principles. The expectations of an owner must be seen
as being shaped, not by each legal rule as a separate, opaque command, but by
a web of rules and reasons; if an owner understands that, in our legal culture,
purely malicious behavior is not highly valued, then she, and we, will be less
likely to see a spite fence statute as a significant curtailment of property
rights.
47
144. Rideout, 19 N.E. at 392 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 390-91. Holmes's view was likely that the common law excluded consideration of motive
to impart greater certainty to ownership rights. See id. at 392 (expressing concern that statute broadly
prohibiting construction with malicious intent would make property rights subject to jury findings on
motive). Patrick Kelley recognizes that identification of the purposes underlying rules of existing law is
central to Holmes's inquiry in Rideout and other takings opinions Holmes wrote on the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court. See Kelley, supra note 83. at 385-87. However. Kelley places consequentialism
at the center of Justice Holmes's theory of constitutional property protection. He argues that under
Holmes's theory a change in law will not amount to a taking "when an objective evaluation of the taking's
consequences for all concerned would lead to the conclusion that it would not be reasonable (and the
constitution makers therefore couldn't have intended) to preclude this kind of restraint on property owners"
Id at 384; see id. at 381 (describing Holmes as "balanc[ing] the public need against the harm to the
landowner"). By contrast, under my reading, Holmes's constitutional property junspridence was focused
on protecting settled expectations by assessing degrees of change from existing law. As Richard Posner and
Thomas Grey have put it, Holmes was a "tame utilitarian" but a "militant skeptic." See RICHARD POSNER.
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 241 (1990); Thomas C. Grey. Molecular Motions: The Holmejan Judge
in Theory and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 19. 26-33 (1995). That skepticism. I believe, led
Holmes away from consequentialism in his constitutional property jurisprudence.
146. Rideout, 19 N.E. at 393.
147. My view of the role of such "structural habits" in Holmes's constitutional property jurisprudence
is clarified by contrast with Bruce Ackerman's interpretation of Holmes's position in Mahon. Holmes.
Ackerman argues, approached constitutional property problems from what Ackerman calls an Ordinary
Observer perspective. See ACKERMAN, supra note I. at 164, 267 n.108; id. at 10-12 (arguing that Ordinary
Observer is "ordinary" because he believes that ordinary layman's language is sufficient for legal analysis.
and an "observer" because he believes that legal rules are sound to extent that they vindicate expectations
generated by dominant social institutions). According to Ackerman. Holmes's crucial decision was to treat
the right to subjacent support-a technical legal construct-as an ordinary layman's thing. Once that right
had been invested with the status of a "thing," then it followed that, when the right was redistributed, as
a constitutional matter a thing was taken. See id. at 163-64.
I agree with Ackerman that Holmes was an "'Observer," but I question his conclusion that Holmes
was an "Ordinary Observer." Holmes not only embraced, but shaped and promoted the "Scientific" view
that the property protected by the Constitution is a "bundle of rights" defined by standing positive law. See
ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 10-11, 27-28 (defining Scientific view of legal language as technical construct
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3. The Assessment of Legal Change in Mahon
That brings us to Mahon itself. The legal discussion in Mahon is divided
into two main parts. The first half concerns the constitutionality of the Kohler
Act as applied to the Mahons in their capacity as private owners of surface
rights. The second half, which Justice Holmes added after some prompting by
Chief Justice Taft,' is supposed to concern "the general validity of the
Act."'49 It contains some analysis of the Act's application to publicly owned
surface rights and some additional discussion of legal principles that are
equally applicable to publicly and privately owned rights. The Mahon Court
concludes that the Kohler Act is unconstitutional in all of its applications.5 0
Holmes's discussion is terse in both halves of the opinion, but somewhat
more detailed in the first. He starts by announcing that "[t]his is the case of a
single private house"' t -a bit of rhetorical exaggeration, since Holmes
knows that the Court is considering the Kohler Act as it affects all private
houses, not the Mahons' alone. His general point, however, is that although
"[s]ome existing rights may be modified"'' 52 in the case of private houses,
independent of ordinary language, and identifying "bundle of rights" model as Scientific approach to
property); supra text accompanying notes 33-41. Holmes did not ask the Ordinary Observer's question
whether a challenged statute fit into the static ordinary language category of "taking." Rather, he asked a
question that recognized that legislation always changed the status quo: Does this redistribution of rights
represent a change drastic enough to require compensation? To answer that latter question, Holmes looked
to the principles and distinctions of a legal tradition, rather than ordinary layman's language.
Ackerman recognizes that a "Scientific Observer" approach is possible, and identifies, as Scientific
Observers, the members of the Lochner-era substantive due process school. See ACKERMAN, supra note
1, at 18, 199 n.26. Holmes certainly would not agree with those Lochner-em Scientific Observers that
"historical analysis [of the common law tradition] would yield a body of principles sufficiently abstract and
self-consistent to constitute a Comprehensive View." Id. at 199 n.26; see also id. at 11-12. But Holmes's
view that the principles immanent in positive law do not coalesce into a single "Comprehensive View" need
not disqualify him from "Scientific Observer" status. Alternatively, Holmes's view challenges the distinction
between "Ordinary" and "Scientific" approaches, because it recognizes that legal language is neither wholly
independent of nor wholly congruous with ordinary language. On Holmes's view, both languages should
broadly reflect practices and expectations generated by dominant social institutions; legal language may
recognize subtle distinctions that ordinary language does not, and may reflect changes in social institutions
(such as patterns of ownership) more quickly than ordinary language.
148. Joseph DiMento's excavations in the Holmes Papers have brought to light the fact that Holmes's
original draft of Mahon contained only the first half, addressing the Kohler Act only as it applied to the
Mahons. Holmes added the second half after Chief Justice Taft sent Holmes a letter expressing his view
that the Kohler Act was unconstitutional with respect to streets and schools, as well as private houses, and
that the Mahon opinion should say so. See Letter from William H. Taft to Oliver W. Holmes (Dec. 2,
1922), in DiMento, supra note 23, at 407.
149. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). The split between the first and
second half of the opinion were crucial to Justice Stevens's effort to distinguish Mahon in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Justice Stevens characterized the second half
of the Mahon opinion as "advisory," id. at 484, a point disputed by the four dissenters. See id. at 507-08
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). I discuss Keystone below. See infra text accompanying notes 397-405.
150. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
151. Id. at 413.
152. Id. Here Holmes cites his opinion in Rideout v. Knox, the 1889 spite fence case. Holmes had
noted there that although such fences were "not directly injurious to the public at large, there is a public
interest to restrain this kind of aggressive annoyance of one neighbor by another, and to mark a definite
limit beyond which it is not lawful to go." Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (Mass. 1889).
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"usually in ordinary private affairs the public interest does not warrant much
of this kind of interference."'' 53 This last statement is confusing; taken out of
context, it could easily be the expression of an ahistorical approach to
constitutional property law.'5 If "ordinary private affairs" and "public
interest" are defined independently of any particular positive law tradition, then
Holmes's statement sounds like the affirmation of an ideal boundary-an
independent, stable line between private and public matters. Immediately after
this statement, however, Holmes turns to a discussion of the Kohler Act's
relationship to three relevant doctrines or principles found in the Anglo-
American legal tradition: the doctrine of public nuisance; the value of
protecting physical safety; and the treatment of interests that have the status
of separate estates in land. Thus, the context suggests that Holmes is
discussing "the public interest" and "ordinary private affairs" not as ideal
ahistorical categories, but as defined within a particular legal tradition-not as
matters of "logic," but as "structural habits." '55
Holmes's survey of the relevant portions of the Anglo-American legal
tradition begins with the law of public nuisance. At common law, Holmes
notes, an activity qualifies as a public nuisance only if it causes a type of
injury that will, by definition, affect an entire community, rather than
individual landowners.'56 For example, a brewery might be declared a public
nuisance-as it was in Mugler v. Kansas'"7-because it produced and made
available to the community intoxicating liquors. The injury caused by the
availability of intoxicating liquors affects the community as a whole, not
particular landowners; it is "common or public" injury.'5' By contrast,
subsidence under a particular house causes injury only to a particular
landowner. Even if the subsidence occurs under more than one house-even
if "similar damage is inflicted on others in different places"' 5 9-it still does
not amount to a public nuisance, because the only rights at issue are the rights
of particular landowners in the use and enjoyment of their land. The common
law consequence is that the sovereign is not justified in intervening on behalf
of the public. Thus the Kohler Act represents a significant departure from the
existing law of public nuisance.
153. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
154. For my description of ahistorical approaches, see supra Subsection I.A. I.
155. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79. 87 (1907).
156. Holmes cites an 1867 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion. Wesson v Washburn Iron
Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 95 (1867), for this definition of public nuisance. For the acceptance of such a
definition by the Mahon-era Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see Phillips v. Donaldson. 112 A. 236, 238 (Pa.
1920); for its acceptance by the American Law Institute, see REsTATEIENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 821B113)
& cmt. g (1979).
157. 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887); see supra text accompanying notes 57-68.
158. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (citing Wesson, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) at 103). The brewery might also
be actionable as a private nuisance if it unreasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment of a particular
piece of land-if, for example, the fumes from the brewing operation caused the occupants of a neighbonng
house to become sick.
159. Id.
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Immediately after Holmes concludes that the damage caused by subsidence
is not common or public, he adds the following sentence: "The extent of the
public interest is shown by the statute to be limited, since the statute ordinarily
does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the
coal. ' ' 60 This comment is best read as a supplement to the public nuisance
discussion. Assume that, contrary to Holmes's conclusion, we can identify
some injury that subsidence causes to the public as a whole. For example, we
could argue that the public has an interest in protecting "stable land surface,"
a kind of natural resource. Indeed, the interest in preserving the state's natural
resources is the same interest that Holmes recognizes as "fundamental" in
Hudson County Water Co., the case upholding a limit on the export of water
from New Jersey rivers. 161 Why is this not a worthy purpose? Holmes's
response is that with respect to such a purpose, the Kohler Act is fatally
underinclusive. Subsidence causes a loss of "stable land surface," whether or
not the owner of the surface estate also owns the mineral rights and the right
to support; but the Kohler Act's prohibition on mining that causes subsidence
only applies when ownership is split. The Act allows so much loss of stable
land surface that, absent some particular reason for the Act's limited scope, we
cannot easily understand it as meant to preserve stable land surface at all.
Holmes next considers the relationship of the Kohler Act to the goal of
protecting the physical safety of the people living on top of the mines. Holmes
implicitly acknowledges that protecting individuals from physical harm is a
tradition in American law that justifies regulation even when the cost to the
regulated party is high.' 62 He concludes, however, that the requirement that
the Pennsylvania Coal Company provide notice before mining amply furthers
the recognized interest in protecting the Mahons' lives. Here, the company
gave such notice; "[i]ndeed the very foundation of this bill is that the
defendant gave timely notice of its intent to mine under the house."' 63 Thus
the Mahons could vacate their house if they believed the mining would
compromise their physical safety.164
160. Id. at 413-14.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 137.
162. Three years earlier, in Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919), Holmes had
acknowledged this tradition in an opinion upholding an ordinance banning the storage of petroleum within
300 feet of any dwelling, even though compliance with the ordinance by the oil company in question
required removal of existing tanks that were "necessary for the business" and the company knew "of no
available place in the city where the tanks could be put and oil stored without violating the ordinance." Id.
at 499. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Mahon, pointed to Pierce Oil Corp. as a case demonstrating that
"[restriction upon use does not become inappropriate as a means, merely because it deprives the owner
of the only use to which the property can then be profitably put." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 418 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). There was no finding in Pierce Oil Corp., however, that the petroleum storage ban rendered
useless either the tanks or the land on which they sat.
163. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
164. I discuss below Justice Holmes's lack of deference to legislatures in these two passages, and
Justice Brandeis's advocacy of greater deference in dissent. See infra text accompanying notes 290-95.
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Holmes's third observation about the Kohler Act as applied to the Mahons
is that the Act "purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an
estate in land-a very valuable estate."'165 William Fischel concludes that
Holmes's reference to this factor was "only a matter of rhetorical
emphasis";' 66 Bruce Ackerman finds in this reference the key to the entire
decision. 67 The truth, I think, is somewhere in between. Holmes was
obviously aware of the myriad ways in which the common law of property"b
and the vested rights tradition 69 gave greater protection and powers to
holders of interests that were recognized as estates in land. Once an interest
was recognized as an estate in land, holders of that interest would come to
expect more stability in the legal treatment of that interest. Thus a legal change
that destroyed an estate in land would be perceived as more extreme than a
change that destroyed a less distinct interest. For Holmes, this was not by itself
conclusive, but was a factor that weighed in favor of finding a constitutional
violation.
Two other lines of precedent equally applicable to the Mahons emerge in
the Mahon opinion's second half. 70 First, Holmes reemphasizes the principle
of protecting "personal safety," and introduces the principle of "average
reciprocity of advantage," in the course of distinguishing Mahon from
165. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. As William Fischel has noted, the Pennsylania Supreme Court
recognized the right to support as a separate estate only five years before Afahon. in Penman v Jones. 100
A. 1043 (Pa. 1917). See FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 17-18, 32-33. Ironically. the chief advocate of such
recognition was Phillip Mattes, the Scranton City Solicitor. author of the Kohler Act and an amicus bnef
in support of the Mahons. See Amicus Brief for the City of Scranton. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon.
260 U.S. 393, 411 (1922) (No. 549); FISCHEL, supra note 23. Mattes had invented the notion of treating
support rights as a separate estate in land to enable Scranton to acquire those nghts cheaply from a % illing
seller. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court swallowed the theory, but it came back to haunt the court a short
five years later in Mahon. See id. at 33. As Fischel notes, the court's decision was roundly cnticized by
none other than Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, in one of the very few examples of his own application of
"Hohfeldian analysis" before his untimely death. See id.; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. Faulty Analysis in
Easement and License Cases, in WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD. FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONcEpTONS As
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 160 (Walter Wheeler Cook cd.. 1923).
166. FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 18.
167. See ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 156-65; supra note 147 (discussing Ackerman's interpretation
of Holmes).
168. For example, for several hundred years. estates in land have been alienable inter vivos and
devisable, unlike some future interests in some jurisdictions. Compare I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
2.1, at 77 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (noting that freehold estates were alienable and devisable after
1540), with LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAw OF FIrURE I,,NEPSTS §§ 1857. 1859. at 167,
171-73 (2d ed. 1956) (noting that executory interests and contingent remainders were once inalienable in
many states and are still inalienable in some states), and id. § 1903, at 204-05 (noting that some courts
have held possibilities of reverter not to be devisable). Similarly, co-owners of possessory estates generally
have the power to partition, whereas co-owners of future interests do not. See id. §1764. at 88.
169. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
170. The opinion's drafting history explains this seeming misplacement. In addition to suggesting that
Holmes append a discussion of the constitutionality of the Kohler Act as applied to publicly owned
surfaces, see supra note 148, Chief Justice Taft advised Holmes to address Plymouth Coal Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914), on which he predicted (correctly) Justice Brandeis's dissent would rely.
See Letter from William H. Taft to Oliver W. Holmes (Dec. 2, 1922). in DiMento, supra note 2.3. at
407-08. Rather than rewriting his initial draft, Holmes placed all additional discussion in a new second half
of the opinion, whether or not it specifically related to the Kohler Act's application to public lands.
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Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania.t7 1 In Plymouth Coal, theCourt upheld
a Pennsylvania statute requiring each mine owner to leave coal in place at the
edge of its property, to protect miners from being drowned if a neighboring
mine was abandoned and allowed to fill with water. Holmes concedes that the
statute upheld in Plymouth Coal made it impossible to mine certain coal, an
effect that "has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it.' 72 The Plymouth Coal statute was different
for two reasons. First, it "was a requirement for the safety of employees
invited into the mine.' ' t73 Thus Holmes returns to the goal of protecting
personal safety: The Plymouth Coal statute was adequately related to that goal,
while the Kohler Act was not. 74 Second, because the regulation not only
burdened, but also benefitted each mine owner, the Plymouth Coal statute
"secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a
justification of various laws."'
75
Holmes's development of this idea-"average reciprocity of
advantage"-provides a particularly clear example of his analogical method.
In Noble State Bank v. Haskell,t76 Holmes starts with a practice that is
recognized as constitutional under settled law, the "every day" case of
taxation. 77 He then attempts to frame a principle explaining why taxation is
constitutional and suggests that there are other cases that might be justified
under that principle. Taxation, he indicates, is probably not the only practice
justified on the principle that "the share of each party in the benefit of a
scheme of mutual protection is sufficient compensation for the correlative
burden that it is compelled to assume."'' 7 ' Holmes then elaborates on this
principle in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 179 noting that the police power "has
been held warranted in some cases by what we may call the average
reciprocity of advantage, although the advantages may not be equal in the
particular case."' 80 The scheme established by the statute in Plymouth Coal,
Holmes suggests, is similar enough to these other recognized practices to pass
constitutional muster. It is not too much of a stretch to call the scheme a
"scheme of mutual protection,"'' though it, like many of the other practices,
171. 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
172. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
173. Id. at 415.
174. Holmes does not really explain the difference between Mahon and Plymouth Coal with regard
to the goal of protecting personal safety. Is there some reason why requiring mine owners to give notice
of intent to abandon a mine would not have provided the same degree of protection as notice would have
in Mahon? Does it matter that the statute in Plymouth Coal was supposed to protect business invitees rather
than owners?
175. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
176. 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
177. See id. at I11.
178. Id.
179. 260 U.S. 22 (1922).
180. Id. at 30.
181. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
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may imperfectly distribute benefits and burdens. By contrast, the Kohler Act
is much less like a scheme of mutual protection; it seems to effect a
redistribution from one defined group to another.12 The holding in Plymouth
Coal cannot save it.
The other discussion in the second half of the Mahon opinion not
specifically directed toward public lands is that of the wartime rent control
cases. 183 The laws at issue in those cases, Holmes contends, are
distinguishable from the Kohler Act because they were "intended to meet a
temporary emergency and provid[ed] for compensation determined to be
reasonable by an impartial board.""' Holmes's discussion of the "temporary
emergency" justification in his opinion in one of those cases, Block v.
Hirsh,18 5 provides another good example of his effort to find principles in
preexisting law. He notes that the rent controls will undoubtedly deprive
apartment owners of the ability to profit fully from "the sudden influx of
people to Washington caused by the needs of Government and the war and
thus of a right usually incident to fortunately situated property."'u However,
the policy of restricting profits from a national misfortune "has been embodied
in taxation and is accepted."'8 7 In other words, the principle of restricting
"war profits" is well established in existing law; whether or not it is logical,
it is a "structural habit," and that is all Holmes needs to know. The wartime
rent control cases are close enough to the existing tradition not to constitute
a radical change and thus pass constitutional muster.' The Kohler Act, on
the other hand, has nothing to do with restricting profits from war or other dire
emergencies so it cannot gain protection from that tradition.
Holmes's review of the Kohler Act as it applies to public lands-the
announced topic of the second half of the opinion-is less satisfying. Holmes
himself was not content with this portion of the opinion, and a letter that he
wrote to Frederick Pollock expressing this dissatisfaction may contain the
clearest statement of what he intended to convey:
Brandeis's dissent speaks as if what I call average reciprocity of
advantage were made the general ground by me. Not so. I use that
182. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393. 416 (1922) (concluding that Kohler Act
"giv[es to private persons and communities] greater rights than they bought'). Carol Rose emphasizes this
point in her reading of Mahon. See Rose, supra note 15, at 581 (noting that Mahon "turned... on the fact
that the statute transferred rights from one finite class of property owners to another").
183. See Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)
184. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
185. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
186. Id. at 157.
187. Id.
188. In a later case, Holmes showed that he was serious about the importance of the **war profits" and
"temporary emergency" rationale; he maintained that the rent control law upheld in Block v. Hirsh became
unconstitutional once the emergency ceased. See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair. 264 U.S. 543. 548-49 (1924);
infra note 226 (discussing Chastleron).
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only to explain a particular case. My ground is that the public only
got on to this land by paying for it and that if they saw fit to pay only
for a surface right they can't enlarge it because they need it now any
more than they could have taken the right of being there in the first
place. Perhaps it would have been well if I had emphasized more the
distinction between the rights of the public in places where their right
to be there is unqualified and their right where they only get any
locus standi by a transaction that renounced what they now claim."'
Holmes's only discussion of related precedent is a discussion of the doctrine
of public necessity, under which certain emergencies will justify public
authorities in destroying private property without compensation. The classic
case of public necessity, exemplified by the Supreme Court opinion Holmes
cites,19 is the destruction of privately owned buildings to provide a
firebreak. Holmes argues that these exceptional cases should be read narrowly
and then speculates, interestingly, that the whole doctrine may "stand as much
upon tradition as upon principle."'' Under my reading of Holmes, this is an
odd comment for him to make. Here, Holmes seems to discard tradition in
favor of "principle" of unknown origin. There is an answer to this, but it is
one that introduces further complexities to Holmes's thought, and to his
constitutional project.
Holmes believed that some legal doctrines could be identified as
"survivals"t'--rules that continue to exist by inertia even though the law in
general has discarded their original justifications. His comment in Mahon about
the doctrine of public necessity suggests that he believed that doctrine to be
such a survival. Although the public necessity doctrine persisted, other legal
doctrines pointed to the acceptance of a principle at odds with allowing "public
necessity" to justify uncompensated destruction of property. In The Common
Law, Holmes had argued that Anglo-American tort law was best understood
as embodying the principle that a person should generally be liable for those
harms that a prudent man would have known would result from his
actions.193 That tort liability, argued Holmes, was independent of the
189. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 31, 1922), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETrERS, supra note 40, at 108, 109. The fact that the Kohler Act reverses the outcome of a specific
bargain is important in Frank Michelman's treatment of Mahon. Michelman notes that an owner's
"psychological commitment to his explicit, formally carved out, appurtenant rights in another's land is
much more sharply focused and intense, and much nearer the surface of his consciousness, than any
reliance he places on his general claim to be safeguarded against nuisances." Michelman, supra note 17,
at 1231. Such a factor may well have been important to Holmes, who certainly believed that property had
a psychological basis, see supra text accompanying notes 112-22, and was aware that crystallized
expectations were given special protection by some positive-law traditions, such as the vested rights
doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 50-62.
190. Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879).
191. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
192. See, e.g., 3 HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24,
at 406, 412.
193. See 3 HOLMES, The Common Law, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 142, 146-47.
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blameworthiness of the action in question. For example, we would not blame
a man for stealing a horse when his life depended on it. Yet the law would
hold the man liable; "although [the horse thief] does wisely to ransom his life
as best he may, there is no reason why he should be allowed to intentionally
and permanently transfer his misfortunes to the shoulders of his
neighbors."' ' Private necessity does not exempt a person from liability;
Holmes thought it was an anomaly that public necessity did. Echoing his
pronouncement in The Common Law, Holmes asserts in Mahon that "[i]n
general it is not plain that a man's misfortunes or necessities will justify his
shifting the damages to his neighbor's shoulders."' 9
It is not within the scope of this Article to trace further the connections
between Holmes's theory of torts and his constitutional property jurisprudence,
but it is important to note the complications that recognition of "survivals"
introduce into Holmes's method of deciding constitutional property cases. If
we are to recognize such a category, then we must not only identify "structural
habits" in positive law, but also evaluate which ones might be "survivals" that
no longer fit in with other legal principles. The more weight we give to that
"fit," however, and the more abstract the contravening principles on which we
rely, the more it seems we are relying on a model of law-as a consistent
body ordered by highly abstract principles-that Holmes seems at other times
to reject. Even with those complications, however, the Mahon opinion is best
understood as exemplifying Holmes's jurisdictional project: assessing the
degree to which the challenged legislation departs from principles embedded
in standing positive law.
4. The Place of Diminution in Value
Until now, I have not focused on the role of economic value, and of
diminution in that value, in Holmes's constitutional property jurisprudence.
Diminution in value cannot be ignored, however, for Holmes obviously thought
it had an important role.'9 He never explicitly stated the reason he
considered diminution in value important, but the most likely explanation is a
positivist reduction of right to remedy. Never a sentimentalist, Holmes
recognized that the "just compensation" guaranteed by the Constitution was in
practice far less than the "full and just equivalent"'91 about which the Court
194. Id. at 190.
195. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. David Rosenberg traces the connection between Holmes's general theory
of torts, the doctrine of private necessity, and the just compensation requirement for takings. in DAVID
ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HoLMEs: His THEORY OF ToRTS IN HISTORY 112-13, 120-21 (1995).
196. It also cannot be ignored because of its prominence in modern takings analysis. See infra text
accompanying notes 372-96.
197. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States. 148 U.S. 312. 325 (1893). For recent opinions
quoting this language from Monongahela Navigation Co., see PruneYard Shopping Center st Robins. 447
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occasionally rhapsodized. Rather, he noted, the community "runs highways and
railroads through old family places in spite of the owner's protest, paying in
this instance, to be sure, the market value ... but still sacrificing his will and
his welfare to that of the rest."' 98 Because the remedy for a taking is the
limited one of payment of market value, rather than return of the property
itself, the ownership interest protected by the just compensation principle is not
the interest in physical possession, but the interest in market value. Thus, the
police power is precisely the "power of the State to limit what otherwise
would be rights having a pecuniary value,"' 9 and the effect of a legal
change on pecuniary value becomes particularly important to constitutional
property analysis.
Viewed from the perspective of his broader constitutional property
jurisprudence, Holmes's comments in Mahon and elsewhere suggest two
different roles for diminution in value. First, Holmes sometimes appears to
treat the amount of loss in value as a second factor in his takings equation, in
addition to the degree of change from principles in existing law. On this view,
the general question posed by all constitutional property cases becomes, "How
much are settled expectations disturbed by this change in law?" The magnitude
of that disturbance is, roughly speaking, the product of multiplying the degree
of legal change by the amount of economic loss caused by the change.
This way of framing the inquiry recognizes that the Constitution is
designed to protect people, and that the way people react to legal change
depends both on how unexpected the change is and how much impact the
change has on their lives. Imagine, for example, that a town council passed an
ordinance that funded the production of purple and yellow postcard-sized
address plates for each home and required each homeowner to affix an address
plate to her home because the council decided that the signs were aesthetically
pleasing and would make the town prettier. There may be little precedent for
such an ordinance in the law of the jurisdiction; perhaps there is no tradition
of requiring homeowners to change the facades of their homes for wholly
aesthetic reasons. If that is the case, the change wrought by the sign ordinance
may be quite unexpected; it may run counter to rather deep "structural habits."
On the other hand, the burden this alteration places on homeowners is small;
it requires them to do very little, and the effect on their homes is trivial. Thus,
the net effect may be that the change jiggles rather than jolts settled
expectations. By contrast, an ordinance requiring homeowners to paint their
U.S. 74, 83 n.7 (1980), and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 148
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
198. 3 HOLMES, The Common Law, in COLLECrED WORKS, supra note 24, at 109, 137; see also
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510-12 (1979) (confirming use of fair market value
as general measure of just compensation under Fifth Amendment).




entire houses yellow and purple would have a considerably larger impact and
thus be more upsetting, even though it and the address plate ordinance
represent the same challenge to principles embedded in existing law."- '
Holmes's comment at the beginning of the legal discussion in Mahon
suggests a possible variation on this role. Holmes may have believed that as
the loss in economic value increases, there is some point at which legislation
will amount to a taking no matter how consistent it is with principles
embedded in preexisting law (as long as it can still be identified as changing
that preexisting law). "When [the diminution in value] reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act."' 2 ' The evidence in Mahon,
however, suggests that while Holmes may have toyed with the idea of fixing
a particular point at which diminution in value required compensation "in all
cases," 202 he was not ready to carry it out. Instead, Holmes describes the
diminution in value in Mahon only in vague terms-portraying the support
rights as "a very valuable estate"203 --and bases his decision on the Kohler
Act's departure from principles embedded in existing law .0
The second role for diminution in value is quite familiar to students of
200. Holmes appears to take this approach in Rideout r. Knox. 19 N.E. 390 (Mass. 1889). In Rtdeout.
Holmes comments that "[s]ome small limitations of previously existing rights incident to property may be
imposed for the sake of preventing a manifest evil," although 'larger ones could not be. except by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain." Id at 392. The statute at issue, he notes. is confined "to such
fences only as unnecessarily exceed six feet in height"; in his opinion, "[i]t ts hard to imagine a more
insignificant curtailment of the rights of property." Id. The insignificant impact of the statute, or as Holmes
calls it, "the smallness of the injury," id. at 393. becomes one factor weighing in favor of the statute's
constitutionality, along with "the nature of the evil to be avoided'" and "the quast accidental character of
the defendant's right to put up a fence for malevolent purposes," id. Similarly. tn Noble State Bank v
Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), Holmes seems to suggest that the magnitude of a statute's impact is also a
factor in determining whether the statute meets the "public purpose" or "pubhc use" requirement of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 110 ("[A]n ultenor public advantage may justify a
comparatively insignificant taking of private property for what, in its immediate purpose, is a pnvate use.")
201. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). This suggestion is undoubtedly
related to Holmes's vision of legal specification, a project that I descnbe in greater detail below See infra
text accompanying notes 228-36.
202. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
203. Id. at 414.
204. Two other Holmes opinions suggest that if legislation can be closely identified with a well-
established practice, the economic loss caused by the legislation does not matter. In Alaska Fish Salting
& By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921), Holmes wrote an opinion upholding an Alaska statute
imposing a tax on the production of fertilizer and other specified products from hemng "If Alaska deems
it for its welfare to discourage the destruction of herring for manure and to preserve them for food for man
or for salmon ... it hardly can be said to be contravening a Constitution that has known protective tariffs
for a hundred years." Id. at 48. Indeed, stated Holmes. Alaska was operating within the bounds of such a
well-established practice of assessing protective tariffs that '[elven if the tax should destroy a business it
would not be made invalid or require compensation upon that ground alone." Id. Similarly. in Erie R.R.
v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U.S. 394 (1921), Holmes wrote an opinion upholding an
order of a New Jersey commission requiring railroads to build bridges or viaducts over or under newly laid
out highways to avoid grade crossings with their previously existing railroad tracks. Holmes concluded that
the state had the power to insist that its highways would not be dangerous to the public, regardless of the
cost to the railroads. "That the States might be so foolish as to kill a goose that lays golden eggs for them.
has no bearing on their constitutional rights.... If the burdens imposed are so great that the road cannot
be run at a profit it can stop, whatever the misfortunes the stopping may produce." Id. at 410-11
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recent regulatory takings jurisprudence. Holmes notes in the second half of the
Mahon opinion that "[t]o make it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it."'205 Here, it is not the raw amount of
diminution in value that matters but the fact that we can identify some separate
object--"certain coal"-the value of which has been completely eliminated. In
the mathematical terms often used in more recent discussion,2" the value of
the discrete object is the denominator and the amount of diminution the
numerator. As the fraction approaches unity, the likelihood of finding a taking
increases.207 Conceivably, this fact is significant in Holmes's view because a
variety of doctrines in existing law, such as the law of tortious conversion,
grant strong protection against the destruction or appropriation of discrete
objects. Legislation that results in destruction or complete loss of value of a
discrete object thus represents a substantial change in one settled principle.20
As Holmes immediately makes clear in Mahon, however, this is not the only
principle to be considered: The statute in Plymouth Coal v. Pennsylvania2"
equally made it "commercially impracticable to mine certain coal"2 ' and yet
did not violate the Constitution.21' Moreover, Holmes makes clear in other
cases that the "average reciprocity of advantage" 212 he identifies as the
saving factor in Plymouth Coal is not perfect compensation, but an elastic
concept derived from legal traditions such as taxation.2"3 In sum, Holmes
considered at least two different roles for diminution in value. Both made it an
important factor, but neither made it the organizing principle of his
constitutional property calculus.
C. The Historical Process of Constitutional Specification
I have already suggested one way in which history was important to
Justice Holmes's view of constitutional property theory. For Holmes, the
205. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
206. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); Michelman, supra note 17, at 1192.
207. Much recent debate has focused on choosing the denominator:. What counts as a discrete object?
See, e.g., EAGLE, supra note 12, § 8-2(h), at 324-44 (discussing problems of "segmentation" and
"agglomeration"); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674-78 (1988) (considering phenomenon of
"conceptual severance"). Holmes does not address this issue in Mahon; one can only surmise that he would
have been likely, here as elsewhere, to look to legal traditions. As I note below, see infra text
accompanying note 391, Justice Scalia has more recently suggested such an approach.
208. This explanation is not completely convincing, as I will discuss below. See infra text
accompanying notes 407-13.
209. 232 U.S. 531 (1914). I discuss Plymouth Coal above. See supra text accompanying notes 170-80.
210. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
211. See id. at 415.
212. Id.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 175-80.
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"property" protected by the Constitution was defined by historically contingent
positive law; compensation was required when legislation departed too
drastically from legal traditions. History was also important to his view of that
theory in another way, however. Holmes thought that the process of discerning
the principled limits of legal change was itself irreducibly historical.
For Holmes, the idea that constitutional boundaries can only be limned
over time is an outgrowth of the common law view of legal organization.21t
If constitutional law is organized around paradigm cases and if constitutional
adjudication is an exercise in fixing the position of each new set of facts in
relation to existing multiple paradigm cases, then the development of a body
of constitutional law will take time. In a relatively new area of law, rendering
decisions will be difficult. As Justice Holmes notes in Hudson County Water
Co. v. McCarter,2"5 "[i]t sometimes is difficult to fix boundary stones
between the private right of property and the police power when, as in the case
at bar, we know of few decisions that are very much in point."
21 6
Federal constitutional property law was, for Holmes, a relatively new area.
The Fifth Amendment, the Contract Clause, and "principles of general
constitutional law'2 17 had produced some relevant precedent, as had, in a
broader sense, the entire common and statutory law of property. The field did
not coalesce, however, until the Supreme Court began to accept the idea that
Fourteenth Amendment due process had a substantive component, an event that
occurred sometime in the nine year period between 1878, the date that the
Court seemed to have rejected substantive due process in Davidson v. New
Orleans,28 and 1887, the date the Court decisively embraced it in Mugler
v. Kansas.219 On Holmes's common law time scale, a period of thirty-five
years-the period separating Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon-was
not particularly long. Thus, in Noble State Bank v. Haskell,'2 after noting
that "lines are pricked out by the gradual approach and contact of decisions on
the opposing sides,"' Holmes suggested just how gradual the process might
be. The Court's holding in that 1911 case was a decision on one of the
opposing sides, to be contrasted with the Court's most recent holding on the
other side, its 1875 decision in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka." '-
214. See supra text accompanying notes 123-42.
215. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
216. Id. at 355.
217. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878) (describing legal basis of Court's decision in
Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875)).
218. 96 U.S. 97 (1878) (rejecting landowner's Fourteenth Amendment challenge to special assessmcnt
levied to fund swamp drainage project).
219. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). For a description of the Court's shift dunng this period. see DAVID P
CURRiE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPRE.ME CoURT. THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS. 1789-1888. at 373-77
(1985).
220. 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
221. Id. at 112.
222. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875). But see Noble State Bank. 219 U.S. at 104.
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The available evidence suggests that Holmes saw Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon not as an exceptional case that revolutionized constitutional property
law, but rather as one more small boundary stone in a field that was still
largely unmarked. 223 Thus, in a dissent written four years after Mahon,
Holmes returned to his basic image of legal structure and development-the
image of paradigm cases with blurred edges that are slowly sharpened by the
development of precedent-and used Mahon itself as an example: "The line
[bounding the police power] cannot be drawn by generalities, but successive
points in it must be fixed by weighing the particular facts. Extreme cases on
the one side and on the other are Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel and
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." Here, one has to understand Holmes's
image of "opposite poles ''21 to understand fully this passage. Edgar A. Levy
Leasing Co., a 1922 case upholding a rent control ordinance, is "extreme" not
because it is so obviously within the police power, but because it is
exceedingly remote from the cases that everyone would agree are paradigm
exercises of government power that require no compensation. It is so remote,
in fact, that it almost falls within the orbit of another set of paradigm
cases-those in which the exercise of government power must be accompanied
by compensation.226 Mahon had fallen into that orbit, but just barely, which
makes it an extreme case on the other side. Together, they help to define the
edges of the police power, just as samples of frozen and liquid water at,
respectively, thirty-one and thirty-three degrees Fahrenheit would help to
establish the freezing point at thirty-two degrees. As Holmes articulated the
notion in his essay on The Theory of Torts, and later repeated in The Common
Law, "at last a mathematical line is arrived at by the contact of contrary
decisions.
227
223. For my discussion of specific precedents for Mahon, see infra text accompanying notes 273-83.
224. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 601 (1926) (Holmes, J..
dissenting) (citations omitted).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
226. A bit of fascinating history can help explain why Holmes really thought that Edgar A. Levy
Leasing Co. was an "extreme case" barely within the police power. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. was the
last of three cases in which the Court had upheld rent control laws instituted during World War 1. The other
two, decided in the previous Term, were Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921), and
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). (Justice Holmes wrote the Court's opinions in both of the latter cases,
getting a bare majority of five votes.) In Mahon, Holmes concludes that these three cases "went to the
verge of the law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). This is the proposition for
which Mahon was most frequently cited in its first, pre-1937 life. See infra text accompanying note 299.
Two years after Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co., Holmes wrote the Court's opinion in Chastleton Corp.
v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924). In Chastleton, the Court reversed an order dismissing a challenge to a
statute extending the time of the rent control provisions upheld in Block v. Hirsh. Justice Holmes, writing
for the Court, expressed in dicta a much more extreme judgment. "[l]f the question were only whether the
statute is in force today," Holmes states, "upon the facts that we judicially know we should be compelled
to say that the law has ceased to operate." Id. at 548-49.
227. 1 HOLMES, The Theory of Torts, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 326, 327; see also 3
HOLMES, The Common Law, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 109, 179.
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Legal specification-the development of definite rules of conduct from less
determinate standards-was for Holmes not just a phenomenon to notice and
describe, but a valuable project for courts to undertake. The value underlying
the project was predictability. As Holmes declares in the last part of his lecture
on trespass and negligence in The Conunon Law, "it is very desirable to know
as nearly as we can the standard by which we shall be judged at a given
moment. '228 Giving a negligence case to the jury amounts, Holmes writes,
to a confession by the judge that he is uncertain about the rule by which to
assess the conduct of the defendant, and to a resolution that he will seek aid
from "twelve men taken from the practical part of the community."' 9 But
that predicament should not be permanent. As the conduct is repeated in a
number of cases, the judge should perceive a more specific rule of liability and
should announce that rule as law. "[T]he tendency of the law," writes Holmes,
"must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty."2" Holmes presents a
variety of examples of this process. An example particularly relevant to land-
use law is that of the English doctrine of ancient lights:
An obstruction to be actionable must be substantial. Under ordinary
circumstances the erection of a structure a hundred yards off, and one
foot above the ground, would not be actionable. One within a foot of
the window, and covering it, would be, without any finding of a jury
beyond these facts. In doubtful cases midway, the question whether
the interference was substantial has been left to the jury. But as the
elements are few and permanent, an inclination has been shown to lay
down a definite rule, that, in ordinary cases, the building complained
of must not be higher than the distance of its base from the dominant
windows."'
When Holmes suggests in Mahon that one might be able to fix "a certain
magnitude" at which diminution in value would require compensation "in most
if not all" cases,232 he is thinking in terms of this same project of legal
specification. As he states in a letter to legal philosopher John Wu, the limits
of the police power are "a matter of degree and in Martin v. District of
Columbia I took pleasure in pointing out that a man's constitutional rights, the
difference between the police power and the need of eminent domain with
compensation, might be a matter of feet and inches.
233
228. 3 HOLMES, The Common Law, in COLLECTED WORKS. supra note 24. at 109. 179
229. Id. at 177.
230. Id. at 179.
231. Id. at 180 (citation omitted). Holmes's discussion of the project of specification continues in 3
HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in CoLLECTED WORKS. supra note 24. at 406, 415-18
232. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
233. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Doctor John C.H. Vu (Nov. 4, 1923). in JUSTICE HOLMES
TO DOCTOR WU: AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1921-1932. at 17 (n.d.. probably 1947) (citation
omitted).
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Holmes's project of specification, with its desired goal of specific rules,
is in obvious tension with his view that law and society are always in flux.
Why should the rule that buildings may be built as high as their distance from
a neighboring window, but no higher, be good for all time? Holmes recognizes
this problem, but he concludes that legal and social change would, in most
areas, occur extremely slowly so that they would not overtake a project of
specification and render it impossible.234 As he notes regarding tort liability:
No doubt the general foundation of legal liability in blameworthiness,
as determined by the existing average standards of the community,
should always be kept in mind, for the purpose of keeping such
concrete rules as from time to time may be laid down conformable to
daily life .... But these considerations only lead to the conclusion
that precedents should be overruled when they become inconsistent
with present conditions .... [T]he standards for a ve7 large part of
human conduct do not vary from century to century.
Only in a few selected areas of human conduct would Holmes's project of
specification be undesirable or impossible: "The exceptions would mainly be
found where the standard was rapidly changing, as, for instance, in some
questions of medical treatment. ' z 6 Otherwise, courts should move toward
formulating specific rules of conduct that individuals could know in advance.
Courts that are involved in the adjudication of constitutional property cases
should pursue the same project, so that governments and individuals
understand their respective powers and liabilities in greater detail.
II. THE MYTHS OF MODERN MAHON
[T]he holding in Pennsylvania Coal ... has for 65 years been the
foundation of our "regulatory takings" jurisprudence.... [O]ur
repeated reliance on that opinion establishes it as a cornerstone of the
jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
Clause.237
There is no reason to think that any other member of the Mahon Court, let
alone a majority, embraced or even appreciated the whole of Justice Holmes's
234. I question the continuing validity of this assumption below. See infra text accompanying notes
417-24.
235. 3 HOLMES, The Common Law, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 109, 179.
236. Id. at 178. For a recent view of the wisdom of refraining from specification in an area of rapid
change, see Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2402-03 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring), where Justice Souter argued that the First Amendment should be
applied td cable television "by direct analogy rather than by rule" until "the technologies of
communication ... have matured and their relationships become known."




constitutional property jurisprudence. Thus, it would be a mistake to suggest
that the true Holmesian meaning of Mahon was once known to all, and has
since become obscured. But Chief Justice Rehnquist's comment, suggesting
that the Supreme Court's understanding of and reliance on Mahon remained
consistent over the sixty-five years between 1922 and 1987, is equally
inaccurate. The frequency of citation of the Holmes opinion in Mahon-a
telling indicator of its influence-has varied widely over that period.3 Most
dramatically, after being cited in a moderate number of Supreme Court
opinions between 1922 and 1935, Mahon all but disappeared from the United
States Reports for over two decades. In the twenty-two years from 1936
through 1957, Mahon appeared in a single obscure dissent by Justice
Frankfurter.239 After 1957, the Court's understanding of Mahon differed
drastically from its understanding before 1936. In their haste to appropriate
Holmes's reputation and utilize his striking turns of phrase in a new
constitutional era, Supreme Court Justices of every stripe began to ignore key
points of understanding between Justice Holmes and the 1922 Court. By the
mid-1980s, the Court had embraced a new understanding, or new
understandings, of Justice Holmes's Mallon opinion. In this Part, I first explain
the original common points of understanding. I then show how Mahon was
rediscovered, if not reinvented, and explore the role it has played in modem
takings cases. Finally, I suggest some issues to consider in deciding whether
238. The following chart shows the citation history of Holmes's Mahon opinion in the Supreme Court.
the lower federal courts, and the state courts:
PERIOD NUMBER SUPREME COURT LOWER FEDERAL STATE COURT
OF CrTATIONSIPER YEAR COURT CITATIONS/PER CrTATIONSIPER YEAR
YEARS YEAR
1922-1935 14 12 0.86 22 1.57 43 307
1936-1957 22 1 0.05 15 0.68 83 3.77
1958-1977 20 7 0.35 61 3.05 177 8.85
1978-1996 19 29 1.53 239 12.58 228 12.00
These figures were compiled from Shepard's Citations and \Vestlaw; the last penod ends in September
1996. I have not attempted to adjust the figures to take account of varying caseloads. eather among different
courts or over time, nor have I adjusted more specifically for varying takings caseloads or regulatory
takings caseloads. Nonetheless, the figures give some sense of Mahon's varying stature over time.
Interestingly, the citation history of Mahon in the lower federal courts roughly parallels that in the Supreme
Court, with a dip in citations from 1936 through 1957. and a dramatic rise after 1978. yet the citation
history in state courts shows no post-1935 dip. The continued reliance on Maho in state courts after 1935
may well be related to the persistence of state court use of economic substantive due process after ats
rejection by the Supreme Court, a phenomenon that was noted in several law review articles an the 1950s.
See John A.C. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law. 53 Nw. U.
L. REV. 13 (1958); John A. Hoskins & David A. Katz. Substantive Due Process in the States Revsited.
18 OHIO ST. LJ. 384 (1957); Monrad K. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States.
34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
239. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 133-34 (1950) (Frankfurter. J..
dissenting in part). I discuss Commodities Trading Corp. below. See infra text accompanying note 313.
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there is a role in modem constitutional property jurisprudence for a
rediscovered Mahon.
A. The Court's Original Understanding
Justice Holmes and the 1922 Supreme Court shared three key points of
understanding about Mahon, all of which have since been lost. First, Holmes
and the 1922 Court understood Mahon to be a Due Process and Contract
Clause case, not a Takings Clause case. Second, rather than viewing Mahon
as a seminal case, they understood the decision as one among many that
incrementally established the limits of the police power. Although Mahon was
part of a trend toward accepting that the constitutionality of nontrespassory
regulations could turn on the provision of compensation, it was not the first
case to so hold. Third, both Holmes and the Court recognized and accepted
Mahon's use of a historical method that looked to traditional legal principles
and categories, and that considered both the purpose and effect of legislation
important to the constitutional inquiry.
1. The Textual Basis
Holmes and the 1922 Court agreed that Mahon should be decided under
the Contract and Due Process Clauses, not the Takings Clause. At the same
time, the Due Process Clause was thought. to protect a right of just
compensation upon expropriation of property. Holmes's references to the
textual basis for the Mahon decision, although brief, are quite straightforward.
Holmes refers explicitly to the textual basis of the decision once: The police
power must be limited, he contends, "or the contract and due process clauses
are gone."240 Three coupled references to contract and property rights
elsewhere in the opinion underscore this dual textual basis. 4' Later in the
opinion, Holmes notes that the Fifth Amendment provides that private property
"shall not be taken for [public] use without compensation." '242 He recognizes,
however, that Mahon is not being decided under the Fifth Amendment, which
applies only to the federal government. Holmes notes carefully that "[a] similar
assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment.,
243
The case he cites makes clear-although in 1922 this hardly needed to be
240. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
241. See id. at 412 (noting that Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that "the defendant had
contract and property rights protected by the Constitution of the United States"); id. at 413 ("As applied
to this case, the statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights of property and contract."); id. at
414 ("[The Kohler Act] purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land ... and
what is declared by the Court below to be a contract hitherto binding the plaintiffs.").




made clear-that the pertinent provision of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
Due Process Clause.2"4
If Holmes did not take care to review the Kohler Act separately under the
standards of the Contract Clause and the standards of the Due Process Clause,
it was because, at the time, the standards that governed the dispute in Mahon
were identical in practice. To be sure, the threshold questions under the two
Clauses were in theory different. Under the Contract Clause, the threshold
question was whether the challenged statute arguably impaired a contract
obligation. Under the Due Process Clause, the question was whether the
challenged statute deprived an individual of a property interest. But the parties
in Mahon did not dispute the threshold questions: "As applied to this case, the
statute is admitted to destroy previously existing rights of property and
contract. ''245 Once these questions were answered in the affirmative, the
analyses under the two Clauses merged. 246 The single remaining issue under
both provisions was whether the challenged law was justified as an exercise
of the police power.247 Thus there is nothing mysterious about the fact that
the Mahon opinion refers to the Contract and Due Process Clauses in tandem
without attempting to distinguish them. There was no reason to draw a
distinction.2 s
Although the Contract and Due Process Clauses both had their place in
Mahon, the Takings Clause did not. In 1896 and 1897, the Court had decided
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prevented the states from
244. See id (citing Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598. 605 (1908)). Although Hairston
itself does not explicitly mention the Due Process Clause, it relies on a number of cases that do. See. e.g.
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) ("The taking by a State of the private
property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the private use of another, is not
due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth ... Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States."); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
245. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
246. This merger of analyses is reflected in the headings under which contemporary law review
comments treated Mahon. For six out of seven law reviews. Mahon was, first and foremost, a "police
power" case. Only three out of seven mention a specific constitutional provision in the heading. See
Comment on Cases, Constitutional Law: Police Power v. Eminent Domain. II CAL L REv. 188 (1923);
Current Decisions, Constitutional Law-Police Power-Unjustifiable Extension, 32 YALE .J. 511 (1923);
Note and Comment, Constitutional Law--Police Power Regulation. and Confiscation, 21 MtcH. L REv.
581 (1923); Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Legislative Powers: Impairment of the Obligation of
Contracts-Pennsylvania "Cave-in" Statute, 36 HARV. L. REv. 753 (1923); Recent Cases, Constitutional
Law--Police Power-Due Process-Mining-Surface Subsidence. 7 MINN. L REV. 242 (1923); Recent
Cases, Constitutional Law-Police Power-Kohler Act Held Unconstitutional. 71 U. PA. L. REV. 277
(1923); Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-Police Power-Taking Property and Impairing Contractual
Obligations by Exercise of State Police Power, 9 VA. L REV. 457 (1923). 1 explain this merger in greater
detail above. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
247. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (Contract Clause); Muglr v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887) (Due Process Clause). For further discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 57-68
and note 74.
248. It gives me pause that as careful a scholar as Carol Rose flatly states that the Mahon Court did
not address the Pennsylvania Coal Company's argument that the Kohler Act impaired an obligation of
contract, and then comments that "Holmes' neglect of the obligation of contract argument is somewhat
puzzling." Rose, supra note 15, at 565 n.22. Yet I remain convinced that Holmes simply had no need to
treat the two clauses separately.
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taking private property for private uses,249 and required the states to pay just
compensation if they took private property for public uses.250 The Court,
however, did not do so on the theory that the Due Process Clause extended the
reach of the Takings Clause from the federal government to the states. Rather,
the Court used the "fundamental rights" theory later documented and
championed by Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter and the second Justice
Harlan.251 As Justice Moody wrote in the 1908 case of Twining v. New
Jersey,252 "some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight
Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state
action, because a denial of them would be due process of law," ' but "[i]f
this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight
Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in
the conception of due process of law." 4 An important corollary of the
logical independence of due process principles from the rules of the first eight
amendments was that a due process principle might overlap an enumerated rule
only in part; the principle and the rule need not be coextensive.
Justice Holmes unquestionably accepted a version of the fundamental
rights theory of the Due Process Clause. In his dissent in Lochner v. New
York,256 for example, Holmes criticized the Court's application of substantive
due process, but acknowledged that a statute would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment if it "would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law." 7 Holmes also
explicitly accepted the notion that a due process fundamental principle need
249. See Missouri Pac. Ry., 164 U.S. at 417; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 157-58.
250. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 226 (1897); RICHARD C.
CoRTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RGHTS 24-29 (1981) (discussing Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 226). Three years earlier, the Court had held, in an opinion by
Justice Brewer, that the just compensation guarantee was included in the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894) ("The equal
protection of the laws which, by the Fourteenth Amendment, no State can deny to the individual, forbids
legislation, in whatever form it may be enacted, by which the property of one individual is, without
compensation, wrested from him for the benefit of another, or of the public."). Once Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. placed the just compensation guarantee in the Due Process Clause, however, the equal
protection theory faded.
251. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174-80 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adamson V.
California, 332 U.S. 46,59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,324-25
(1937) (Cardozo, J.); Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965).
252. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
253. Id. at 99.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 98, at 1196 (arguing that under fundamental rights theory, "[tihe
Fourteenth [Amendment] requires only that states honor basic principles of fundamental fairness and
ordered liberty-principles that might indeed happen to overlap wholly or in part with some of the rules
of the Bill of Rights, but that bear no logical relationship to those rules.").
256. 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (arguing that




not be coextensive with a provision in the Bill of Rights.?" In particular,
Holmes appeared willing to distinguish the due process principle of just
compensation from the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. In his dissent in
Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co.,2 9 Holmes concluded
that the "public use" limitation in the Takings Clause was not a due process
fundamental principle:
I wish to add only that I am not aware of any limitations in the
Constitution of the United States upon a State's power to condemn
land within its borders, except the requirements as to compensation.
All that was decided in Loan Association v. Topeka and Cole v. La
Grange was that the constitutions of certain States did not authorize
the taking of private property for a private use. But if those decisions
had been rested on the Fourteenth Amendment, which they were not,
and in my opinion could not have been, I do not perceive that they
have any bearing upon what I have said or upon the case at bar.260
Against this background, Holmes's remarks in Mahon about the relationship
between the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
are not sloppy, but quite precise. Holmes refers to the protection afforded by
the Takings Clause against the federal government and then states that "[a]
similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the 14th Amendment."-2 6'
The use of the word "similar" here is best read as an admonition that the
258. Holmes explained:
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the
Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word "liberty" as there
used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation
than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws
of the United States.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes. J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
259. 196 U.S. 239 (1905) (holding that respondent in state condemnation action may remove case to
federal court upon demonstrating diversity of citizenship). The Court decided the case by a bare majority.
Holmes's dissent garnered the votes of Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer and Peckham.
260. Id. at 260-61 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Both Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka and Cole v. LaGrange preceded Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska. 164 U.S. 403 (1886). which
held that Fourteenth Amendment due process encompassed the requirement that states take property only
for public uses; Holmes curiously fails to cite Missouri Pacific. which would seem to be directly on point.
When Holmes wrote for the Court, he had to accept the Court's precedent holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did contain a "public use" requirement; but his Fourteenth Amendment publtc use opinions
always stressed the breadth of state power to define public use. See, e.g., Hendersonville Light & Power
Co. v. Blue Ridge Interurban Ry., 243 U.S. 563 (1917); Mt. Vcmon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v
Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32-33 (1916); Noble State Bank v. Haskell. 219 U.S. 104,
111-12 (1911); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.. 200 U.S. 527. 531 (1906). Four yeats after
Mahon, Holmes, writing in dissent, appeared to return to the position he took in Madisonville: "The truth
seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when compensation is due., the legislature may forbid or
restrict any business when it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it." Tyson & Brother-United
Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes. J., dissenting).
261. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added) (citng Hairston
v. Danville & Western Ry., 208 U.S. 598, 605 (1908)). For a parallel use of the word "similar." see
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes. 1.) (specifically leaving "undecided the question
whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the First
[Amendment]").
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Fourteenth Amendment's fundamental principle of just compensation is
logically independent of the scope of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. On
this point, Justice Holmes was speaking for all of the Justices on the Mahon
Court, each of whom accepted the view that the Fifth Amendment applied only
to the federal government, and that the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied
to the states, did not incorporate the Fifth Amendment.262 Mahon, a state law
case, was not decided under the Takings Clause.263
2. Regulation and Just Compensation
A second point of common understanding between Holmes and the 1922
Court was that Mahon did not announce a radically novel doctrine; rather, it
was one of a series of cases articulating the boundaries between governmental
power and constitutional property rights. Mahon is now widely understood, by
Supreme Court Justices and academic commentators alike,2  to be a
262. As of 1922, the only Supreme Court Justice to have advocated the theory that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the first eight amendments was the first Justice Harlan. See Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan had left the Court in 1911. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 29, at 985. In the early to middle 1960s, the Court recharacterized many earlier due
process cases, including Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). as
incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights, although those cases did not originally rest on incorporation
theory. The Just Compensation Clause thus became subject to what Richard Cortner has fittingly dubbed
"retroactive incorporation." See CORTNER, supra note 250, at 215. As late as 1962, however, the second
Justice Harlan successfully intervened to prevent Justice Douglas from suggesting, in the opinion for the
Court in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated"
the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause. Harlan noted that Chicago, Burlington & Quincy referred
only to Fourteenth Amendment due process. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN:
GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT 281 (1992). Justice Stevens most recently picked up this cry,
arguing in dissent in Dolan v. City of 7igard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), that the Court was resurrecting
substantive due process and noting that the Court began its discussion by citing Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy, a substantive due process case. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Court's somewhat evasive response takes advantage of the "retroactive incorporation" phenomenon:
"[T]here is no doubt that later cases have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does make the Takings
Clause... applicable to the States. Nor is there any doubt that these cases have relied upon [Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy]." Id. at 2316 n.5 (citations omitted).
263. Holmes's comments in dissent in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923)
(invalidating District of Columbia minimum wage law), appear to reflect a modem, incorporationist
perspective on the independence of takings and substantive due process inquiries:
I agree, of course, that a law [directed toward a legitimate end, by means that many
governments have approved] might be invalidated by specific provisions of the Constitution.
For instance it might take private property without just compensation. But in the present
instance the only objection that can be urged is found within the vague contours of the Fifth
Amendment, prohibiting the depriving any person of liberty or property without due process of
law.
Id. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Adkins, however, is a case involving federal law, to which the Takings
Clause is directly applicable, and Holmes had this direct application in mind when he considered the
distinction between the Takings Clause and the Fifth Amendment (not the Fourteenth Amendment) Due
Process Clause. I have not found an instance of Holmes speaking in this manner when considering a
challenge to state law.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
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landmark: the first "regulatory takings" case. This honor is ambiguous; but
under any of the principal resolutions of the ambiguities, Mahon does not
deserve it. I have already argued that the claim is invalid under one
interpretation: Mahon was not the first case to hold that "regulatory" legislation
could violate the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, because Mahon was not
a Fifth Amendment case.
Assume, next, that "regulatory" legislation is that which does not affect the
physical possession of property but only its use and enjoyment. Perhaps the
claim is that Mahon was the first case to hold that use and enjoyment rights
were constitutionally protected property, whether under the Due Process Clause
or the Takings Clause.265 But under classical substantive due process, already
well established when Mahon was decided, constitutionally protected property
rights included the right to acquire wealth through bargaining for the sale of
one's labor,2 and the right to set the price at which one's property would
be sold.267 Thus Mahon is too late to claim the honor of expanding
constitutional property protection beyond physical possession.
265. This claim might be featured in a broader account of American law as moving from a primitive
physicalist understanding of property to a modem view of property as abstract legal relations or economic
value. Prominent versions of this account appear in MORTO. J. HoRwrz. TIHE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 145-67 (1992); Thomas C. Grey. The
Disintegration of Property, in NOmOs XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John V. Chapman cds.,
1980); and Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 325 (1980). (In a somewhat simplified form. of course.
the story of the transition from crude layman's physicalism to sophisticated lawyer's abstraction has bcomc
a staple of first-year law school property courses. See, e.g.. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN V. JOHNSON.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1-3 (3d ed. 1989)).
I cannot fully develop my skepticism of this broader account here, so one juxtaposition will have to
suffice. In the 1780s, James Madison and Gouvemeur Morris, among others, were issuing polemics against
price regulation, depreciating paper currency, and debtor relief laws. The men argued that such practices
amounted to takings of property, indicating an understanding of property rights as economic value. See
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIITnS OF AMERICAN CONSTITTIONALis~t 22-23.
72-74 (1990) (noting that Madison urged Virginia legislature to see that depreciating paper money "affects
rights of property as taking away equal value in land" and that Morris spoke of price regulations as an
"invasion of the rights of property... clothed with every necessary circumstance of violence-). Two
hundred years later, in the 1980s, the Supreme Court was issuing opinions holding that "permanent physical
occupations" constitute per se takings, indicating a continuing attachment to the idea that "property" is.
above all else, physical things. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S 825. 831 (1987);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
266. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I, 14 (1915) ("Included in the right of personal liberty and the
right of private property-partaking of the nature of each-is the right to make contracts for the acquisition
of property."); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: The Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on
Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REv. 201. 208 n.26 (1996) (noting that Lochner-cra Court treated
property rights as including right to contract); Roscoe Pound. Liberty of Contract. 18 YALE L.J. 454. 461
(1909) ("[O]ur courts regard the right to contract, not as a phase of liberty--a sort of freedom of mental
motion and locomotion-but as a phase of property, to be protected as such.").
267. See Tyson & Brother-United Theater Ticket Offices. Inc. v. Banton. 273 U.S. 418. 429 (1927)
("Mhe right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attrbute
of the property itself, and, as such, within the protection of the due process of law clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.") (citation omitted); see also Block v. Hirsh. 256 U.S. 135. 165 (1921) (White,
CJ., McKenna, Van Devanter, McReynolds, JJ., dissenting) ("There can be no conception of property aside
from its control and use, and upon its use depends its value.").
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Another possibility is that "regulatory taking" refers to legislation that
would be constitutional if and only if accompanied by just compensation.268
Under this interpretation, the textual basis for the just compensation obligation
is unimportant; it could be either the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The claim would be that Mahon
was the first case to hold that the constitutionality of a regulation could turn
on the provision of just compensation. This claim fails as well, but it is a more
interesting and substantial one. Recall that under the ahistorical model adopted
in the substantive rights/police power tradition, the property protected by the
Constitution is defined by an unchanging ideal boundary between the property
owner and the community, concerned with the limits of use and enjoyment as
well as possession.269 If a law is justified as enforcing the ideal boundary,
then no compensation is necessary. The law does not take property rights. To
the contrary, it ensures respect for them. Conversely, if the law is supposed to
enforce the ideal boundary but fails to do so, compensation cannot save it;
governments have no authority to prohibit property uses that do not injure the
community.
7°
268. Here I choose my words carefully. As I am framing it, the issue is not whether a court would
grant retroactive relief-damages measured to be just compensation-were a regulation to be held
unconstitutional. Rather, the issue is whether the prospective relief a court granted would acknowledge the
government's power to impose the regulation if it paid just compensation. In the language of Guido
Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, the issue is whether the constitutional entitlements regarding property
"regulation" are sometimes protected only by a liability rule, rather than a property rule (or an inalienability
rule). See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092-93 (1972). The question whether a damages remedy
is available against the government is a different one, although in the 1980s it became tangled up with the
designation of regulations as "takings." See infra text accompanying notes 345-62.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 57-68.
270. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) ("[U]nless there be some fair ground ...
to say that there is material danger to the public health or to the health of the employds .... [t]hc
legislature of the State has no power to limit their right .... "). At least three Supreme Court opinions
written in the quarter-century before Mahon seem to take an ahistorical approach but frame the
constitutional choice as that between the police power and just compensation rather than the police power
and invalidity. In Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900), the Court upheld an Indiana statute
forbidding owners of gas and oil wells from allowing gas or oil to escape into the open air for more than
two days after gas or oil was struck within the well. Justice White explains that this regulation is
constitutional because it actually protects the property rights of other well owners, since oil and gas are
owned jointly in a "common reservoir" before they are captured by a particular well owner. See id. at
210-11. Throughout the opinion, however, Justice White assumes that if the statute could not be justified
as protecting the rights of other well owners, then it would be invalid because it did not provide for just
compensation. See id. at 192. Similarly, in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), the Court upheld a
Massachusetts law limiting the height of buildings in Boston as reasonably related to the goal of preventing
injury to the public by the spread of fire. Justice Peckham, however, framed the issue as one of whether
the owner complaining about the law has a right to just compensation. See id. at 107. Finally, in Chicago,
Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railroad v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915), the Court struck down a law
prohibiting railroads from letting down an unengaged upper berth when the lower berth in the same section
was occupied, concluding that it was not justifiable as a health measure. See id. at 499-500. However, the
Court also described the issue as whether the law amounted to "a taking of the carrier's property without
just compensation." Id. at 501. Perhaps the approach taken in these cases can be attributed to the framing
of the issue by counsel, perhaps to the failure of the Justices to work out perfectly consistent approaches.
More recently, the Court has once again seemed to graft what was originally a due process test of
governmental authority onto the Takings Clause, suggesting the odd conclusion that a government can take
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This argument might prevail if a government's only legitimate function
were to maintain the ideal boundary between owners and the community: the
classic laissez-faire, "night watchman" view of government. In that case, the
constitutionality of legislation would rarely turn on the provision of
compensation, since the government's power of eminent domain could
presumably be used only in furtherance of its "night watchman"
function-when, for example, the government needed to acquire property rights
to build watchtowers. In fact, the Supreme Court's adoption of an ahistorical
approach under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did coincide
with an increasing acceptance by Supreme Court Justices of a laissez-faire
view of the role of government, influenced by classical political economy.
27'
The Supreme Court, however, never followed the laissez-faire model of
government with perfect consistency. The Court, if not all of its individual
members, recognized that both the states and the federal government had long
played roles other than that of "night watchmen," and it never fully rejected
those roles as illegitimate. For example, the Court never stopped governments
from promoting commerce through active involvement in the development of
mills, canals, and railroads, through means that included eminent domain.2
In those areas, where government action was legitimate but not necessarily
harm preventing, one might expect to find cases holding statutes constitutional
if, but only if, accompanied by just compensation.
Numerous cases of that sort had already been decided before Mahon
reached the Court. Three examples, written by Justices other than Holmes,'7
actions that do not substantially advance legitimate state interests so long as it pays compensation See. e.g.,
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825. 834. 837 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon. 447 U S
255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S 104. 127 (1978)
271. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAmP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW. 1836-1937. at 93-101
(1991).
272. On the promotion of canals and railroads, see generally CARTER GOODRICH. GOVERNMtE.'T
PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS. 1800-1890 (1960). which documents the history of
national railroad and canal subsidies. On the use of eminent domain, see. e.g.. Harry N Scheiber. The
Jurisprudence-and Mythology-of Eminent Domain in American Legal History. in LIBERTY. PROPERTY
AND GOVERNMENT' CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEORE TIlE NEW DEAL 217.220-25 (Ellen Frankel
Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989) [hereinafter Schiber. Jurisprudence]; Harry N Scheiber. Property
Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The Untied States, 1789-1910. 33 J ECO.s.
HIST. 232 (1973) [hereinafter Scheiber. Property Law].
273. I focus on opinions written by Justices other than Holmes in order to suggest that there was some
broader Court recognition that the constitutionality of nontrespassory regulations could turn on the provision
of compensation. However, Holmes had also written opinions before Mahon that struck down rcgulations
for lack of just compensation. See. e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska. 217 U.S. 196. 208 (1910)
(striking down statute requiring railroads to construct and maintain side tracks to service grain elevators
owned by other companies because statute "does not provide indemnity for what it requires"). Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Central Stock Yards Co.. 212 U.S. 132, 144 (1909) (striking down statute requirng
railroads to transport cars owned by other railroads because statute did not contain "adequate
regulations... for securing just compensation"). In 1921. just one year before Mahon was dectided. Holmes
drafted an opinion for the Court in Bullock v. Florida. 254 U.S. 513 (1921). reversing the Florida Supreme
Court's ruling that the state could prevent the sale of a bankrupt railroad's assets to a purchascr who
proposed to dismantle it for its scrap value. Holmes argued that the ruling amounted to forcing the railroad
to operate at a loss and thus was a taking of property without just compensation. See ALEXANDER MI
BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 224 (1957). Justice Brandeis's
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will suffice.274 In 1905, for instance, the Court held in Muhlker v. New York
& Harlem Railroad Co. 275 that a state statute authorizing the construction of
an elevated railroad line on the street in front of the plaintiff's apartment
building deprived him of implied easements of light and air that he had owned,
violating both the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Justice McKenna wrote, "[t]he permission, or command of the State,
can give no power to invade private rights, even for a public purpose without
payment of compensation. 276  Later, in the 1911 case of Curtin v.
Benson,277 the Court invalidated Interior Department rules regulating cattle
grazing on private land within the limits of Yosemite Park. Justice McKenna,
again writing for the Court, concluded that the rules constituted
not a prevention of a misuse or illegal use but the prevention of a
legal and essential use, an attribute of its ownership, one which goes
to make up its essence and value. To take it away is practically to
take [appellant's] property away, and to do that is beyond the power
even of sovereignty, except by proper proceedings to that end.278
The "proper proceedings" were, of course, eminent domain proceedings, under
which the government would pay just compensation for the power to ban cattle
grazing. Finally, in 1914, the Court held in Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co.279 that a federal statute conferring private nuisance immunity on a
railroad company for gases and smoke vented from a railroad tunnel onto a
neighbor's land constituted a taking of private property without just
compensation. Justice Pitney noted that "since [the plaintiff] is not wholly
excluded from the use and enjoyment of his property, there has been no
intervention led Holmes to change his mind and write an opinion affirming the Florida Supreme Court's
ruling by construing it very narrowly; all of the other Justices ended up voting for the new opinion, even
though they had tentatively voted to reverse. As published, however, Holmes's opinion still suggests that
forcing a railroad to continue operating at a loss would constitute a taking without just compensation. See
Bullock, 254 U.S. at 521; BICKEL, supra, at 223-27.
274. In addition to these three examples, there is the entire line of rate regulation cases that suggests
that the regulation of public utilities is subject to the limitation that governmentally set tariffs or rates must
afford just compensation to the owners. For instance, the Court stated in Smyth v. Ames:
A state enactment ... establishing rates ... that will not admit of the carrier earning such
compensation as ... is just to it and to the public, would deprive such carrier of its property
without due process of law and deny to it the equal protection of the laws ... [; whether rates
are] so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without such compensation as
the constitution secures [is matter subject to judicial inquiry].
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898); see also Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307,
331 (1886) ("This power to regulate is not a power to destroy .... Under pretence of regulating fares and
freights, the State cannot... do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation, or without due process of law.") (dicta).
275. 197 U.S. 544 (1905).
276. Id. at 569.
277. 222 U.S. 78 (1911).
278. Id. at 86.
279. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
[Vol. 106: 613
Regulatory Takings
'taking' of the land in the ordinary sense." -s Nevertheless, he wrote, "[wle
deem the true rule, under the Fifth Amendment . . . to be that . . . [the
legislature] may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of
such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for
public use."'211 In Richards, the gases and smoke from the tunnel "materially
contribute[d] to render [plaintiff's] property less habitable ... and to
depreciate it in value. '' 2  The Fifth Amendment did not allow "the
imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial a burden upon plaintiff's
property without compensation to him.
28 3
These opinions suggest the Court's willingness, both before Mahon and
through Justices other than Holmes, to use an eminent domain model to
analyze government alterations of property rules falling short of physical
dispossession and to strike them down for lack of compensation. That
willingness deprives Mahon of the title of first "regulatory eminent domain"
case.
3. Traditional Legal Categories
Holmes's contemporaries on the Supreme Court also shared a familiarity
with and acceptance of the historical and purpose-based analyses Holmes used
in Mahon. This may seem surprising, given that Holmes's historical approach
to constitutional property rights seems dramatically opposed to the prevailing
ahistorical approach, which sought to assess the relationship of laws to an ideal
boundary between the individual and society, independent of existing positive
law. Yet despite their fundamental differences, Holmes and the ahistoricists
used similar methods in practice. The particular brand of ahistoricism
characteristic of Lochner-era substantive due process looked to the traditional
categories of the common law to define the ideal boundary. 2'  Mugler i.
280. Id. at 552.
281. Id. at 553 (citations omitted).
282. Id. at 556.
283. lId. at 557.
284. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 18 ("Dunng the half century between 1870 and 1920. legal
scholarship was dominated by a group of scholars who believed that the disciplined investigation of the
historical common law tradition would reveal the basic principles defining legitimate social expcctations ");
TRIBE, supra note 67, § 8-1, at 565 (arguing that in last quarter of nineteenth century. judges
"[i]ncreasingly ... came to believe that substantive due process revie%, could be confined by boundaries
derived from common law categories"); Stephen A. Siegel. Lochner Era Jurisprudence and tie American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 81 (1991) (discussing Lochner-era jurists' use of common la",
principles as source of constitutional concepts. and in particular as source to define "the right of
property ... and the correlative sphere of government's 'police power"'); Cass R. Sunstem. Lochners
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (arguing that distinctive feature of Lochner era was not
"judicial activism," but rather promotion of constitutional requirement of neutrality. "defined as respect for
the behavior of private actors pursuant to the common law"). Sunstem casts Justice Holmes as a modem
"interest-group" pluralist, completely rejecting the guidance of the common law. See Sunstem. supra, at
879-80, 904-05. He does so, however, by truncating Holmes's dissent in Lochner. asserting that "for
Holmes, the Constitution does not prevent 'the natural outcome of a dominant opinion "' Id. at 879 (quoting
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes. J., dissenting)). The quoted fragment is. of course.
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Kansas, for example, appeals to the common law category of public
nuisance." 5 Munn v. Illinois286 looks to the common law for the category
of businesses "'affected with a public interest.' ' 287 Finally, Lochner v. New
York288 looks to, among other things, the common law contract doctrine of
incapacity.
289
In addition, both Holmes and the practitioners of Lochner-era ahistoricism
relied on a willingness to undertake some independent investigation of a
statute's purposes. The proclamation in Lochner is well known:
The purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural and
legal effect of the language employed; and whether or not it is
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must be determined
from the natural effect of such statutes when put into operation, and
not from their proclaimed purpose.290
One might think that Justice Holmes, the Lochner dissenter, would take the
opposite position that one should always defer to a legislature's
characterization. But Holmes's analysis in Mahon shows his position to be
different only in degree. Deference to legislative judgment in Mahon is one of
the key points of contention between Holmes and Brandeis. Twice, Brandeis
resorts to the now classic form of argument that posits a conceivable state of
affairs in which the legislature's chosen means would be more tightly
incomplete, as it is immediately qualified: "[U]nless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). One could, of course, argue that the qualification is disingenuous, but I am convinced otherwise.
285. The Court explained that:
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance,
or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very
different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without
due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending
property is taken away from an innocent owner.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
286. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
287. The full quote reads: "Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the
Constitution protects, we find that when private property is 'affected with a public interest, it ceases to be
juris privati only."' Id. at 125-26 (quoting Matthew Hale, De Portibus Maris, in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS
RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND (London, T. Wright 1787)). Justice Holmes thought the phrase
"affected with a public interest" to be as obfuscatory as "the police power": "[W]hen Legislatures are held
to be authorized to do anything considerably affecting public welfare it is covered by apologetic phrases
like the police power, or the statement that the business concerned has been dedicated to a public use."
Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
288. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
289. As the Court explained:
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men
in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care
for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of
judgment and of action.
Id. at 57.
290. Id. at 64.
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connected to the stated end. Regarding the supposed underinclusiveness of the
Kohler Act,29' Brandeis argues:
Where the surface and the coal belong to the same person, self-
interest would ordinarily prevent mining to such an extent as to cause
a subsidence. It was, doubtless, for this reason that the legislature,
estimating the degrees of danger, deemed statutory restriction
unnecessary for the public safety under such conditions.'
In response to Holmes's contention that giving notice of the mining would
have been sufficient to advance the state's interest in protecting personal
safety,293 Brandeis asks the rhetorical question: "May we say that notice
would afford adequate protection of the public safety where the legislature and
the highest court of the State, with greater knowledge of local conditions, have
declared, in effect, that it would not?"2'
Holmes implicitly rejects such extreme deference to the legislature. Indeed,
his method of analyzing constitutional property issues would seem to depend
on such a rejection. If one always defers to a legislature's declaration that a
statute is directed toward preventing some kind of damage traditionally
recognized as legally injurious, then one will never be able to conclude that the
statute drastically changes preexisting law. Although Holmes and the Lochner-
era ahistoricist undoubtedly may have disagreed in specific cases, they did not
disagree that, as Holmes put it in Mahon, "[t]he greatest weight is given to the
judgment of the legislature, but it is always open to interested parties to
contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power. ' -"
291. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. 413-14 (1922). supra text accompanying
notes 160-62.
292. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 420 (Brandeis. J., dissenting).
293. See id. at 414; supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
294. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 420 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
295. ld. at 413. G. Edward White observes that Holmes's relatively close scrutiny of legislation in
Mahon appears to conflict with his advocacy of deference to legislatures in Lochner and other due process
cases, and proposes to resolve the conflict by drawing a distinction between "takings" and "due process"
cases. White acknowledges that Mahon and Lochner were technically both due process cases 'because
Mahon preceded incorporation of the Takings Clause), but he argues that Holmes regarded Mahon." lespite
technical problems, as ... a 'takings clause' case," involving "tangible" rights of property, rather thn as
a "conventional due process case," involving "chimerical" rights "in the fashion of iberties' of contract."
G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OUVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND TIlE INNER SELF 402-03 (1993)- Thus.
according to White, Holmes first considers whether a law infringes "tangible" rights or merely "chimerical"
rights, and then decides on that basis whether to scrutinize the law closely or deferentially
By contrast, I think that the central issue in both Lochner and Mahon is that of change from principles
embedded in a positive law tradition. In Lochner. Holmes lists a wide variety of laws that. so far as he can
see, restrict liberty of contract as much as a maximum hour law for bakers: Sunday laws, usury laws.
prohibitions on lotteries, antitrust laws, bans on margin sales, and maximum hour laws for miners. See
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The maximum hour law challenged in Lochner. suggests
Holmes, does not involve a radical change from these existing laws. "A reasonable man might think it a
proper measure on the score of health," id., at 76, a justification found sufficient to restrict liberty of
contract in other cases. Thus, liberty of contract is "chimerical" for Holmes in the sense that it fails to
describe any of the structural habits of standing positive law that are Holmes's starting points; but it is
better to spell out that failure than to stop at the label "chimerical." Similarly. Holmes finds the ban on
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In sum, the Lochner-era ahistoricist would agree with Justice Holmes on
many intermediate issues about methods of legal analysis. The ultimate
significance of the analysis remained controversial. Holmes investigated
tradition to measure change, whereas the classic substantive due process
ahistoricist looked to tradition for static norms. The deeper jurisprudential
controversy, however, often remained submerged, since the content of most
judicial opinions-detailing the relationship between the challenged law, its
purpose, and relevant legal traditions-stayed within an area of agreement. So
it was with Mahon. For both Holmes and the ahistoricists, the resolution of the
constitutional issue in Mahon had to involve an examination of the relationship
of the Kohler Act to the doctrines of public nuisance and public necessity, and
to the traditions of closely protecting personal safety and possessory estates in
land. Neither would have seen these portions of the Mahon opinion as largely
inexplicable and superfluous comments muddying up a diminution in value
test. Both would have understood them as integral parts of the real work to be
done in deciding the case.
The citation history between 1922 and 1935 suggests that Mahon became
part of the Court's broader substantive due process discourse. Eleven of the
twelve citations during that period appear in Fourteenth Amendment due
process cases.296 In some of those cases, the issue is whether a state can act
in some way without paying just compensation,297 but in other cases,
compensation is not an issue.298 Mahon is cited most often-five times-for
the proposition that the wartime rent control laws upheld by the Court "went
subsidence in Mahon-drafted to apply only when the ownership of surface and mineral rights are split-to
involve a drastic change from existing positive law principles; to say that those principles arc
"tangible"-unlike the principle of liberty of contract-says too little.
Not only are the tags "chimerical" and "tangible" oversimplifications, but the role of such
categorization in Holmes's thought is, in my view, somewhat different than Professor White appears to
portray it. According to that portrayal, Holmes initially decides whether a law burdens "tangible" rights,
and then, if it does, scrutinizes it more closely. I think that Holmes intends the scrutiny, which takes place
before categorization, to be uniform. In addition, I think that Holmesian scrutiny was, in practice, more
deferential than that associated with classical substantive due process, but less deferential than later scrutiny
of "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions" under a pluralist political theory that
assumes that "political processes ... can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation" and protect minorities. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 152 n.4 (1938).
Thus, for example, the underinclusiveness of a law with respect to a stated end is of some consequence to
Holmes if the law also happens to fit neatly an unstated end that cuts into a fundamental principle, as it
did in Mahon; Holmes just could not find any fundamental principle at stake in Lochner.
296. The twelfth citation is in a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause case, Omnia Commercial Co. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923), in which Justice Sutherland applies the traditional distinction between
direct and consequential injury in holding that the federal government's requisition of goods that a private
party had contracted to buy does not constitute a taking of that party's contract rights, He cites Mahon in
passing for the proposition that the doctrine of public necessity may be based on tradition. See id. at 508:
supra text accompanying notes 190-95 (discussing Holmes's treatment of public necessity).
297. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613, 621 (1935)
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 n.7 (1935); Delaware, Lackawanna
& W. R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 193 (1928).
298. See, e.g., Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927):
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270
U.S. 402 (1926); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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to the verge of the law.''299 In this guise, Mahon appears in opinions of the
Court in three well-known cases striking down state regulations-Adkins v.
Children's Hospital,30° Charles Wolff Packing Co. iv Court of Industrial
Relations,3"' and Tyson & Brother-United Theatre 7icket Offices, Inc. v.
Banton,302-as well as in the impassioned dissents of the "Four
Horsemen 3 3 in two cases that, by narrowly upholding state regulations,
heralded the constitutional revolution: Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell304 and Nebbia v. New York. 305 Justice Holmes's only citation of
Mahon, which juxtaposes it with a wartime rent control case, is closely related
to this group of citations.3°6
The other citations are a grab bag of relatively superficial references: The
Court's deference to the legislature is strong but not absolute;" 7 the
existence of a public purpose does not mean that a statute cannot amount to
a taking; 08 and the police power cannot be exerted arbitrarily or
unreasonably.3°9 And in his concurrence in Whitney v. California,' Justice
Brandeis is joined by Justice Holmes in lumping Mahon together with four
other substantive due process cases that held "[p]rohibitory legislation...
invalid, because unnecessary, where the denial of liberty involved was that of
engaging in a particular business. 31 ' No one even hinted that Mahon was
a landmark case about regulatory takings. When the Court decided in 1935 that
a change in federal bankruptcy law violated the Fifth Amendment Takings
299. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)
300. 261 U.S. 525, 552 (1923).
301. 262 U.S. 522, 542 (1923).
302. 273 U.S. 418, 437-38 (1927).
303. The term "The Four Horsemen" was used by cntics to refer to Justices Butler. Van Decanter.
Sutherland, and McReynolds as consistent opponents of New Deal legislation Intended to e'oke the Four
Horsemen of the Apocalypse, the allusion was hardly complimentary. See TuIE OXFORD COtPA%1O\ TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 29, at 309; Revelation 6- I-S (descnbing opening
of first four of seven seals, and white, red, black, and pale green horses that emerge, carting horsemen
committed to such tasks as taking peace from earth and killing wtth sword. famine. pestilence, and wild
beasts). Of the 12 citations between 1922 and 1935, eight are attrbutable to Justices Sutherland. Butler.
and McReynolds--three of the Four Horsemen. See Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co- v State Highw ay Comm'n.
294 U.S. 613, 621 (1935) (MeReynolds, J.); Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502. 552 (1934) (McRcynolds.
J., dissenting); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell. 290 U S. 398. 479 (1934) (Sutherland. I.
dissenting); Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R. v. Town of Morrstown, 276 U S 182. 193 t1928) (Butler.
J.); Tyson, 273 U.S. at 437-38 (Sutherland. J.): Weaver. 270 U.S at 410 (Butler. J ). Adkins. 261 U S at
552 (Sutherland, J.); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States. 261 U.S. 502. 508 (1923) tSutherland. J
304. 290 U.S. 398, 479 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
305. 291 U.S. 502, 552 (1934) (McReynolds, J.. dissenting).
306. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n. 271 U.S. 583. 601 t1926 ) (Holmes. J.
dissenting) ("Extreme cases on the one side and on the other are Edgar A. Lev .Y Leasing Co. v Siegel and
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.") (citations omitted). I discuss this passage aboe See infra text
accompanying notes 224-27.
307. See Weaver, 270 U.S. at 410 (Butler, J.).
308. See Delaware, Lackawanna, 276 U.S. at 193 (Butler. J
309. See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Waters. 294 U.S. 405. 415 n 7 (1935) (Brandeis.
J.). This proposition is, of course, probably supported better by Brandeis's on Maho, dissent than by
Holmes's majority opinion.
310. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
311. Id. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Clause-a regulatory takings decision if ever there was one-it did not cite
Mahon.312
B. Mahon Lost and Found
After 1935, Mahon appeared to be destined for oblivion, along with many
other minor substantive due process cases. For over two decades, it failed to
surface in a single Supreme Court majority opinion. Between 1935 and 1958,
its only appearance in the United States Reports was in a dissent by Holmes
admirer Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Commodities Trading
Corp.,313 an obscure 1950 case about the amount that the United States
should pay for the black pepper it requisitioned during World War II.
Frankfurter cited Mahon, not for its holding, but for its rhetoric supporting
Frankfurter's observation that "[ifn the exercise of its constitutional powers,
Congress by general enactments may in diverse ways cause even appreciable
pecuniary loss without compensation. 3 4
By 1958, Mahon had a future only if each of the points of understanding
about the case between Holmes and the 1920s Court could be forgotten or
ignored. The constitutional revolution of the late 1930s 315 rejected the Due
Process Clause as a textual home for substantive economic rights. Rejected,
too, was Lochner's ahistorical approach to protection. In the process, the new
regime also abandoned the inquiries into traditional legal categories and
legislative purposes that Holmes's approach shared with the Lochner
ahistoricists. Viewed as a run-of-the-mill due process case, Mahon-along with
the three key points of its original understanding-was hopelessly obsolete.
In the post-1937 world, however, a judge who wanted to reestablish some
sort of constitutional discourse about the governmental regulation of property
rights could find alternative uses for Mahon. It might be the best precedent
available in support of a discourse that was not vulnerable to charges of either
textual or methodological Lochnerism. 3 6 First, the matter of text. The keys
here are Justice Holmes's posthumous reputation as a determined opponent of
312. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
313. 339 U.S. 121 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
314. Id. at 133.
315. The conventional date is 1937, because of the Court's landmark decision in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which upheld a Washington minimum wage act against a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process challenge and overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
316. As William Fischel has pointed out to me, it is also important that Mahon happens to concern
the most traditional form of property: land. Although modern regulatory takings jurisprudence is supposedly
based on a broad, modem understanding of property as a bundle of rights, see, e.g., PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 n.6 (1980), it has overwhelmingly focused on protecting interests in land.
The other "regulatory takings" opinions that Holmes wrote, concerning the activities of railroads, see supra
note 273, have remained obscure in part because they are, in one sense, all too modem. They treat rights
to act in certain ways as property rights, even though those rights are unconnected to ownership of land.




economic substantive due process and Mahon's mention of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, which, if not examined too closely, could be
taken to indicate reliance on that text.3"7 Even as the Court repudiated
economic substantive due process, it began to develop the doctrine of
incorporation, under which the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
in addition to retaining a weak substantive component of its own,"'8 became
a conduit for applying most of the Bill of Rights against the states.3 '9 The
obvious candidate to support a reinvigorated constitutional property discourse
was the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, with its ringing declaration that
private "property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation. ' 320 There could be no doubt that the Takings Clause placed a
substantive limitation on government action: "[W]ithout due process of law"
might have referred to mere procedure, but "without just compensation"
referred to hard cash.32'
The trickier issue was whether the terms "property" and "taken" could be
interpreted broadly enough. Some precedent appeared to hold that "property"
was only "taken" within the meaning of the Takings Clause when the
government directly appropriated physical things-when government agents
317. Justice Holmes comments in Mahon that "Itlhe protection of pnvate property in the Fifth
Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use. but provides that it shall not be taken for such
use without compensation." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S 393. 415 (1922) As I have argued
above, however, see supra text accompanying notes 261-62. the next sentence makes clear that Holmes
is relying in Mahon on a fundamental rights theory of due process. and a fundamental right to just
compensation which is "similar" to, but not logically linked to. the Fifth Amendment right. See Mahan.
260 U.S. at 415 ("A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment-")
318. This was soon to become a strong substantive component, but not to protect property See. e g.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
319. On the history of incorporation generally, see CORNER. supra note 250; WILLIAM E
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 237-58 (1995).
The Court has never accepted the "total incorporation" theory of the first Justice Harlan and Justice
Black, under which the Amendment simply functions to make all of the first eight Amendments applicable
to the states. For Justice Harlan's view, see Twining it New Jersey. 211 U.S 78. 114-27 (1908) (Harlan.
J., dissenting); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516. 556-58 (1884) (Harlan. J . dissenting); for Justice
Black's, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162-71 (1968) (Black. J. concumng). Adamson v
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J.. dissenting). But it has accepted a "'selective incorporation"
theory under which once a clause of one of the first eight Amendments is deemed to be "incorporated."
it places exactly the same limitations on the federal and state governments. See. e g.. Pointer v Texas, 380
U.S. 400,406 (1965) (holding that Confrontation Clause applies to states and overruling Vest v Louisiana.
194 U.S. 258 (1904)); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I. 11 (1964) (holdtng that Self-lncnmination Clause
applies to states and overruling Twining, 211 U.S. at 78) This differs from the "fundamental rights" theory
that the Court had generally accepted at the time it decided Mahon, under which a nght found to be
implicit in the concept of due process, such as freedom of speech or the nght to just compensation upon
a taking of private property, need not have the same scope as the similar right protected by one of the first
eight amendments.
320. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
321. Of course, "for public use" might be interpreted to place a second substantive limitation on the
taking of property, but a post-1937 constitutional property discourse needed some foothold other than the
distinction between private and public spheres. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). which interpreted
the "public use" limitation in the context of a challenge to the District of Columbia's urban renewal
program, made clear the deep aversion to reliance on such a distinction. See id. at 32-33 (describing
judicial deference to legislative determinations of public purpose).
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forced owners off their land or seized or destroyed their chattels. 22 Other
precedents had used just compensation language in reviewing a wider variety
of legislation, but the discredited doctrine of substantive due process tainted
most of that precedent. The opinions used hybrid phrases like "tak[ing] without
due process of law' 323 or equated takings and due process challenges by
using phrases like "taking . . . property for public use without compensation,
and, therefore, without due process of law.' 324 Worse yet, they were written
by known heretics-Justices like Joseph McKenna,3 5 who joined Lochner
v. New York326 and Coppage v. Kansas;327 Mahlon Pitney,328 who wrote
Coppage; and John Marshall Harlan,329 who dissented in Lochner but wrote
Adair v. United States.
330
Mahon was not similarly tainted, however, because Justice Holmes had
been canonized by the Progressives.33' In the first of three lectures delivered
on Holmes in 1938, Felix Frankfurter made him the personification of the new
constitutional order:
322. See, e.g., Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871) (holding that Just
Compensation Clause "has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to
consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power").
323. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 695 (1899) (invalidating state law
requiring railroads to sell 1000-mile tickets at rate lower than otherwise determined reasonable).
324. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 582
(1906) (emphasis omitted); see also Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915)
(upholding statute requiring railroads to maintain ditches and drains along their track embankments) ("[li]t
is well settled that the enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a legitimate regulation established under
the police power is not a taking of property without compensation, or without due process of law, in the
sense of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. City of Omaha, 235 U.S. 121, 127 (1914)
(upholding ordinance requiring railroad to construct viaduct to carry public street over its tracks at its own
expense while framing question presented as whether ordinance constituted "a taking of [the railroad's]
property without compensation for the benefit of another, and therefore without due process of law").
325. See Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911); Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544
(1905). I discuss these cases above. See supra text accompanying notes 275-78.
326. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
327. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
328. See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914). I discuss Richards above. See
supra text accompanying notes 279-83.
329. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 200 U.S. at 561. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy held that
an Illinois law requiring the railroad to pay for the widening of a creek channel running across its right of
way was a taking of property without just compensation and therefore without due process. See id. at 582,
594. Justice Holmes concurred, making it clear that, in his opinion, "if an expense is thrown upon the
railroad unlawfully, its property is taken for public use without due compensation." Id. at 595. The same
Term, Justice Harlan wrote the opinion of the Court in West Chicago Street Railroad v. Illinois ex rel. City
of Chicago, 201 U.S. 506 (1906), upholding an ordinance requiring the West Chicago Street Railroad to
relocate its tunnel under the Chicago River against a challenge that the ordinance took property without
just compensation. Justice Holmes concurred in the judgment on the basis of Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy. See id. at 529 (Holmes, J., concurring). Four Justices dissented.
330. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
331. On the treatment of Holmes by the Progressives, and their "haste to make Holmes into a figure
of legend," see WHITE, supra note 295, at 359-69, 378-79 (1993). White notes that "[a]bove all, however.
the link between Holmes and his young admirers was their conviction that they and the justice shared a
modernist political sensibility. In this assessment they were not quite accurate." Id. at 359-60.
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During most of his thirty years on the Supreme Bench, and especially
during the second half of his tenure, his were not the views of the
majority of the Court. But the good that men do lives after them.
About a year ago the old views of Mr. Justice Holmes began to be the
new constitutional direction of the Court.
332
Although entitled "Property and Society," this lecture unsurprisingly contained
no reference to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.33' For the Progressives,
Holmes's decision in Mahon was a lapse to be explained away privately and
ignored publicly.334 Justice Brandeis, in particular, was quite condescending
toward Holmes's protection of property rights in Mahon. Brandeis once
accounted for Holmes's position in Mahon "by what one would think Holmes
is last man to yield to-class bias. He came back to views not of his manhood
but childhood. '3 35 Brandeis remarked further that "[h]eightened respect for
property has been part of Holmes' growing old" and that "they cut (caught)
him when he was weak (after Holmes's prostate operation) & played him to
go whole hog."336 Nor is it clear that Brandeis even grasped-or was willing
to accept-the full measure of Holmes's approach in Mahon. One juxtaposition
of comments is particularly telling. After Mahon was handed down, Justice
Holmes wrote Harold Laski about the case. "I have always thought," he
remarked, "that old Harlan's decision in Mugler v. Kansas was pretty
fishy.' 337 This statement, of course, expresses one of Holmes's deepest
jurisprudential resolutions-the rejection of an ahistorical approach to
constitutional property.338 Yet Brandeis attributed Holmes's rejection of
Mugler to the most shallow of motives: Holmes's "'impatience with
prohibition. 339
332. FELIx FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREIE COURT 72 (2d cd. 1961)
333. Seven years earlier, in an essay reviewing Holmes's 25 years on the Court. Frankfurter relegates
Mahon to a footnote and refers the reader to both Holmes's opinion and Justice Brandeis's dissent See
Felix Frankfurter, Mr Justice Holmes and the Constitution, in MR. JUSTICE HoLmES 46. 97 n 79 (Felix
Frankfurter ed., 1931). Possibly even more revealing is Frankfurter's treatment of Mahon in his review of
Holmes's constitutional opinions, written the year after Mahon was decided. Frankfurter classifies ,lahon
as a Contract Clause case, and does not mention that the opinion also refers to the Due Process Clause. See
Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes' Constitutonal Opinions. 36 HARV L REv 909.
937 (1923). It seems at least possible that Frankfurter wanted to minimize Mahon's reliance on substantic
due process. Later that year, Justice Brandeis told Frankfurter that Mahon was, in Holmes's mind. a
substantive due process case. Referring to Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.. 251 U.S
146 (1919), Brandeis said that "Holmes balked on 'Due Proceas'--he thing that prevailed with him in the
Mahon case later." Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations. 1985 SUP. Cr. REV 299.
324 (quoting Felix Frankfurter's notes of conversations with Justice Brandeis) (footnote omitted)
334. See WHITE, supra note 295, at 403.
335. Urofsky, supra note 333, at 321 (quoting Felix Frankfurter's notes of conversations with Justice
Brandeis).
336. Id. On Holmes's prostate surgery, which had been performed in July 1922. see SHELDON M
NOVICK, HONORABLE JUS'nCE 348-49 (1989).
337. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 13. 1923). in I HoLIEs.-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 40, at 473.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 33-41. 77-119.
339. Urofsky, supra note 333, at 324 (footnote omitted) (quoting Felix Frankfurter's notes of
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The Progressives' refusal to see in "the true Holmes" anything but a
Progressive, and their failure even to mention Mahon in public assessments of
Holmes's career, simply fortified Holmes's reputation as an opponent of
economic substantive due process. On the strength of that reputation, Mahon,
stripped of its original meaning, could be repackaged as a novel Takings
Clause case, completely independent of discredited substantive due process. A
giant of American jurisprudence, generally unsympathetic to constitutional
property rights, had "recognized ... that if the protection against physical
appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the
government's power to redefine the range of interests included in the
ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional
limits.
3 40
If a new constitutional property discourse could not be based on the Due
Process Clause, neither could it invoke the methods of Lochner ahistoricism.
It was no longer acceptable to look to common law rulings and categories to
give content to a phrase like "health, safety, and general welfare," which was
supposed to define the proper sphere of the police power. 4' Rather, as
Justice Douglas famously observed in the 1954 case of Berman v. Parker"342
conversations with Justice Brandeis). Justice Brandeis's comment was not directly about Mahon, but about
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919). In Hamilton, Justice Brandeis wrote for a
unanimous Court upholding the War-Time Prohibition Act, a federal law prohibiting the sale of distilled
spirits as beverages, passed before the Eighteenth Amendment took effect. Brandeis relied heavily on
Mugler. See id. at 157. According to Brandeis, the Court's tentative vote was 54 to strike down the
prohibition law, with Holmes in the majority, but Brandeis eventually convinced everyone to join his
opinion upholding the law. See Urofsky, supra note 333, at 324. When Holmes joined Brandeis's opinion,
he wrote a note to Brandeis commenting that he thought Mugler was "[a] mighty fishy decision," but went
on to comment that he was "merely whispering in your ear, not suggesting that you make any changes. You
have done nobly and I felicitate you on getting away with it." BICKEL, supra note 273, at 229 (footnote
omitted). Alexander Bickel concludes that, in spite of Justice Brandeis's dismissive comment about
Holmes's rejection of Mugler, Brandeis "well knew" that Holmes's impatience with prohibition "was not
the heart of the matter," and that the difference lay in Holmes's and Brandeis's differing views on questions
of property rights. See id. Justice Holmes's memo to Brandeis about Hamilton substantially weakens the
argument that Holmes must have accepted Mugler because he joined in other opinions citing Mugler after
Mahon and once cited Mugler himself. For such an argument, see Norman Williams, Jr. et al., The White
River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 211 n.60 (1984).
340. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). Justice Scalia's account
of Mahon in Lucas is foreshadowed by Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 179 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the case that ended the 23-year drought of Mahon
citations. Central Eureka Mining concerned a federal government order directing nonessential gold mines
to shut down-a kind of use regulation. The owners of the shuttered gold mines brought an action seeking
just compensation for the losses they suffered during the period of shutdown, arguing that the shutdown
order constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. In an opinion by Justice Burton, the Court rejected
the mineowners' claims. But, citing Mahon, it recognized the possibility of a modem regulatory takings
claim based on diminution of value. See id. at 168. Justice Harlan went further. In dissent, he argued that
under Mahon the shutdown order was a taking, requiring the government to pay just compensation. See id.
at 182-84 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Like Justice Scalia, Justice Harlan portrays Mahon as a case in which
Justice Holmes recognized that the Takings Clause could not be meaningfully enforced unless it was
extended to regulations: "(W]here the Government proceeds by indirection, and accomplishes by regulation
what is the equivalent of outright physical seizure of private property, courts should guard themselves
against permitting formalities to obscure actualities." Id. at 184 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
341. See Sunstein, supra note 284, at 880-82.
342. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 4
Nor was it acceptable for courts to conduct anything but the most cursory
examination of the purposes of ordinary economic legislation or of the
relationship of the legislature's means to its purported ends. The language of
deference might not have changed, but the attitude had. Thus, in a moment of
remarkable judicial candor and sensitivity to the malleability of language,
Justice Murphy responded in 1949 to a litigant's reliance on a 1928 case: "[A]
pronounced shift of emphasis since the Liggett case has deprived the words
'unreasonable' and 'arbitrary' of the content for which respondents
contend." 4
Although Justice Holmes's inquiries into tradition and purpose had a
different ultimate theoretical basis, no one considered whether that basis
provided a justification for those inquiries that could survive the rejection of
Lochner ahistoricism. Rather, courts sought to construct a takings inquiry that
placed little reliance on tradition and purpose. As Justice Stewart declared in
Hughes v. Washington,35 "the Constitution measures a taking of property not
by what a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does."' 6 Mahon
survived because it contained language suggesting a test that seemed to fulfill
Justice Stewart's hopes for an objective takings jurisprudence: the diminution
in value test. To measure the effect of a regulation on a property's value, one
need not know anything about the regulation's purpose or its relationship to
a legal tradition. Thus, when Mahon reappears after its twenty-three-year
hiatus, it is cited for the propositions that "action in the form of regulation can
so diminish the value of property as to constitute a taking" 7 and that
"governmental action in the form of regulation ca[n] be so onerous as to
constitute a taking which constitutionally requires just compensation." "
C. Mahon in the Last Two Decades
Although Mahon had shown its new textual and methodological face by
the early 1960s, the Supreme Court did not devote serious, sustained attention
to its "regulatory takings" doctrine until the late 1970s. When it did, however,
343. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
344. Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225 (1949) (citing Louis K. Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928)).
345. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
346. Id. at 298 (Stewart, J., concurring).
347. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
348. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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Mahon became a critical, contested authority in a number of major doctrinal
battles that continued to reshape perceptions about the case's textual basis and
methods of analysis.
1. Mahon and the Constitutional Text
Mahon's reconstruction as a Takings Clause case, rather than a substantive
due process case, was fortified in the battle over whether the Constitution
mandated a retrospective damages remedy for those temporarily subject to
excessively burdensome regulation. By 1980, it was established that the
Takings Clause itself entitled an owner whose property had been taken to bring
an "inverse condemnation" action, seeking just compensation.349 Moreover,
owners whose property had been taken temporarily-for example, owners
whose land or buildings had been taken over by the federal government to be
used in the war effort during World War I-could recover just compensation
for the period when they had been dispossessed, even after the government
returned possession to them.350 It appeared that if regulations were subject
to review under the Takings Clause, the Constitution guaranteed damages for
the time during which an excessive regulation was in effect, even if the
government agreed to lift the regulation once a court found it to effect a
taking. Those opposed to awarding damages for temporary regulatory takings
did not question this logic. Rather, they developed the argument that
regulations were subject to review only under the Due Process Clause, which
did not provide an inverse condemnation action or require interim
damages.35'
Into this debate came Mahon and Justice Holmes's comment that "if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. '352 Did this mean
that the Court had decided in 1922 that regulations were reviewable under the
Takings Clause? The state courts that had decided against a temporary
damages remedy maintained that Justice Holmes had used the word "taking"
only in a "metaphorical" sense and that the real issue in Mahon was whether
349. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
350. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
351. One prominent group of land use academics and lawyers opposed to a damages remedy started
from the mistaken assumption that Holmes believed that the Due Process Clause had no substantive
component:
[Holmes's] previous stinging criticism of the use of substantive due process doctrine to
invalidate legislation had effectively foreclosed him from employing that doctrine as a
constitutional principle. Faced with a statute which he found constitutionally offensive, and cut
off from reliance on the due process clause, Holmes turned to the taking clause as the basis for
his decision.
Williams, supra note 339, at 209 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). This mistaken assumption most likely backfired, and convinced many that Mahon was a
Takings Clause case.
352. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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the Kohler Act was "an invalid exercise of the police power under the due
process clause.
' 353
In 1981, however, Justice Brennan rejected this interpretation in his dissent
in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.35 While the majority
in San Diego Gas & Electric held that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide
the temporary damages issue, Justice Brennan, joined by three others, enlisted
Mahon in support of his conclusion that the Constitution did mandate damages
for temporary takings. "[T]he general principle that a regulation can effect a
Fifth Amendment 'taking,"' Justice Brennan asserted, "has its source in Justice
Holmes' opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon."" The
state courts were wrong to interpret Mahon as merely indicating when a police
power regulation would be invalid; the Mahon Court "[cilearly...
contemplated that a regulation could cross the boundary surrounding valid
police power exercise and become a Fifth Amendment 'taking. '35 If, as
Brennan and others assumed, all government action reviewable under the
Takings Clause could give rise to liability for temporary damages, then Mahon,
by reviewing a regulation under that Clause, supported a damages remedy for
temporary regulatory takings.
After San Diego Gas & Electric, the Court failed in two other cases to
reach the temporary damages issue.357 In the 1987 case of First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,' however, the
Court adopted Justice Brennan's position that the Constitution mandated a
damages remedy for temporary regulatory takings, and with it, Brennan's
interpretation of Mahon. 59 In the view of the First English Court, when
Holmes stated that "'if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking,"' he meant a Fifth Amendment taking, and he meant to acknowledge
that the Fifth Amendment provided a damages remedy regardless of whether
353. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York. 350 N.E.2d 381. 385 (N.Y 1976); see Aglns
v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 29 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (stating that Holmes used word
"taking" to "indicate the limit by which the acknowledged social goal of land control could be achiced
by regulation rather than by eminent domain").
354. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
355. Id. at 648-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 650 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 641 n.4 (Brennan. J. disscnting) (detailing
state courts' position).
357. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo. 477 U.S. 340. 348 (1986): Williamson
County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Both of these cases maintained
the focus on Mahon. The Court in Wiilliamson explained the arguments about the interpretation of Malhon
in some detail, see id. at 198-99, but concluded that the plaintiff's claim was premature, see id. at 199
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, argued that Justice Holmes did not mean to suggest that
regulations held to be invalid as takings would always give rise to obligations to pay just compensation
See id. at 203 (Stevens, J., concurring). In MacDonald. Sommer & Fraies. Justice White, dissenting in favor
of the Brennan position, cited Mahon to support his contention that "pohce-powcr regulations may nsc to
the level of a taking if the restrictions they impose are sufficiently severe." 477 U.S. at 360 (White, J.,
dissenting).
358. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
359. See id. at 316.
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the government had formally instituted condemnation proceedings.W
Together, San Diego Gas & Electric and First English contributed mightily to
Mahon's reputation as a seminal Takings Clause case.
Mahon's role as support for a damages remedy for temporary regulatory
takings depends on two anachronisms. The first is familiar: None of the
members of the Mahon Court believed that the Fourteenth Amendment
"incorporated" the Takings Clause, which continued to apply only to the
federal government. 36' Rather, Fourteenth Amendment due process included
the fundamental right of just compensation, which happened to be embodied
in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as well. In addition, a deeper
anachronism affected Justice Brennan and the First English Court's views
about Mahon and the issue of damages for temporary regulatory takings.
Brennan and the First English Court assumed, as did the state courts they
opposed, that if a regulation really effected a "taking," then the Constitution
required an award of retrospective damages for any period the regulation was
in effect. But Justice Holmes and the Mahon Court would likely have seen the
issue in a different light.
In Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States,362 a case decided the same year
as Mahon, a coal company claimed that the action of a federal administrative
agency, fixing the price of coal and directing its sale to particular buyers
during World War I, effected a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 363 The
coal company sought, not invalidation of the statute granting power to the
agency, but damages: the difference between the price at which it had contracts
to sell the coal and the lower price at which the agency ordered it to sell the
coal to other buyers. Justice Holmes considered the issue under the then-
prevailing theory that takings claims could be brought under a federal statute
that waived sovereign immunity for claims upon any "contract, express or
implied." The theory was that when the government appropriated property for
a public use, it impliedly promised to pay just compensation, since such an
implication would be "consistent with the constitutional duty of the
government, as well as with common justice."' ' 4
360. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
361. For my discussion of Mahon's textual basis, see supra text accompanying notes 240-63.
362. 259 U.S. 188 (1922).
363. Because the suit was against the federal government, there was no need to resort to the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
364. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 657 (1884). Great Falls was decided under
the Court of Claims Act, which conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Claims over actions founded "upon
any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States." Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122,
10 Stat. 612, 612 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2501-22 (1994)). In 1887, Congress passed the Tucker
Act, which, among other things, enlarged the Court of Claims's jurisdiction to include "all claims founded
upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress." Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 505
(1887). This raised the possibility that the Court might recharacterize takings claims as "claims founded
upon the Constitution of the United States," thus discarding the legal fiction of implied promise. The Court,
however, at first declined to take that step. In United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), the Court stuck
with the implied promise theory, rejecting the position, taken by Justice Brown in a concurring opinion,
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Using sweeping language, Justice Holmes denied the coal company's
claim. Holmes asserted that:
no lawmaking power promises by implication to make good losses
that may be incurred by obedience to its commands. If the law
requires a party to give up property to a third person without adequate
compensation the remedy is, if necessary, to refuse to obey it, not to
sue the lawmaker.365
Assuming that Holmes meant the refusal to obey the law to serve as a basis
for a legal challenge to its validity,366 his comments suggest that he saw the
issue of a damages remedy as separate from the issue of whether a regulation
violated the Takings Clause. A regulation might indeed effect a Fifth
Amendment taking, such that a party affected by the regulation could obtain
a declaration of its invalidity or an injunction ordering the government to cease
enforcing it unless it paid the affected party just compensation. Nonetheless,
a damages remedy would be unavailable.
To be sure, Morrisdale Coal Co. is a case about federal sovereign
immunity, and its holding would not apply in a case involving a state law like
the Kohler Act or the Los Angeles County regulation at issue in First English.
But Morrisdale demonstrates, first, that Justice Holmes saw as distinct the two
issues of whether an action amounted to a taking and whether a damages
remedy was available, and second, that Holmes was willing to treat "regulatory
takings" differently from direct appropriations by the government. In addition,
Holmes's broad references in Morrisdale to "lawmaking power[s]" and
"lawmakers" suggest that he was thinking in terms of the immunity of all
sovereigns, not just the federal government. Morrisdale thus further weakens
any connection between Justice Holmes's opinion in Mahon and the damages
issue in First English and suggests that the First English Court enlisted Justice
Holmes's prestige at the cost of further distorting the Mahon opinion.
2. Mahon and Methods of Takings Analysis
If First English and its precursors have influenced recent perceptions of
Mahon's textual basis, two other developments in takings law have influenced
perceptions of Justice Holmes's analysis in Mahon. The first is the evolution
of economic impact takings, culminating in the creation in Lucas v. South
that takings claims were "claims founded upon the Constitution" within the meaning of the Tucker Act.
See id at 461-62; id. at 475 (Brown, J.. concurring). It was not until Jacobs v, United States. 290 U.S 13.
16 (1933), after Justice Holmes had left the Court, that the Court began to embrace the theory that takings
claims were "founded upon the Constitution" within the meaning of the Tucker Act.
365. Morrisdale Coal Co., 259 U.S. at 190.
366. It seems rather unlikely that Holmes meant that the coal company's only remedy was to engage
in an act of civil disobedience that might prompt a political decision to change the law, or an act of
defiance to incite revolution.
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Carolina Coastal Council367 of a per se takings category for regulations that
"den[y] all economically beneficial or productive use of land. 36' The second
is the Court's decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis,369 narrowly upholding a coal mining subsidence statute quite
similar to the statute Mahon struck down. The line of cases leading to Lucas
is, along with the earlier cases of United States v. Central Eureka Mining
Co. 370 and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,371' responsible for the
perception of Mahon as a "diminution in value" case. Keystone is responsible
for the perception that Mahon turned on a balancing test.
The road to Lucas began in 1978 with Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York. 372 Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Penn
Central, upholding New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law against a
takings challenge, famously characterized the Court's takings inquiries as
"essentially ad hoc" and "factual. 373 At the same time, however, it suggested
a narrower, more discrete set of circumstances under which a regulation would
amount to a taking. "It is ... implicit in Goldblatt [v. Town of Hempstead],"
wrote Justice Brennan, "that a use restriction on real property may constitute
a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose... or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use
of the property. '374 Justice Brennan then introduced Mahon as the most
prominent case in the somewhat dubious second category of "impact" takings.
Mahon, he wrote, "is the leading case for the proposition that a state statute
that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct
investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking.' ' 375 Brennan
makes clear, however, that this category is narrow. He asserts that the statute
in Mahon was invalid because it "had nearly the same effect as the complete
destruction of rights claimant had reserved" 376 and appends citations to two
other cases mentioning the "complete destruction" of property interests.
377
Later in the opinion, it becomes clear that the reason for characterizing Mahon
as involving "distinct investment-backed expectations" 37 is to distinguish the
Pennsylvania Coal Company's support rights from the Penn Central
Company's air rights. The latter were not a distinct part of Penn Central's
367. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
368. Id. at 1015.
369. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
370. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
371. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
372. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
373. Id. at 124.
374. Id. at 127.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See id. at 128 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Hudson County Water Co,
v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908)).
378. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127.
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"primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel,"'3 9 and therefore their
destruction did not fall under the rule in Mahon.3s
Justice Brennan's treatment of Goldblatt and Mahon forms part of his
effort to justify upholding the landmarks ordinance in Penn Central. It is not
clear that he intended that discussion to ossify into a two-prong takings test.
Yet ossify it did, as early as two years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon."'
In the course of upholding a zoning ordinance against a takings challenge, the
Court recited that "[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular
property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests ... or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.' 382 The Agins two-prong formulation became a favorite with the
Court.383 It was again linked to Mahon in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis,38 when Justice Stevens read Mahon as resting on two
propositions that the Mahon opinion itself did not reveal in so many words, but
which turned out to be the two Agins prongs.3 5 As a result, when the Court
actually found in Lucas a case in a procedural stance odd enough to present
the question whether a regulation that left a parcel of land completely valueless
would always constitute a taking, the second Agins prong, frequently recited
and imbued with the stature of Oliver Wendell Holmes, made the answer seem
obvious.386
The question whether Justice Holmes would have voted with the majority
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council317 to establish a per se takings
category for total deprivations of land value is interesting and difficult. There
is much in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court that the positivist Holmes
would find congenial. Justice Scalia criticizes the distinction between
preventing injury and conferring benefits as almost infinitely malleable,""
just as Holmes criticized the "sic utere tuo" imperative as being unable to
decide specific cases. 3 89 In framing what has come to be known as the
"nuisance exception" to the per se category, Scalia formulates the takings issue
as Holmes would have formulated it, in terms of change from preexisting
positive law. A regulation that prohibits all economically beneficial use of
land, Scalia concludes, effects a taking unless it "inhere[s] in the title itself, in
379. Id. at 136.
380. See id. at 130 & n.27.
381. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
382. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
383. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 474 U S 121. 126 (1985). Kirby Forest
Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. I, 14 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.
452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S 61.68 (1981). see also San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621. 647-48 (1981) (Brennan. J . disscnting)-
384. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
385. See id. at 484-85.
386. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
387. Id.
388. See id. at 1026.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
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the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership. '390 In speculating how courts
might divide property interests into discrete units for purposes of determining
whether a regulation has deprived an interest of all economically feasible use,
Justice Scalia seeks an answer in the positive law tradition of the jurisdiction
in question.39'
On the other hand, Justice Holmes's vision of law seems to accord it more
depth and fluidity than Justice Scalia's, perhaps because Holmes's positivism
is tempered by a larger dose of historicism than Scalia's. 3' The "nuisance
exception" in Lucas turns only on the binary question of whether legislation
has changed existing positive law. Lucas, unlike Mahon, does not provide an
account of positive law under which it would be possible to discern degrees
of change. Justice Scalia also appears to minimize the legislature's role in
forming the "background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance. '393 Justice Holmes did not draw as clear a line between legislature
and judiciary, and explicitly suggested that a sufficiently settled statute could
come to inhere in the title just as much as a common law limitation.
390. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
391. See id. at 1017 n.7.
392. On Justice Holmes's historicism, see supra text accompanying notes 135-36. An investigation
into the degree to which Justice Scalia may reject historicist views is outside the scope of this Article, but
it might start with his comments on the rule of law. Scalia's ideal of a "law of rules," see Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989), is parallel to Holmes's project of
specification. But while Holmes continued to believe in the common law model of incremental legal
development, see supra text accompanying notes 213-27, Scalia appears to devalue it, see Scalia, supra,
at 1177-78. However, any difference between the two methods is likely to be one of degree.
393. The examples of "background principles" that Justice Scalia gives are all traditional common law
doctrines such as private nuisance, public nuisance, and public necessity. See id. at 1029; id. at 1031
(stating that "question ... of state law to be dealt with on remand" is whether "common-law principles
would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's land")
(emphasis added). Commentators who assume that Justice Scalia excludes legislation include Fred P.
Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the "tle to Wetlands at Common Law, 2 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 253
(1996); Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REv. 329,
337 (1995); John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J.
ENvT. L. 1, 1-3 (1993); and John M. Walker, Jr., Common Law Rules and Land-Use Regulations: Lucas
and Future Takings Jurisprudence, 3 SEMON HALL CONSTI. L.J. 3, 17 (1993). Courts applying Lucas have
been split on this issue; some have held that the exception for limits "inher[ing] in the title" prevents a
landowner from challenging any law, legislative or judicial, that predated her acquisition of the parcel of
land in question. See, e.g., Hunziker v. Iowa, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994). Justice Scalia would
undoubtedly reject this broad interpretation. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833
n.2 (1987) (Scalia, J.).
In drawing a distinction between real and personal property, however, Scalia refers to "the State's
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings," Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, which could refer
to a legislative tradition as well as ajudicial one; so perhaps there is in Scalia's view some unspecified role
for legislative traditions in shaping constitutional property law.
394. See Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 152 (1906); supra note 39 (discussing Otis Co.).
In Presault v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992), the Court of Federal Claims arguably interpreted the
Lucas "inhere in the title" exception in a Holmesian manner. The court addressed the plaintiffs' claim that
a federal act took their reversionary interest in a railroad right-of-way by examining in some detail the
evolution of federal and state law over the previous hundred years. It held that the plaintiffs did not have
a compensable property interest "given long-standing, pervasive, and specific federal limitations on rights
created by state law in respect of property burdened by a private easement for a public purpose." Id. at 89.
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Justice Holmes's project of specification meant that he would not have
rejected a per se rule out of hand.395 In this respect, Justice Stevens,
dissenting in Lucas, is mistaken to draw the conclusion that, because Holmes
stated in Mahon that the constitutional question was one of degree, he would
not have supported any categorical rule.39 But if Justice Holmes were to
decide in favor of the rule in Lucas, his judgment would be complex,
comparing the value of the Lucas category to other alternatives. The treatment
of Mahon in Lucas and the cases that preceded it misses that complexity and
leaves Justice Holmes's opinion representing little more than the single
dimension of diminution in value.
The major exception to the Supreme Court's treatment of Mahon as a
"diminution in value" case, and the case that highlighted Mahon's supposed
use of a balancing test, is Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis 7 The Keystone Court upheld Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act against a takings challenge. Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, faced the difficult task of distinguishing the
Subsidence Act from the very similar Kohler Act invalidated in Mahon.
Although Justice Stevens conducted a detailed discussion of the diminution of
value issue,398 he also found it important to compare the legislative purposes
that could be inferred from the operative provisions of the Subsidence Act and
the Kohler Act. The Subsidence Act, he noted, did not have the Kohler Act's
exception for land surfaces owned by the owner of the underlying coal, a
feature that had caused Holmes to be skeptical of "the extent of the public
interest''399 underlying the latter.4 0 In addition, although notice might
protect the state's interest in protecting personal safety, as Justice Holmes
suggested in Mahon,4"" the Subsidence Act served other purposes that notice
could not serve: conservation of land, preservation of surface water drainage,
and so on. °2
The inquiry proposed by Keystone, however, turns out to be quite different
from Holmes's analysis in Mahon. Justice Stevens, borrowing from another
passage in Agins, states that the takings question "'necessarily requires a
weighing of private and public interests.'0 In Keystone, the weight is on
395. I discuss the project of legal specification above. See supra text accompanying notes 217-36
396. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1063-64 (Stevens, J.. dissenting). Justice Blackmun. dissenting in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATYV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). similarly argues that Mahon is authority
for rejecting any per se takings category, including the category of "permanent physical occupation" created
in Loretto. See id. at 442 & n.1 (Blackmun, J.. dissenting). He is. I think, similarly mistaken
397. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
398. See id. at 493-99.
399. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. 413-14 (1922) 1 discuss Mahon's treatment of
the Kohler Act exception above. See supra text accompanying notes 160-62
400. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486.
401. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. 1 discuss Mahon's treatment of the public safety rationale above
See supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
402. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-86.
403. hL at 492 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S 255. 260-61 (1980))
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the public side since "the public interest in preventing activities similar to
public nuisances is a substantial one"4" and the Subsidence Act more closely
seeks to further such an interest than the Kohler Act. Thus, Keystone ends up
turning on a balancing test, in which courts apparently decide independently
the weight accorded to various public interests, much as, in contemporary
equal protection analysis, courts decide whether particular state interests are
compelling, substantial, or merely legitimate.4 5 The Keystone Court implies
that Mahon was decided on the same logic. That characterization of Mahon,
however, represents just one more distortion of its theory and analysis of
constitutional property. Although Holmes might well have found the
differences between the Subsidence Act and the Kohler Act to be significant,
their significance would not stem from an independent judicial assessment of
their purposes. Rather, Holmes would have considered whether, given its
differences from the Kohler Act, the Subsidence Act less drastically undercut
principles embedded in existing Pennsylvania law.
D. A Role for Rediscovered Mahon?
What impact, if any, should a rediscovered Mahon have on current takings
jurisprudence? My goal in the last Section of this Article is to suggest a
variety of issues that judges and scholars must face before they can decide
whether to adopt a Holmesian approach to constitutional property. The issues
divide into two groups. The first concerns the feasibility of Holmes's approach:
Is implementation possible? The second concerns its desirability: Do we want
such an approach?
1. Feasibility
The most basic issue of feasibility is whether law actually is organized the
way that Holmes assumed it was for purposes of adjudicating constitutional
property cases. Holmes assumed that the positive law of a jurisdiction can be
described as a body of law, organized around multiple principles, poles, or
paradigm cases. But perhaps this organization is illusory, or perhaps there is
a more or less equally convincing principle to justify any result one wishes. If
that is the case, then Holmes's approach may be just one more failed attempt
to separate law from politics and the adjudication of constitutional property
cases may be indistinguishable from legislation.4"6
404. Id.
405. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 67, § 16-32, at 1602 (comparing assessment of importance of
government purpose under three tiers of equal protection scrutiny).
406. Morton Horwitz has suggested that Holmes himself came to the conclusion that no distinction
between law and politics was possible. See HORWITZ, supra note 265, at 140.
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Even if we could imagine describing positive law as an organized body,
there remain other crucial questions in a legal system as large and complicated
as that of the United States: How many separate bodies of law are out there
and on which body do we need to focus in deciding constitutional property
cases? After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,"O° the correct answer to the first
question seems to be that each state has its own body of law and legal
tradition, as does the federal government. It would seem that in assessing the
change wrought by a piece of legislation we would have to identify the
sovereign from which the legislation issues and analyze its relationship to the
body of law connected with that sovereign. 48 In practice, however, Holmes
was not particularly concerned about distinguishing the legal traditions of each
sovereign. In Mahon, he does allude to one tradition peculiar to Pennsylvania:
the treatment of support rights as a separate estate in land. '*' But he
considers other principles-public nuisance, personal safety, and so
on-without regard to Pennsylvania precedent. '
This rift between theory and practice perfectly parallels Holmes's position
on federal general common law. Holmes, anticipating Erie, famously argued
that there could be no federal general common law.'" At the same time,
however, Holmes continued to create law under that rubric as a Supreme Court
Justice, issuing some of his most criticized opinions. 2
The confusion caused by the failure to reconcile the theory and practice
of identifying law with a particular sovereign is even greater in federal
constitutional property law than in private law. For it would seem that some
of the principles developed over time in elaborating federal constitutional
property law would be federal principles, applicable regardless of the particular
jurisdiction at issue, whereas principles developed in elaborating primary
private law might be specific to particular jurisdictions. But where is the
dividing line between those two sets of principles? Holmes seems to suggest
that the result in Mahon might have been different if Pennsylvania did not treat
support rights as a separate estate in land, just as he suggests that the result in
407. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
408. There is no reason in principle not to get even more local. If a large city or county vith
substantial lawmaking power over a wide variety of issues develops a body of law. %%hy could %%c not begin
to identify principles within that body? This is analogous to the problem of geographic scope faced by
those who seek to ground constitutional property standards in community norms See Carol M Rose.
Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE l.J. 1121, 1145-46 (1996) (reviewing FIsCIf~t.L supra note 23)
(noting that reliance on "normal behavior" raises issue of size of community %,hosc bchaior %ill be
considered normal).
409. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393. 414 (1922)
410. See id. at 393.
411. See Black & White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi Co.. 276 U.S. 518. 533 (1928) tHolmes.
J., dissenting); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205. 218 (1917) (Holmes. J. dissenting); Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (Holmes. J.. dissentng).
412. Holmes's federal common law cases include, most notoriously. Balimore & Ohio Railroad v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), and United Zinc & Chemical Co. %- Brat. 258 U.S. 268 (1922) G Edward
White discusses these cases and their relationship to Holmes's proclaimed rejection of federal general
common law in WHrrE, supra note 295. at 381-90.
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Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.4 1 3 might have been different if Pennsylvania had
not previously recognized party-wall easements for neighboring landowners.
The implication seems to be that the constitutional constraints on the
Pennsylvania legislature may be different from those on another state's
legislature. Does this mean that a state that traditionally had a strict law of
trespass might be subject to a per se takings rule for permanent physical
occupations, whereas a state that traditionally treated trespass more flexibly
might not be? Holmes never addresses this issue directly. He seems to assume
that, although the legal traditions of the states are independent in theory and
occasionally different in small details, they are largely parallel in fact, all
drawing from one Anglo-American legal tradition. A greater sensitivity to
differences in legal traditions among particular jurisdictions, however, may
raise both theoretical and practical problems with developing a federal
constitutional property jurisprudence.
A third issue is the practical and psychological feasibility of the Holmesian
inquiry within the constraints of actual litigation: Do judges have the time and
inclination to consider all of the relevant "structural habits" in a body of law
and sufficient detachment not to be swayed by their own views of the
desirability of the particular policy in question? Many have criticized the
Supreme Court, along with other courts, for practicing "law office" history,
whether due to bias or time constraints that necessitate reliance on parties'
briefs and cursory independent inquiries." 4 Of particular relevance to this
Article, a number of scholars have argued that the Court has relied on the
mistaken historical assumption that land-use regulation was uncommon in
colonial and early American times and began to expand only at the end of the
nineteenth century.415 In addition, Jeremy Paul has argued that psychological
pressures on judges might make it difficult to implement a model of takings
depending on an assessment of change from preexisting law. Paul contends
that a judge will find it difficult to determine the preexisting law uninfluenced
by the fiscal consequences of her decision about whether compensation is
416necessary for a challenged statute.4,
The fourth issue of feasibility relates directly to the Holmesian project of
specification. In constitutional property law as in the law of negligence,
Holmes imagined, broad, imprecise standards would eventually be replaced by
more specific, predictable rules.417 Holmes recognized that this project would
413. 260 U.S. 22 (1922). I discuss Jackman above. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39, 179-80.
414. See, e.g., CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); Alfred
H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119; William M. Wiecek, Clio
as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1988).
415. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1287-93 (1996); William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State
Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061 (1994).
416. See Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1425 (1991).
417. See supra text accompanying notes 231-36.
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be threatened by rapid legal and societal change, but he believed that change,
though inevitable, occurred slowly. One of the most astonishing statements in
The Common Law, to modem eyes, is that "the standards for a very large part
of human conduct do not vary from century to century. ' "" Can we believe
this anymore? Holmes was content with juxtaposing cases that stood thirty-six
years apart from each other.41 9 Each reader is invited to develop her own list
of the social changes that have occurred in the last thirty-six years. I will
content myself with a single observation of some relevance to contemporary
takings issues. The only definition of "environmentalist" in my copy of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language is
someone who "views environment rather than heredity as the important factor
in the development of the individual or a group. Most English speakers
would now understand that word to have a different primary meaning. The
environmental movement has significantly affected the cultural and legal
understanding of property. Could we trust a decision of thirty-six years ago to
provide a window on the same world as a decision of today ?' 2' Holmes's
answer in areas of rapid change was to leave the question to the jury, which
would express "the existing average standards of the community.""- Perhaps
those who advocate formalizing the use of community standards in
constitutional property law, such as Robert Ellickson,"2 ' followed most
recently by William Fischel4 2 are the true modem heirs of the Holmesian
tradition.
2. Desirability
Even if the Holmesian project is feasible, is it the right project to graft
onto the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? The issues that this question raises
conveniently divide into issues of scope and issues of approach.
418. 3 HOLMES, The Common Law, in CO.L.ECTEDr WORKS. supra note 24. at 109. 179
419. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112 (1911) ("It will serve as a datum on this
side, that in our opinion the statute before us [in 1911 ] is well within the State's constitutional power, while
the use of the public credit on a large scale ... has been held (in 18751 to be beyond the line.")
420. WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTnONARY 760 (1971).
421. Many observers expressed skepticism about Justice Stevens's attempt to distinguish Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.&
470 (1987). Perhaps a key factor was a shift in attitude that Stevens noted but did not rely on formally
After graphically describing the effects of subsidence caused by coal mining. Stevens comments: "In short.
[coal mine subsidence] presents the type of environmental concern that has been the focus of so much
federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades." Id. at 475. A Holmesian reading of this comment
might be that basic attitudes, as reflected in numerous incremental changes in positive law, have shifted
enough "in recent decades" that a ban on coal mine subsidence is no longer the kind of radical jolt it was
in 1922.
422. 3 HOLMES, The Common Law, in COLLECTrD WORKS. supra note 24. at 109. 179.
423. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants. Nuisance Rules. and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHi. L. REv. 681 (1973); Robert C. Ellickson. Suburban Growth Controls: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
424. See FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 351-55.
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Two issues of scope seem to be most important. First, shouldn't we read
the Takings Clause to apply only to physical dispossession and the Due
Process Clause to be concerned only with matters of procedure? William
Michael Treanor is only the most recent of a series of scholars to have
adduced considerable evidence indicating that the Takings Clause was
originally meant to apply only to physical appropriation of land and goods.425
Undoubtedly, the prohibition on uncompensated appropriations was in some
sense motivated by the "benevolent yearning ' 426 that government should not
"forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." '427 But so, for that matter,
was the Third Amendment.428 Yet no one has seriously argued that the tenure
protections associated with rent control violate the Third Amendment on the
ground that the government is forcing landlords to quarter in time of peace
people who, in terms of the burdens they visit on landlords, might as well be
soldiers. Contrary to Justice Scalia's argument in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council,429 "meaningful enforce[ment]" of the Takings Clause's
"protection against physical appropriations of private property,,430 hardly
necessitates a jurisprudence of regulatory takings. Regulations may do some
bad things that look quite similar to the bad things caused by physical
appropriations, but the Takings Clause is not a limit on bad things.
Judges and scholars, however, have rarely been able to resist the
temptation to read broader protections of property into the Constitution,
whether the chosen textual hook is the Contract Clause, the Due Process
Clause, or the Takings Clause. Even Treanor, after establishing that the
Takings Clause originally applied only to physical appropriations, ends up
arguing that the Takings Clause should be applied to protect discrete and
insular minorities from harms caused by political process failures, such as the
harms caused to racial minorities by placing hazardous waste dumps in or near
their neighborhoods-harms that hardly fit within the category of "physical
appropriation. 43' It appears that courts will continue to read the Constitution
to authorize broader protections of property.
The second issue of scope concerns limiting the reach of "property" if
physical appropriation is not to be the exclusive focus. The Holmesian project
focuses on changes in positive law and does not appear to be clearly limited
to one subset of those changes. But very few people would agree that all
425. See Treanor, supra note 12, at 785-97.
426. 3 HOLMES, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 24, at 371, 373
(characterizing maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas").
427. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
428. U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
429. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
430. Id. at 1014.
431. See Treanor, supra note 12, at 872-78.
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changes in positive law implicate property rights. Consider, for example, a law
that bans previously allowed musical performances in public parks, or one that
raises the minimum age for drinking from eighteen to twenty-one. Do these
changes affect property rights? If not, how do we define that portion of
positive law that is concerned with property, once we agree that takings are not
limited to physical appropriation?. 3 2 The relevant Holmesian comments do
not suggest an easy answer to this question. Consider two passages from
Holmes opinions, both written in 1921, the year before Mahon was decided.
On the one hand, when confronted with the labor injunction statute struck
down in Truax v. Corrigan,433 Holmes argued in dissent:
By calling a business "property" you make it seem like land, and lead
up to the conclusion that a statute cannot substantially cut down the
advantages of ownership existing before the statute was passed. An
established business no doubt may have pecuniary value and
commonly is protected by law against various unjustified injuries. But
you cannot give it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing. It is
a course of conduct and like other conduct is subject to substantial
modification according to time and circumstances both in itself and
in regard to what shall justify doing it a harm.4s
On the other hand, when confronted with the wartime rent control and tenure
protections upheld in Block v. Hirsh,435 Holmes wrote for the Court:
The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give rigidity to
our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others less
concretely clothed. But the notion that the former are exempt from the
legislative modification required from time to time in civilized life is
contradicted not only by the doctrine of eminent domain, under which
what is taken is paid for, but by that of the police power in its proper
sense, under which property rights may be cut down, and to that
extent taken, without pay.
436
These are marvelous samples of Holmesian rhetoric, but they hardly suggest
a coherent theory for determining which "modifications of courses of conduct,"
a description that encompasses all of positive law, should be treated as
property subject to legislative alteration but within limits. One possibility is to
look once again to the legal tradition of the jurisdiction in question: If we are
432. One school of thought suggests that the category of "property- has disintcgratcd-that %%c can
no longer speak meaningfully of "property rights" as a distinct category of legal rights. See. e g.. Grey.
supra note 265, at 69, 73 ("It seems fair to conclude from a glance at the range of current usages that the
specialists who design and manipulate the legal structures of the advanced capitalist economics could easily
do so without using the term 'property' at all.").
433. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
434. Id. at 342-43 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
435. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
436. Id at 155.
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considering a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute, how does Pennsylvania law
develop distinctions between property rights and other rights? That approach,
however, seems to leave what is supposed to be federal law in a completely
fragmented state.
The second group of issues of desirability concerns the basic approach to
the protection of property. The basic value underlying Holmes's approach is
continuity. In Holmes's view, because law and society are always in flux,
settled expectations can never be completely protected. In most cases, a court
must allow legislatures to destroy those expectations. When a court intercedes
to protect property, however, it intercedes to protect against
discontinuities--changes in positive law that cannot be justified or explained
in evolutionary terms.
That is an important view of the role of property, but certainly not the only
one. One might, for example, see property as inextricably connected to a whole
range of substantive moral values, of which continuity is only one. The
problem with continuity is that it equally preserves the wicked and the good.
Although preservation of the wicked might be justified to avoid the greater
evils produced by radical discontinuity, on a larger moral view that is not a
matter that can be decided in advance once and for all. This issue, however,
was not a pressing one for Holmes, the convinced amoralist.
Alternatively, one may conclude that property rights, as well as all sorts
of other rights, are adequately protected by the pluralist political process so
long as that process is not stacked against "discrete and insular
minorities." '437 On that view, the Takings Clause should be invoked whenever
a judge finds a sufficiently grave defect in the political process affecting
property rights, but not otherwise. Holmes undoubtedly would have scoffed at
the idea that a well-oiled democratic process would lead to a fair distribution
of resources, or even that fair distribution was or could be the goal underlying
the constitutional protection of property, but we might think otherwise.
The choice of a Holmesian framework is partly or wholly independent of
other choices about the constitutional protection of property. The most
fundamental question about constitutional protection might seem to be: How
much leeway does the Constitution leave legislatures? Choosing between
historical and ahistorical models of property protection does not answer this
question. Justices Brandeis and Brennan have championed "permissive"
versions of the ahistorical model, while Justice Sutherland and others in the
substantive due process tradition have promoted relatively "restrictive"
versions. Justice Holmes developed a rather permissive version of the historical
model, relative to the Supreme Court's attitude of his day. Justice Scalia has
437. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The seminal scholarly
work advancing such a theory of constitutional interpretation is, of course, John Hart Ely's. See ELY, supra
note 101. For applications of process theory to the Takings Clause, see FISCHEL, supra note 23, at 100-40;
Treanor, supra note 12, at 855-87.
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sometimes appeared to be developing a rather restrictive version, relative to
more recent Supreme Court attitudes.43 The choice of a Holmesian approach
is undoubtedly also, to some degree, independent of a commitment to the
reasons Holmes himself formulated. One does not need to be a moral skeptic,
for example, to find merit in Holmes's method of recognizing and protecting
expectations. Yet, in spite of the fact that Holmes's approach neither
determines particular results in particular cases nor flows from one particular
set of beliefs about the nature of property and law, it is worthy of
consideration as an attempt to provide a coherent theory of constitutional
property protection.
III. CONCLUSION
Justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon has been
simultaneously acclaimed as the seminal case in the law of "regulatory
takings" and blamed for the doctrinal confusion in that area. Both the
commendations and the accusations, however, have been largely misplaced.
Mahon was not the "first regulatory takings case." It was not decided under the
Takings Clause. It was not the first case to hold that the Constitution protected
nonphysical property or property as value. And it was not the first case to hold
that a use restriction might be constitutional if and only if accompanied by just
compensation. Its supposed status as the progenitor of all regulatory takings
cases is the result of erroneous genealogy.
On the other hand, Justice Holmes's opinion in Mahon does not deserve
all of the blame it has attracted. Holmes had worked out a theory of
constitutional property that was far more sophisticated than a mere "diminution
in value" or "balancing" test. He decided that the "property" the Constitution
protected was the set of advantages that an owner could count on the state to
enforce as existing positive law. The Constitution did not protect the owner
against every change in law. Change was a fact of life, and no one assumed
that all change would be accompanied by compensation. The Constitution did,
however, protect the owner against radical, discontinuous alterations. These
degrees of change were not measured solely, or even primarily, by the
yardstick of economic value. Rather, change was measured as deviation from
fundamental principles, or structural habits, embedded in the organized body
of standing positive law.
438. A direct comparison between Holmes and Scalia would not necessarily result in Scalia being
branded the more ardent defender of property rights. Remember that Holmes appeared ready to stike down
rent control during peacetime, see Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair. 264 U.S. 543. 548-49 (1924). whereas
Scalia has suggested that peacetime rent control is, on the whole, fine, although "tenant hardship
provisions" are not, see Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1988) (Scalia. I., concurrng in
part and dissenting in part). Of course, from a Holmesian perspective, one might argue that Justice Scalia's
position is actually the more conservative one, since rent control gradually became a more established and
accepted practice of our legal culture between 1924 and 1988.
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The story of Mahon's reputation and interpretation is a case study in legal
evolution, selective borrowing, and amnesia. After the 1937 constitutional
revolution, Mahon was the best case upon which to rebuild a constitutional
property discourse. It was rediscovered-and to some extent reinvented-as the
"foundation of regulatory jurisprudence." But in order to serve that role, a
number of its features had to be ignored or misunderstood, and they were. One
result is that American law does have a jurisprudence of regulatory takings,
supported in part by the existence of Mahon, a Supreme Court case written by
the great Lochner dissenter that affirmed the existence of constitutional
protections for property. Another result is that the jurisprudence is confused,
at least in part because a thin reading of Mahon was necessary to make it pass
as a Takings Clause case with rules of decision fit for modern consumption.
This left courts with very little framework within which to decide
constitutional property rights cases.
Understanding Justice Holmes's theory in Mahon is important for at least
three reasons. First, it sets the historical record straight. Second, it helps us see
the range of choices to be made in constructing a theory of constitutional
property, especially revealing the connections between theories of
constitutional property and basic issues of jurisprudence. Finally, it makes clear
the theoretical choices that one of the most important judges and legal thinkers
in the United States made, thus providing a model that may be useful as courts
and scholars continue to ponder the issue of the constitutional protection of
property rights.
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